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ABSTRACT
Many American mainline Protestant denominations discriminate against gays and
lesbians or have discriminated against them in recent history by denying ordination to
“self-avowed practicing homosexuals.” This dissertation analyzes such ordination
policies and their enforcement in ecclesial courts in three denominations, the United
Methodist Church, the Presbyterian Church (USA), and the Evangelical Lutheran Church
in America. Moving from a theoretical framework that integrates Michel Foucault’s
theories of discourse and subjectivity with Christian body theology, this dissertation
argues that the language of the “self-avowed practicing homosexual” discursively
produces a homosexual subject that does violence to gays and lesbians in these churches.
The rhetoric of homosexual practice functions in a way that condemns the
homosexual person even as it claims to condemn only homosexual acts. The language of
avowal intervenes in the coming out experience of gays and lesbians by placing one’s
coming out in the context of the prohibition of homosexual practice (and personhood).
Coming out, then, is an admission of guilt that defines the homosexual as incompatible
with ordained ministry and the Christian faith. By placing gays and lesbians in this
situation, the rhetoric of the “self-avowed practicing homosexual” is no more than a selffulfilling prophecy: it produces the homosexual subject that it claims merely to identify,
thereby creating the terms under which gays and lesbians are found culpable.
viii

CHAPTER ONE
SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND ORDINATION IN
AMERICAN MAINLINE PROTESTANTISM
“I know that, by telling the truth about myself,” Irene “Beth” Stroud told her
congregation in her coming out sermon, “I risk losing my credentials as an ordained
minister.”1
Beth Stroud was ordained in the United Methodist Church (UMC) in 1997. She
came out to her bishop in March 2003 as a lesbian in a covenanted relationship with
another woman, and preached her coming out sermon shortly thereafter at First United
Methodist Church Germantown in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
She preached on peace. In John’s Gospel, Jesus appeared to the disciples after his
crucifixion. They had locked themselves in a room, hidden themselves from the world,
for fear of how their own people would perceive them. Jesus’ message was brief and
powerful: “Peace be with you.” Stroud spoke of the peace that she found by finally
embracing her sexuality, but also recognized that peace cannot be confused with
complacency. After all, the disciples did not stay in that locked room forever. Inner
peace compelled Stroud to be true to herself not just privately, or with her congregation,

1

Irene Elizabeth Stroud, “Walking in the Light”, April 27, 2003.
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but in every aspect of her public life. Such authenticity, however, came with risk, and so
she acknowledged that coming out could jeopardize her ordination.
She was right. That summer, her bishop initiated a complaint process, charging
Stroud with “practices declared by the United Methodist Church to be incompatible with
Christian teaching.”2 What followed was a juridical rollercoaster: first, a trial by jury
convicted her of the charges; then an appellate court overturned the verdict; and, finally,
the highest court of the UMC reversed the appeal decision and defrocked Beth Stroud in
October 2005, two and a half years after she initially came out to her bishop.
Beth Stroud is a self-avowed practicing homosexual, and, in the eyes of the UMC,
this fact makes her incompatible with Christian teaching and unfit for ordination.
She is not alone.
Many gay and lesbian ordination candidates and clergy in other mainline
Protestant denominations have also experienced the weight of church discipline due to
their sexual orientation. Even in denominations that have changed their ordination
policies in recent years to allow openly gay clergy, many gays and lesbians in those
denominations have had much of their adult lives shaped by their churches’ years of
refusal to recognize their calls to ordained ministry.
Take, for example, Bradley Schmeling. He was ordained in the Evangelical
Lutheran Church in America (ELCA) in November 1989 and defrocked by the
denomination’s highest judicial body in July 2007 for being in a relationship with another

2

The Book of Discipline of the United Methodist Church, 2008 (Nashville, TN: United Methodist
Publishing House, 2008), ¶ 2702b.
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man. At the time, the ELCA considered his relationship status “conduct incompatible
with the character of the ministerial office.”3 In 2009, the ELCA overturned that policy,
allowing gays and lesbians in “publicly accountable, lifelong, monogamous same-gender
relationships”4 to be ordained. As a result, Schmeling was reinstated to the roster of
clergy in 2010. He now serves his congregation, St. John’s Lutheran Church in Atlanta,
Georgia, without fear of ecclesial discipline, but up until now, he had lived under the
reality that if he ever chose to act on his sexual orientation—if he decided to “practice”
his sexuality—he would likely be charged and tried by his church.
It is hard to know the toll that such a predicament takes on a person. It is as
though the ELCA demanded of Schmeling that he constantly choose between being gay
and being an ordained minister. For him, this was an impossible choice. As he said to his
congregation the Sunday following his defrocking, “Twenty-two years ago I started
seminary and, as many of you probably understand, my identity has been bound up in my
call to serve the church.”5 He could not walk away from his call any more than he could
stop being gay.
And there is Lisa Larges, who entered the ordination process in the Presbyterian
Church (USA) [PC (USA)] in 1985. At that time, homosexual behavior disqualified a
person from becoming ordained in the PC (USA). After completing seminary, she

3

ELCA Church Council, Definitions and Guidelines for Discipline, 1993, b.4. The practice of
homosexuality is no longer considered conduct incompatible with the ministerial office, which is reflected
in the revised version of the Definitions and Guidelines. See ELCA Church Council, Definitions and
Guidelines for Discipline, 2010.
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ELCA Church Council, Candidacy Manual (Chicago: Office of the Secretary of the ELCA, 2010), 17.
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Bradley Schmeling, “Sermon, Sixth Sunday after Pentecost”, July 8, 2007.
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informed her ordination committee that she was a lesbian, and, because she did so, she
went back and forth through her denomination’s judicial system. The ordination
committee continued with her ordination process, until the highest court of the PC (USA)
stopped the process in a ruling issued in 1992. She sought ordination again more than ten
years later, this time in a different presbytery. As before, the presbytery agreed to
proceed with her candidacy. But, also as before, a church court blocked her candidacy
for ordination because of her status as a lesbian in a 2009 decision.
The PC (USA) removed its policy banning self-acknowledged practicing
homosexuals from ordination in June 2011, meaning Larges’ pursuit of her call to
ordained ministry will likely enter a new phase very soon. What cannot be undone,
however, is that for twenty-six years Larges was denied ordination because of her sexual
orientation.
These are but a few stories of openly gay and lesbian men and women within
mainline Protestantism in America today who are struggling or have struggled to follow
their calls to ordained ministry while simultaneously living openly and honestly about
their sexualities. It is a struggle because, in seeking to serve the body of Christ, their own
bodies have become a place of ecclesial adjudication, a place where their denominations
have exercised a power that is both homophobic and heterosexist. Any power exercised
out of fear and prejudice is sure to inflict harm, and this is certainly the case with
Protestant policies about homosexuality. Indeed, the policies studied here are violent for
how they perpetuate the fear and suspicion—both externalized and internalized—of gays
and lesbians.

5
My dissertation investigates this violence. To do so, I examine the policies and
court proceedings of three American mainline Protestant denominations—the UMC,
ELCA, and PC (USA)6—that force or did force gays and lesbians to choose between
public authenticity and ordained ministry. My project, therefore, is a textual analysis,
examining both the vocabulary employed to exclude gays and lesbians from ordination
and how that vocabulary is interpreted and enforced in ecclesial judicial processes. I
focus on ordination policies because the hearings that result from them prosecute a gay or
lesbian person or, in some cases, the church that ordains or installs that person.
Furthermore, hearings that concern the ordination of homosexuals—whether it is the
homosexual individual or the congregation being tried—focus intently on the status and
sexual expression of the homosexual in question.
Another important issue in the movement for gay rights is same-sex marriage. To
be sure, same-sex marriage is a crucial issue and is linked to homosexual ordination in
that the current marriage policies of many mainline Protestant churches are also a form of
discrimination against gays and lesbians. In this project, though, I address same-sex
marriage only as it relates to ordination policies (i.e. the heterosexual definition of
marriage is used to label any homosexual sexual activity as sinful because it cannot take
place within a church-sanctioned marriage). As with the ordination policies, same-sex
marriage has become of subject of judicial discipline—with one key difference. The

6

Another major mainline Protestant denomination that could be discussed in this dissertation is the
Episcopal Church. However, a study of the Episcopal Church would necessarily include a global
dimension, as the Anglican Communion is currently facing potential schism over the issue of
homosexuality. The focus of my dissertation centers on the religious attitudes toward homosexuality in
American mainline Protestantism. While such global dialogue is important, it is beyond the scope of this
project.
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court trials resulting from the performance of a same-sex marriage ceremony prosecute
the clergyperson performing a same-sex marriage—gay or straight—and not the two
people getting married. The trials certainly relate to the rhetoric of the self-avowed
practicing homosexual—as in ordination policies, the foundation of the ban on same-sex
marriage is the condemnation of homosexual practice—but they do not adjudicate the
exact language found in the ordination policies, and so do not focus on the moral status of
homosexuality and homosexual “practice” in the same way. While it is an important
topic of investigation and related to my own, it does not receive extended treatment in
this dissertation.
My analysis of policies banning self-avowed practicing homosexuals from
ordination shows that the overt exclusion of gays and lesbians from ordained ministry is
not the only way these policies harm gays and lesbians in the church. This is because the
language of these policies and its enforcement in church courts do more than simply
identify a category of homosexual persons who are ineligible for ordained ministry. This
rhetoric also produces a homosexual subject, a particular conception of what
homosexuality is and who the homosexual is. This assertion is based on the conviction
that the discourse on homosexuality taking place in these churches is more than the sum
of its parts. To say this differently, the cumulative effect of these policies and their
deployment in church courts goes beyond the intentions of the denominations that
adopted them and, quite likely, many of the persons who lobbied for them.
As I will argue, the homosexual subject created by Protestant discourse about the
self-avowed practicing homosexual is founded on a dichotomy of being and acting,

7
where the very fact that one identifies as a homosexual forecloses any possible acceptable
expression of one’s sexuality. And yet, at the same time, the rhetoric also conflates
homosexual identity with homosexual conduct, so that identifying as a homosexual also
associates one with the “practice” that is prohibited. This conflation becomes apparent in
the court decisions that adjudicate these ordination policies. It is a catch-22, one that is
made worse by the fact that the language of “self-avowal” asks gay and lesbian
clergypersons to define themselves in relationship to it. When gay and lesbian clergy and
ordination candidates come out to their denominations, it is always contextualized by the
prohibition of homosexual practice. Avowing that one is a homosexual becomes a
confession, an admission of guilt in the eyes of one’s church.
These policies do real violence to gays and lesbians because this homophobic
conception of the homosexual infects how others perceive them and sometimes—and
most tragically—how gays and lesbians perceive themselves.7 Thus, the lives of gays
and lesbians are harmed because their sexual subjectivity is entangled in an oppressive
understanding of homosexuality. Subjectivity, as Ronald Long defines it, is “the product
of learning to think and handle the self in terms of the societal practices and
conceptualities of the culture in which a person lives.”8 Even for gays and lesbians who

7

Melissa M. Wilcox notes that this internalizing of oppression is rooted in cognitive dissonance, where
Christian identity and queer identity seem mutually exclusive. The result sometimes is that the individual
suppresses any trace of queer identity to ease the dissonance. See Wilcox, Coming Out in Christianity:
Religion, Identity, and Community (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2003), 153f. For another
good discussion of the nature of internalized oppression, see Leanne McCall Tigert, Coming Out Through
Fire: Surviving the Trauma of Homophobia (Cleveland, OH: United Church Press, 1999).
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Ronald E. Long, “The Sacrality of Male Beauty and Homosex: A Neglected Factor in the Understanding
of Contemporary Gay Reality,” in Que(e)rying Religion: A Critical Anthology, ed. Gary David Comstock
and Susan E. Henking (New York: Continuum, 1997), 268.
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reject negative perceptions of homosexuality, the presence of this homosexual subject in
church discourse is a factor in their daily lives. The gay or lesbian self, in other words, is
always forced to confront and grapple with the homosexual subject of Protestant
discourse.
In analyzing the discourse surrounding gay and lesbian ordination, my project
brings together postmodern theories of gender and sexuality and Christian sexual ethics.
The former provides insight into how discourse forms our understanding of categories
like sex and sexuality and a critique of theories that assume these categories are natural,
where “natural” connotes changelessness or fixedness. Within Christian sexual ethics, I
draw on theories of embodiment and sexual justice not only to form (alongside
postmodern theory) my analysis but also to facilitate the progression from analysis to
constructive proposal. The integration of these two bodies of literature forms the
questions I bring to the texts considered in this dissertation. These questions, fourfold,
serve as investigative starting points: 1) What assumptions about human sexuality and/or
homosexuality are behind the language in question? 2) What sort of homosexual subject
do these texts discursively produce? 3) How do they impact the lives of gays and
lesbians within these churches? And 4) do they also create possibilities for renewal and
revision regarding the Christian tradition’s treatment of homosexuality?
I should also include a brief word about terminology. LGBT (lesbian, gay,
bisexual, transgender) is a common acronym used today, and it highlights the importance
of coalition building as part of the pursuit of justice, as well as the need for community in
one’s life. It is an important designation, but one that I seldom use in this dissertation.

9
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The ordination policies studied here deal specifically and only with homosexuality.

They do not address bisexuality or transgenderism, and so I do not speak at length about
them in my analysis. This is not to say that bisexuality and transgenderism are somehow
less important, nor is it to suggest that there are no connections between homosexuality,
bisexuality, and transgenderism. Neither of these are the case. But the strength of any
analysis is tied to its level of specificity. To use terminology that is broader than the
subject being analyzed would only obfuscate my conclusions. Therefore, I refer only to
gay men and lesbians throughout my dissertation.
A Brief Note on Historical Context
Before describing the language and documents that comprise the subject of my
analysis, it is important to note that these texts have been produced in an interesting
convergence of events. The second half of the twentieth century witnessed the merging
of churches from similar Protestant traditions into larger denominational bodies. The
three denominations studied in this dissertation all came into existence during that time.
The UMC began in 1968 with the union of the Evangelical United Brethren Church and
the Methodist Church. Two Presbyterian denominations, the Presbyterian Church in the
United States and the United Presbyterian Church in the United States of America,
merged in 1983 to form the PC (USA). The ELCA began in 1988, bringing together the
American Lutheran Church, the Association of Evangelical Lutheran Churches, and the

9

Only one ecclesial court ruling from these three denominations, that I am aware of, deals with a person
who is transgender, and I am not aware of a case that addresses bisexuality. In a case concerning an elder in
the UMC who underwent a gender change, the UMC Judicial Council did not address whether gender
change is a chargeable offense under church law. That issue, the council claimed, was not before the court.
See UMC Judicial Council Decision 1074 (2007).
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Lutheran Church in America. When these mergers took place, the new denominations
drafted the official documents outlining the policies and guidelines that govern them.
Also during this period, gays and lesbians in the United States were coming out in
large numbers and beginning to identify publicly as homosexuals. Prior to the late
1960s/early 1970s, the precursor to the gay rights movement, the homophile movement,
had been gaining momentum and organizing nationally, but its emphasis was more on
social support and internal professional networking, less on political organization or
social visibility. The Stonewall Riots of June 1969 changed all that. When New York
police officers raided the Stonewall Inn, a gay bar in Greenwich Village, the patrons
resisted and rioted in the streets. The episode made headlines and mobilized the gay
community across the country. Activism became the crux of the modern gay rights
movement, and coming out became not just a significant personal milestone, but a
political act as well.10
The increasing visibility of gays and lesbians soon impacted mainline
Protestantism, as clergy and seminarians challenged their denominations by publicly
coming out and continuing to practice or pursue ordained ministry.11 Such public gay and

10

I am obviously painting the narrative of gay and lesbian organizations in broad strokes. This basic
storyline of Stonewall as the start of the modern gay rights movement is found in numerous works by gay
historians, most notably the groundbreaking history by John D’Emilio, Sexual Politics, Sexual
Communities: the Making of a Homosexual Minority in the United States, 1940-1970, 2nd ed. (Chicago:
University of Chicago Press, 1998). It should be pointed out, though, that other historians argue that the
earlier homophile movement was more politically active than previously thought. See, for example, Martin
Meeker, “Behind the Mask of Respectability: Reconsidering the Mattachine Society and Male Homophile
Practice, 1950s and 1960s,” Journal of the History of Homosexuality 10 (January 2001): 78-116.
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For example, a United Methodist minister, F. Gene Leggett, came out to his colleagues at the Southwest
Texas United Methodist Annual Conference in 1971. When the conference voted to suspend him from
ordained ministry, the Gay Liberation Front, an organization founded in the wake of the Stonewall riots,
rallied outside the conference to protest the vote. See “Homosexual Minister Is Ousted By Southwest
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lesbian activism compelled the three denominations that occupy this study to begin or
revamp a dialogue about homosexuality and the Christian tradition while they were also
developing their governing documents and denominational identities.
The convergence of these three denominational formations with a burgeoning
discourse about the moral and legal status of homosexuality gives the tenor of this
discourse a contextual importance for my project. Beginning in the early 1970s,
discussions of homosexuality and treatment of homosexuals shifted from a position of
intolerance to one of tolerance. The 1973 decision of the American Psychiatric
Association to remove homosexuality from its list of mental disorders is a good example.
This decision stopped the pathologization of homosexuality but did not provide an
explicit affirmation of it. National political dialogue began to parallel this decision.
While antigay rhetoric still circulated at the time and still exists today, it is less common
for people to publicly describe gays and lesbians as sick or deviant, and persecution or
hate crimes against homosexuals are condemned by most public figures. In short, a shift
in discourse occurred that, on the one hand, did not grant homosexual relationships social
and legal validation but, on the other hand, made it more difficult—or at least politically
incorrect—to publicly censure or condemn homosexuals qua homosexuals.
In many ways, the stances on homosexuality that emerged from the UMC, the PC
(USA), and the ELCA reflect this attitude. These denominations have not condemned
homosexuality as a sexual orientation per se, and each, in fact, has passed resolutions
condemning the harassment of gays and lesbians. They have, however, passed

Texas Methodists,” New York Times, June 3, 1971. Leggett's ordeal is discussed at more length in chapter
four.
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resolutions that condemn the “practice” of homosexuality. This stance has led to
prohibitions against clergy or ordination candidates who openly identify as “practicing
homosexuals.” Thus, the UMC, PC (USA), and ELCA occupy or recently occupied a
tenuous middle ground in the debate about homosexuality, a straddle-the-fence position.
These churches are places where—supposedly—it is not sinful to be gay, only to act gay.
“Practice” and “Avowal” as Linguistic Axes of the Analysis
The language of homosexual practice is one of the foci of my analysis. It is found
in each of the policies studied here. The UMC is perhaps clearest in its policy, stating,
“self-avowed practicing homosexuals are not to be certified as candidates, ordained as
ministers, or appointed to serve in The United Methodist Church.”12 The ELCA policy,
which was overturned at the 2009 Churchwide Assembly (the national gathering of the
church), was also very direct. In its Definitions and Guidelines for Discipline of
Ordained Ministers the ELCA stipulated: “Practicing homosexual persons are precluded
from the ordained ministry of this church.”13 The PC (USA) arrived at the same
prohibition by a less direct route. In 1997, the church officially banned practicing
homosexuals from ministry by adding section G-6.0106b to its Constitution. This section
was removed from the Constitution in 2011. It read:
Those who are called to office in the church are to lead a life in obedience to
Scripture and in conformity to the historic confessional standards of the church.
Among these standards is the requirement to live either in fidelity within the
covenant of marriage between a man and a woman, or chastity in singleness.
Persons refusing to repent of any self-acknowledged practice which the

12

2008 Book of Discipline, ¶ 304.3.

13

Definitions and Guidelines for Discipline, 1993, b.4.
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confessions call sin shall not be ordained and/or installed as deacons, elders, or
ministers of the Word and Sacrament.14
Here, the denomination’s heterosexual definition of marriage was used to deny
gay and lesbian clergy and ordinands any legitimate sexual expression. To
remain ordained or get ordained, they must either be “unpracticing” or repent
from such “practice.”
This vocabulary of sexual “practice” has a taxonomic force, whereby the
“practicing homosexual” is labeled as sinful, incompatible, or unacceptable. What
constitutes practice in the eyes of these denominations is more difficult to determine than
one would imagine. It is easy to assume that “practice” refers to sexual activity. In fact,
all three denominations either explicitly define it this way or strongly suggest such a
definition. By that understanding, a clergyperson could date or begin a relationship with
someone of the same sex as long as sexual activity was not involved. Technically
speaking, she or he would not be a “practicing homosexual.” But it is difficult to imagine
any of these three denominations permitting such same-sex romance. “Practice,” then,
proves to be a category more nebulous than one would expect. This taxonomy is
rendered even more ambiguous because the church documents never explicitly state
whether “non-practicing homosexuals” are entirely compatible with Christian teaching or
qualified for ordained ministry.
What is not ambiguous, though, is that the creation of the category of the
“practicing homosexual” enabled these denominations to submit gay and lesbian clergy

14

The Constitution of the Presbyterian Church (USA), Part II: Book of Order, 2009-2011 (Louisville, KY:
The Office of the General Assembly, 2009), G-6.0106b.
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to their respective court systems. Homosexual practice—whatever that means—became
a chargeable offense and the subject of judicial discipline.
Another focus of my analysis is on the language of avowal. Denominations have
used this language to signify that the “practicing homosexual” cannot be prosecuted—or,
at least, not be found guilty of wrongdoing—unless she or he has confessed or come out
to an official in the denomination. On this point, the wording varies somewhat from one
denomination to the next. The UMC uses the language of avowal, stating “self-avowed
practicing homosexuals are not to be certified as candidates, ordained as ministers, or
appointed to serve in The United Methodist Church.”15 The PC (USA) used the phrase
“self-acknowledged” instead of “self-avowed” (see above quotation). These phrases
function very similarly. “Self-avowed” is a stronger phrase than “self-acknowledge”; it
suggests an unprompted assertion, whereas “self-acknowledge” admits the possibility of
the claim being elicited by someone or something. Both, though, place emphasis on the
individual willingly identifying as a practicing homosexual. The ELCA used different
language. Before the actions of the 2009 Churchwide Assembly, one of its standards for
ordination was that clergy “who are homosexual in their self-understanding are expected
to abstain from homosexual sexual relationships.”16 “Self-understanding” does not have
the same connotation as “self-acknowledgement” or “self-avowal.” It refers to one
identifying oneself as homosexual, but does not necessarily refer to the confession of
homosexual practice. It does, however, stress the individual’s role in confirming one’s

15

2008 Book of Discipline, ¶ 304.3.

16

ELCA Church Council, Vision and Expectations: Ordained Ministers, 2005, 13.
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sexual identity, for a person could not be prosecuted for being homosexual in someone
else’s understanding. Furthermore, the discussion of this policy in the ELCA judicial
process suggests that coerced disclosure of homosexual practice or outside accusations
against a clergyperson would not be admissible as evidence.17 Thus, while the three
phrases used by these denominations are not identical, referring to these phrases
collectively as the language of “avowal” is justified because the effects of these three
phrases are largely the same: judicial proceedings against a “practicing” gay or lesbian
minister are usually only initiated after the disclosure of homosexual practice by the
minister in question.
It should be noted that the language of avowal is, perhaps, rooted in a desire to
avoid accusations against clergy and ordinands. This not only prevents something like a
gay witch-hunt from taking place but also implies that ecclesial trials are never meant to
determine whether someone is a homosexual. But this very fact reinforces the
homosexual closet in powerful ways. It pressures homosexual clergy to keep silent about
their relationships or their sexual orientation all together and creates an atmosphere where
only heterosexuality is granted visibility. As Melissa Wilcox stated in her sociological
study of LGBT religious communities, in most mainline Protestant denominations, “the
best homosexual is one who is publicly indistinguishable from (single) heterosexuals.”18
Furthermore, for those gay and lesbian clergy who disclose their sexual
orientation and agree to remain celibate or “nonpracticing,” we must ask if identifying as
17
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a homosexual does not also generate a deep-rooted suspicion by others about one’s
private conduct. The ambiguity of sexual practice lends itself to intense speculation
about whether an openly gay individual is indeed “non-practicing.” To what extent is
practice simply assumed? If there is any merit to this question, then it becomes clear that
the homosexual subject constructed by this language is a person who is either open also
about sexual practice, and, thus, vulnerable to ecclesial prosecution and discipline, or
silent about sexual practice, and, thus, dishonest and inauthentic.
The language of practice and avowal forms the axes around which my analysis
moves. But the documents containing this language are, in many ways, only the
beginning. The language provides a legal basis for discipline, and the ecclesial courts are
the places where that discipline occurs and takes shape. The courts of these
denominations are charged with interpreting official teachings and guidelines, and so
words like “practice” and “avowal” find their meaning and power in the interpreting
authority of the courts. The body of legal documents—court decisions, trial transcripts,
and written statements—that emerges from these judicial processes produce a discourse
on polity, theology, and sexuality that enforces heterosexist ordination policies through
the defrocking of practicing gay and lesbian clergy, while simultaneously providing a
space for gay and lesbian clergy to voice their resistance to the same policies.
For gays and lesbians called to ordained ministry in these denominations, this
language has made it difficult to live authentically as a sexual person. By analyzing the
language and showing its harmful, even violent, effects, I hope to contribute a critique of
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ecclesial language on homosexuality that will help bring about sexual and social justice
for gays and lesbians within these denominations, the church universal, and society.
Theoretical and Ethical Starting Points
As mentioned above, the lens of my analysis integrates postmodern theories on
sexuality and gender with Christian sexual ethics. I will review this literature in detail in
chapters two and three before proceeding to an analysis of homosexual “practice” in
chapter four and “avowal” in chapter five, but here it is necessary to introduce several
theoretical concepts and ethical convictions that undergird my project.
Theoretical concept 1: Sexuality has a history. Michel Foucault asserted in his
seminal work, History of Sexuality, Vol. 1, that sexuality is “not to be thought of as a
natural given,” but rather as “a name that can be given to a historical construct.”19
Sexuality is inseparable from the contingencies of human history and the fallibility of the
human condition, and, thus, has historical origins and has changed over time. This
concept is fundamental in any discussion of sexuality, but it is often overlooked or simply
paid lip service. Ergo, its implications are not fully appreciated.
Kathy Rudy has noted how uninformed historical understandings of sexuality (or
lack thereof) can lead to heterosexist policies in the church. She states that at the root of
discriminatory policies is the assumption that homosexuality is transhistorical, i.e.
homosexuality as a concept and as a phenomenon has a coherent and stable existence
across history. This perspective accepts as self-evident that “we all know exactly what
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homosexuality is and can identify it both in today’s milieu and throughout history.” The
20

result is that mainline Protestants on both sides of the issue accept that the word
“homosexuality” refers to the same thing today as it did in the biblical world. The fact
that the word itself is an English translation of the original Greek, or that the word was
first used only in the mid-nineteenth century is irrelevant.
Rudy finds this assumption spurious and harmful, and I agree. It does not account
for how same-sex sexual activity has carried many different meanings throughout history.
I contend, though, that there is a deeper assumption at work in mainline Protestant
debates about sexuality that reveals the importance of understanding sexuality as a
historical concept. The transhistorical understanding of homosexuality becomes
particularly potent when considered alongside a larger assumption, that heterosexuality is
ahistorical. According to this view, heterosexuality is transhistorical—it exists as a
stable and coherent reality within history—but, more importantly, it is also ahistorical—it
exists above or outside of history as the relational pattern ordained and created by God.
To remove heterosexuality from the reaches of historical inquiry and analysis sets it as
the thing against which other sexualities are compared. Therefore, if a form of sexual
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expression, orientation, or desire does not conform to heterosexuality, it is labeled sinful
and a byproduct of the Fall.
The Fall is a crucial theological category, because many evaluations of nonheterosexual sex rely on the distinction between a prelapsarian and postlapsarian human
condition. The most important moment of the history of Christian theology concerning
this distinction is, perhaps, Augustine’s assertion that Adam and Eve would still have
engaged in sexual activity had the Fall not occurred. Several earlier theologians had
claimed that the command to “be fruitful and multiply” would have been fulfilled
somehow without sexual intercourse; it was interpreted spiritually, not carnally.
Augustine disagreed, claiming that male-female intercourse was a part of God’s intended
created order, and would have occurred concupiscence-free if not for the original sin of
Adam and Eve.21 The theological implication of Augustine’s view is that, while Adam
and Eve certainly existed within history (indeed, they are responsible for one of the
definitive moments within a Christian narrative of history), God’s plan for heterosexual
intercourse did not. Thus, some claim, heterosexuality is not subject to historical
development or criticism, while other sexualities are.
Much contemporary Christian theology, then, treats heterosexuality as an
ahistorical expression of God’s intention for humanity, and not as a historically rooted
concept. The prohibitions against gay and lesbian ordination result from this
21
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heterocentrist theology, the effects of which are summarized by Lisa Larges in her
written objection to the PC (USA)’s ordination policy: “It [the ordination policy] raises
one category of persons, heterosexual persons, above all others and thereby makes an idol
of heterosexuality.”22
Theoretical concept 2: Reality is constructed, in part, by discourse. Many
postmodern scholars have asserted that language and texts have enormous influence on
our lives, both individually and socially. This influence comes from the belief that we do
not know ourselves or the world around us as they are naturally or essentially, but that
our self-understanding and our understanding of the world is conditioned by social and
cultural factors. This social construction of reality is heavily reliant upon discourse, for,
when we speak, we do not do so in a vacuum. Rather, we rely on an already-established
discourse that makes what we say intelligible to those who hear us. In this way,
discourse delimits how we interpret and communicate. Language, however, has a
creative function as well. We often do not merely repeat what already exists in discourse,
but repeat it with a difference. We imbue our language with values, meanings, and
associations that expand or alter the values, meanings, and associations we inherit. In
this way, our language not only describes a thing but also contributes to its formation or
construction. Thus, Michel Foucault insists that discourses must be treated “as practices
that systematically form the objects of which they speak.”23
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Judith Butler articulates this idea concisely in a discussion of the impact of
discourse on the human body: “there is no reference to a pure body which is not at the
same time a further formation of that body.”24 Thus, the social construction of the body
means that our bodies are not simply our personal property or the vessels of a sacrosanct
agency. Our bodies have a social existence that is interpellated to a large degree—some
say entirely—by discourse.
Discourse, therefore, is an incredibly productive, creative phenomenon. It also
goes hand-in-hand with my first theoretical starting point, because discursive processes
are also historical and sexuality is also formed by discourse. The origins and
development of the terms homosexual and heterosexual in the mid- to late-nineteenth
century are a good example of how these two concepts are intertwined. These terms were
initially used within various scientific disciplines to study and diagnose sexual behaviors
in order to better understand what was “normal” and “abnormal.” Fields like medicine
and psychology, for example, generated a massive amount of literature about sexual
behaviors and predispositions. The important thing to note is that, while over time the
terms homosexual and heterosexual came to represent two opposing eroticisms defined
by the sex/gender of the object of one’s desire, this is not always what they meant. The
term homosexual predates heterosexual, and was used to describe different behaviors,
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desires, or predispositions that were considered perverse. As a result, the term
heterosexuality was developed to describe a universal, human sexual predisposition from
which some persons deviated. Neither term initially referred to what we think of today as
a sexual identity or orientation. However, over the later decades of the nineteenth
century and earlier decades of the twentieth century, the categories of homo- and heterosexual became so widely used, they formed a binary of same-sex and other-sex eroticism
that encompassed everyone. You were one or the other. As the terms took on a more
popular usage, the normalizing impulse that inspired their invention stayed with them.25
Why mention this here? Because it highlights the role that discourse plays in
shaping our perceptions of those around us. By inventing the terms homosexual and
heterosexual, labeling the former abnormal and the latter normal, and by using these
terms as the ultimate heuristic for understanding human sexual desire, scientific discourse
gave heterosexism a new legitimacy and staying power. In fact, one scholar particularly
important in my analytical method, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick, considers the
homosexual/heterosexual binary one of the most defining narrative structures of the
twentieth (and now twenty-first) century.26 This narrative does not simply describe some
natural or innate and universal aspect of humanity, but, rather, constructs a certain way of
perceiving different sexual behaviors and desires that did not previously exist.
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For the purposes of this dissertation, then, I ask how the ecclesial and theological
language about homosexuality participates in this already-established narrative of
homo/hetero sexualities. My argument is not that ecclesial discourse fundamentally
alters that narrative. Rather, at a time when many in American society are challenging
the social meanings inherent in the homo/hetero narrative (i.e. the abnormality of
homosexuality and normality of heterosexuality), these church policies reify those social
meanings not by labeling homosexuals themselves as deviant or abnormal, but by
classifying homosexual practice as incompatible with Christianity, and, thus, refusing
gays and lesbians many forms of public affirmation or validation that these churches
extend to heterosexuals. This process mandates that being a homosexual must be
discussed and evaluated separately from acting homosexual. It thereby creates a
homosexual subject defined by a bifurcated sexual existence.
There is another aspect of the role of discourse in shaping our realities that is
useful not just for critique but also for offering a constructive alternative. Foucault writes
on the inherent instability of discursive power: “Discourse transmits and produces power;
it reinforces it, but also undermines and exposes it, renders it fragile and makes it
possible to thwart.”27 When mainline Protestant discourse describes and creates such a
bifurcated homosexual subject, it draws attention to itself, the harm it inflicts, and, most
importantly, to the gays and lesbians defying that invented subject with the integrity and
faithfulness of their own lives. The policies that ban or banned gays and lesbians from
ordained ministry gave gays and lesbians a space to focus their resistance to their
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churches’ prejudices. The fact that the policies in the ELCA and PC (USA) have been
overturned is evidence of this fact.
Ethical conviction 1: a Christian sexual ethics must be based on an embodied
understanding of the human person. Since the publication of James Nelson’s
Embodiment: An Approach to Sexuality and Christian Theology in 1978, many Christian
theologians and ethicists have drawn on embodiment theories to reevaluate the Christian
tradition’s basic view of human sexuality as a hindrance to Christian discipleship.
Nelson argued that that view is steeped in dualisms that place mind over body and spirit
over flesh. In this system, reason and philosophical abstraction are superior to emotions
and bodily sensation. Embodiment theory seeks to eliminate that dualism by integrating
theoretical knowledge with bodily knowledge. Nelson asks: “What does our experience
as sexual human beings mean for the way in which we understand and attempt to live out
the faith?”28 The western notion of self typically refers to an independent faculty of
cognition—e.g. Descartes’ “Cogito ergo sum”—but Nelson insists we are more than that,
we are bodyselves. Bodily experiences influence how we think and how we know, just
as theoretical speculation can shape how we interpret our experiences. The hierarchy of
mind over body, then, is not only epistemologically shallow, but simply not true to
human experience.
Therefore, theological theorizing does not reverberate only in the abstract. The
transcendent is not also ethereal. It does not exist in some vacuous realm of spirit. The
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transcendent echoes in the body, and, thus, sex and sexuality connect us to the
transcendent. Applying this to my topic, it becomes clear that theological and ethical
claims about the practice of homosexuality have very real, very bodily consequences. If
we do not take those consequences into account, then we deny ourselves the bodily
knowledge that is essential for forming our moral knowledge. Furthermore, the most
important source for this dissertation is not a philosophical or ethical theory, but the
witness of gay and lesbian clergy and ordinands who experience the effects of these
denominations’ heterosexist policies. Their stories inspire my project, but, more than
that, my project would be empty without them. Embodiment theories highlight the
necessity of listening to the individuals touched by the injustice of anti-gay policies.
Ethical conviction 2: a Christian sexual ethics must be motivated by a vision of
social and sexual justice. Sexuality has often been ignored by theories of justice because
it is bracketed off as a private matter, and, thus, not something that should be affected by
legislative processes or public dialogue in general. The work of Beverly Wildung
Harrison has revealed the falsehood of this assumption,29 and others have written about
sexuality as a sphere of justice. Marvin Ellison, for example, combines social ethics with
the methods of modern liberation theologies to produce a powerful premise:
“Injustice…distorts the humanly good desire for intimate connection and remolds it as a
perverted desire for possession and control.”30 He convincingly phrases sexuality as a
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justice issue, and argues that sexism and homophobia must be eradicated for justice to
exist for sexually marginalized and disempowered groups.
Justice, then, becomes the thing by which the fruitfulness of my other theoretical
and ethical starting points is measured. Do they aid the work of justice? Do they
contribute to the eradication of sexual prejudices that oppress the lives of gays and
lesbians in the church today? I believe they can and do. If we are to build a more just
church and society, we must first understand the complex systems of injustice that exist.
To the extent that these starting points aid us in this endeavor, they are indispensable in
the work of justice. And so, by using them as the foundation for my analysis, I hope to
reveal the ways that discourse in American mainline Protestantism about homosexuality
commits violence against gays and lesbians by making their bodies a site where ecclesial,
disciplinary power is exercised unjustly.
Incompatible Subjects: A (Hetero)Sexual Theology of Contradictions
“Incompatible” has a straightforward meaning in most of the policies studied in
this dissertation, but, in reality, it is a double entendre. On the one hand, the word
describes how many mainline Protestant churches understand homosexuality in relation
to Christianity and ordained ministry. While it is true that these denominations only
qualify the practice of homosexuality as incompatible, it raises the question: can a
person’s sexuality be compatible with the Christian tradition if the genuine expression of
that sexuality is inherently incompatible? I do not believe so. Incompatible, then, is the
epithet imposed by the implications of this language on gay and lesbian personhood in
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toto. It is more than a description of certain acts or expressions, it is an entry point to a
theological anthropology within which gays and lesbians occupy an abject position.
On the other hand, “incompatible” also describes how this homosexual definition
fits into the overall sexual theologies of these mainline Protestant denominations. They
describe sexuality as a “good gift” from God or as “created good for expressing love and
generating life, for mutual companionship and pleasure.”31 But how can this be the case
for gays and lesbians if their denomination’s policies foreclose any expression of that
gift? For these churches to claim that sexuality is good but that the expression of
homosexuality is bad forces on gays and lesbians the plight of Tantalus, experiencing an
eros that is always present yet unfulfillable.
More and more gay and lesbian clergy name this situation unjust and oppressive
and have refused to abandon their callings to ordained ministry, and the fact that the
ELCA and PC (USA) now allow “practicing” gays and lesbians to be ordained is a
testament to their resolve. Their lives have challenged the heterosexism in their churches
and have drawn attention to the contradictory nature of this double entendre. But, for
now, the policies remain active in the UMC and other churches not addressed here, and
gays and lesbians are defined as incompatible with the Christian faith within these
denominations. This dissertation shows how such policies are, in actuality, self-fulfilling
prophecies, creating the incompatible subjects they claim merely to identify. Exposing
and critiquing the effects of these policies will, hopefully, hasten their repeal and make
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way for denominational policies about homosexuality that are consistent with the
understanding of human sexuality as a good gift to all persons.

CHAPTER TWO
MICHEL FOUCAULT:
THE PRODUCTION OF SUBJECTS / THE CREATION OF SELVES
We are told from a very early age not to let words hurt us. I recall saying often as
a child, “Sticks and stones may break my bones, but words will never hurt me.” That is,
words will never hurt me emotionally (of course, we grow up and realize that that is not
true). But what about our bodies? Can words hurt them as well? This question is
crucial, for I claim in this dissertation that the language of the “self-avowed practicing
homosexual” creates the homosexual subject it claims merely to identify, and that the
subject created does violence to the lives and bodies of gays and lesbians in the church
and society. How can language have such an effect? How is it that something like a ban
on the ordination of “self-avowed practicing” homosexuals can harm the sexual
subjectivity of gays and lesbians?
In one sense, the answer to this question is obvious: the language works through
prohibition. It excludes certain actions from the realm of moral goodness and certain
persons from positions of authority in the church. This level of operation is important
and will play a significant role in my analysis. Equally important, though, is a second
way the language functions. The ban on practicing gay and lesbian clergy also operates
by constituting, to a certain extent, the homosexual subject about which it makes a moral
judgment. This claim, of course, begs questions about the relationship between language,
29
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identity, and the body. While all the complexities of this relationship cannot be explored
in this dissertation, the most salient features of it can be delineated in a distinction
between different understandings of the self that I will refer to as the “self” and the
“subject” for the sake of simplicity.1
The “self” as I use the term here, going at least as far back as Descartes’ cogito, is
best understood philosophically as a conscious being that can think and act independently
from external influences and discover truths about the world around her or him. This
notion of self correlates with an understanding of reality as objective in nature—we study
and learn about what and how things are—and an understanding of language as
descriptive in nature—we use language only as a communicative tool. The center of this
system is the human mind in all its autonomy and, perhaps above all else, the mind’s
ability to achieve certainty of knowledge.2 The “subject,” however, is a strong departure
from the self, a departure that begins with a different understanding of reality, power, and
language. Whereas the self uses language to describe reality in an (presumably) objective
fashion, the subject is always already immersed in a world created by language
(Heidegger and then Derrida) and power relations (Foucault). Language, therefore, is not
a descriptive phenomenon, but a force that structures the world we live in. Language
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creates subjects, and subjects can only speak within the discursive systems they inhabit.3
A stark reversal has taken place in the shift from self to subject: the self is an author of
language; the subject is the product of language, a vehicle through which language
speaks.
To be sure, this shift is tenuous. Debating the merits and demerits of these
positions has been and remains a fundamental question for contemporary scholars.
Critics of the “self” argue that its detached objectivity is not only naïve, but benefits those
in society who inhabit spaces of social privilege, for their interpretations of reality are the
ones accepted as true. Critics of the “subject” claim that this approach denies or severely
limits the agency of individuals either through the determinative force of a universal,
semiotic system (as posited by structuralism) or the infinite regression that results from
dismantling such a system (as is often the case with deconstruction and
poststructuralism).
It is in the context of this debate that I turn to the main scholar influencing my
methodology, Michel Foucault. Foucault’s career spanned many of the developments in
the ideas of the selfhood and subjectivity, and his corpus contains a gradual blending of
these concepts. However, both his disciples and his detractors often overlook the breadth
of his corpus, mostly because scholars who have utilized his works often focus on one
moment in his career. For example, any scholar who utilizes Foucault’s articulation of
power will draw from his nascent thoughts on this subject in Discipline and Punish
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(1975), as well as his fuller elaboration of it in The History of Sexuality, Volume 1: An
Introduction (1976, hereafter, The History of Sexuality). This focus is certainly
appropriate, but Foucault’s ideas of power are rooted in a particular era of his life and
give only a snapshot (albeit a crucial one) of his intellectual strategies and priorities. Or a
scholar researching the history of medicine will focus on one of his earlier works, like
The Birth of the Clinic (1963). In each scenario, the broad development of Foucault’s
thought is neglected in favor of foregrounding the idea or subject matter that is most
important for one’s project. Such a synchronic approach is, perhaps, justifiable.
Foucault’s corpus is difficult to synthesize, especially since there are several moments in
Foucault’s career where he seems to reject or significantly alter his previous positions.
Nevertheless, a brief survey of Foucault’s career is an important undertaking for
this dissertation, for it will flesh out the complicated relationship between institutional
discourse and sexual subjectivity. My project analyzes discourse, but will only be
successful if I can show how this discourse harms the lives of gays and lesbians in church
and society. I must demonstrate that language has real and substantive effects on bodies
and bodily experiences. While it is tempting to synchronically isolate Foucault’s The
History of Sexuality, since sexuality is the subject of the discourse in question, to do so
would limit the scope of my analysis. Taking Foucault’s entire career into account, we
see that he moved from a focus on discourse that almost completely neglected the body to
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an emphasis on bodies and bodily practices. This movement combines the concepts of
5

the self and the subject that had emerged in continental philosophy. Foucault stressed in
much of his work the view that individuals are subjects6 immersed in and produced by
discourse. Never abandoning this theoretical position, Foucault began to emphasize that
the individual is also a self, not transcendent in nature, but able to reflect on the condition
of his/her existence and reshape it. Subjectivity, in other words, does not foreclose
agency. If there is an overall point in this methodological movement, it is that we must
first comprehend the ways in which power operating through discourse has made us
unwilling subjects if we are to fashion a meaningful existence for ourselves.
The following discussion of Foucault’s methodology lays the groundwork for
describing specific aspects of his analyses that I will utilize in my dissertation. I will
highlight two aspects of Foucault’s theoretical repertoire that are crucial for analyzing the
language of “practice” and “avowal” in mainline Protestantism. These are the
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disciplinary process that Foucault calls individualization, and the role that he assigns to
Christian confession in the development of Western sexual subjectivity.
I will also describe how two other theorists have utilized and expanded Foucault’s
theories in ways that have important implications for my dissertation, namely Eve
Kosofsky Sedgwick and Judith Butler. These scholars are indispensable for a
postmodern analysis of sexual discourse and, while a separate chapter (or dissertation)
could be written for each, my treatment of them here is restricted to how their works
relate to Foucault’s and how they influence my own analysis.
I will conclude this chapter with a critique of Foucault that will segue into chapter
three. Foucault’s position at the end of his life is in need of an important critique if it is
to play a significant role in a Christian ethical analysis. His discussion of the
independent subject is invested with an ethical position that the individual strive for
personal liberation. Highly individualistic, this ethic lacks a form of accountability to
any sort of community, and shows the degree to which Foucault’s “subject” was
distinctly male and socially mobile. Foucault’s ethics, then, needs an anchor. I suggest
that theologies of embodiment provide such a mooring for Christian ethics: they dovetail
with Foucault’s later works in their focus on bodily realities, but are accountable to the
Christian community. This convergence of Foucaultian and embodiment theories is the
subject of chapter three.
Archaeology and Genealogy: From Discourse to the Body
If one were forced to place Foucault’s corpus under one umbrella category, one
might say Foucault’s works are concerned with the production of knowledge. How does
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something come to be thought of as an object of knowledge, or acclaimed as “true”?
Over the course of his life, he approached this question from different perspectives, but
one can trace a trajectory in his thinking that moved from an abstract, discursive view of
knowledge and truth, to one grounded in the body and the self. This movement is an
important framework for my dissertation, for it reveals both the role of discourse in
shaping sexual identity and subjectivity and the role of individuals qua agents in
interacting with, responding to, and challenging those discourses. These two things,
however, seldom exist without tension, and Foucault’s works are no exception. In some
of his earlier works, discourse drowns out any serious consideration of the body and
materiality. In his later works, however, the discursive and the bodily exist in Foucault’s
works as interlocutors, and each is given voice by one of his two major methodologies,
archaeology and genealogy, respectively. Foucault began his career exploring the limits
of archaeological method and emphasized the role of discourse seemingly to the neglect
of the body and the self. He employed it in three of his works from the 1960s—Madness
and Civilization (1961), The Birth of the Clinic, and The Order of Things (1966).
Foucault offered his fullest—and, at times, most convoluted—explication of the role of
discourse in the production of knowledge and truth in modern society in his work, The
Archaeology of Knowledge (1969).
The Archaeology of Knowledge was Foucault’s attempt to describe
comprehensively the method employed in his earlier works. The book expatiates how
archaeological method approaches and analyzes discourse. The reason for this discursive
emphasis is that Foucault, influenced by structuralism (though he eschews this influence
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by using the term archaeology), believes that discourse plays a preeminent role in the
formation of knowledge. There are, of course, various ways to understand the role of
discourse in this formation. Positivism stresses that knowledge is formed through a
process of rational discourse determined by the subject matter, i.e. the object structures
the field of knowledge studying it. One critic of positivism, Jürgen Habermas, argues
that knowledge is structured by the interests of those producing the knowledge, rather
than the object being studied.7 Here, then, the social and political context of the subjects
shapes what counts as legitimate knowledge. In The Archaeology of Knowledge,
Foucault rejects both of these positions, disavowing any role to both objects and subjects
of knowledge.
To explain Foucault’s puzzling position, it is important to understand how he
describes discourse. Recognizing that discourse is an incredibly “polymorphous”
phenomenon, Foucault seeks to outline what brings unity to different discourses and what
does not. Or, more accurately, he wants to show that many notions about what unifies
discourse are false.8 Within this context, he stresses that the objects of knowledge cannot
provide any unity or structure to discourse and the formation of knowledge. Discursive
unity emerges from a system of relations established between institutions, social and
economic processes, systems of norms, etc., and “these relations are not present in the
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object.” Indeed, to begin with objects as prediscursive things, and ascribing to them a
fixed or stable identity that influences the formation of discourse, is backwards. Rather,
Foucault is concerned “to substitute for the enigmatic treasure of ‘things’ anterior to
discourse, the regular formation of objects that emerge only in discourse.”10 Here,
Foucault makes clear the productive potential of discourse. Discourses do not merely
represent or describe the objects of which they speak. They “systematically form the
objects of which they speak.”11
He makes a similar claim about subjects. While it is true that discourse requires
speakers, Foucault has no confidence in the unity or coherence of the thinking, speaking
subject. The subject cannot serve as the locus for discourse, seeing as how it is
comprised of such a complex system of relations. One cannot look to a prediscursive
subject bringing intelligibility or authority to a system of discourse. Foucault writes,
“discourse is not the majestically unfolding manifestation of a thinking, knowing,
speaking subject, but, on the contrary, a totality, in which the dispersion of the subject
and his discontinuity with himself may be determined.”12 Foucault’s analysis in The
Archaeology of Knowledge operates, in other words, “without reference to a cogito” and
thereby purges itself of all “anthropologism.”13
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Having undermined the role of both the speaking subject and objects of
knowledge, he insists that the production of knowledge must be understood through an
analysis that treats discourse as an autonomous phenomenon. The main concept Foucault
uses to describe this autonomy is “exteriority.” Exteriority is a methodological
assumption that Foucault hopes will allow him “to restore statements to their pure
dispersion,”14 i.e. the assumption that discourse can and should be separated from any
context that the authors of discourse or the objects of which discourse speaks may
provide. Stepping outside of discourse reveals, Foucault claims, that there is no inside in
the first place.
What is the purpose of this perplexing claim that discourse is a series of events
that must be analyzed in a vacuum? Foucault believes that doing so will reveal a theme
of discontinuity in discourse that has remained hidden. The very things that have
imposed a sense of continuity on the history of discourse are the notions that discourse
emerges from the transcendental cogito of the speaking subject or the transcendental
nature of the object being spoken about. Exteriority sets these things aside to observe
discontinuities, ruptures, breaks, mutations, and transformations occurring in discourse.
Thus, Foucault’s archaeological project, though clearly structuralist in some of its
assumptions, is also deconstructive; his basic aim is to initiate “a decentering that leaves
no privilege to any centre.”15
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To be sure, there are benefits to Foucault’s archaeological analysis. The unities
that traditional historical narratives purport, when studied from an archaeological
perspective, become fictions; archaeology reveals this by isolating and defamiliarizing
the discourses that we have accepted as true.16 When used constructively—which
Foucault does concern himself with in The Archaeology of Knowledge—this process can
open a space for new perspectives to emerge.
However, The Archaeology of Knowledge is inadequate as a methodology
because of a flaw in the internal logic of the work. If archaeology requires the
disappearance of the subject in order to analyze discourse as an autonomous
phenomenon, then it also requires the disappearance of the author. That is, archaeology
must be anonymous, for reference to an author can provide the same false unity to
discourse as reference to a subject. This fact draws attention to something fairly obvious:
archaeology is itself an example of discourse, and the detachment that Foucault claims as
a necessary component of archaeological analysis is not entirely possible. Foucault
himself seemed ambivalent at times in The Archaeology of Knowledge about how truly
autonomous language is. At points, his equivocation becomes obvious, as when he
claims that discourse “is treated not as the result or trace of something else, but as a
practical domain that is autonomous (although dependent), and which can be described at
its own level (although it must be articulated on something other than itself).”17 The
parenthetical statements are telling.
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This criticism leads to another. Foucault’s form of analysis is simply not
sufficient for a project rooted in normative ethics. Archaeology as described in The
Archaeology of Knowledge amounts to a discursive reductionism, where nondiscursive
realities are described and given meaning only by the network of discursive relations of
which they are a part. In discussing medical discourse, for example, he names
nondiscursive practices (the touching finger, the observing eye), but then suggests that
they become intelligible or coherent only because they are used by clinical discourse.18
In other words, physical, bodily practices and realities are only intelligible and analyzable
as they become appropriated by discourse. An ethical analysis must concern itself with
bodily realities and offering suggestions for improving those realities. Archaeology by
itself cannot achieve this goal.
The strength of Foucault as a scholar is perhaps his recognition of these
limitations, which came almost immediately. In his inaugural lecture at the Collège de
France in 1970, The Discourse on Language, Foucault had already shifted the way he
would speak about discourse. This lecture is often under-analyzed by scholars, however.
Hubert Dreyfus and Paul Rainbow, for example, suggest that Foucault went into a “selfimposed silence” following the publication of The Archaeology of Knowledge due to the
flaws that became apparent in that work.19 Their suggestion treats his lectures as items
that can be glossed over by scholars in favor of his book-length publications. What
Foucault changes about his archaeological analysis in The Discourse on Language is his
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view of the autonomy of discourse. His hypothesis in that lecture is that “in every society
the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organized and redistributed
according to a certain number of procedures.”20 Key here is that Foucault is connecting
discourse to a society. No longer is it completely decontextualized; discourse relates to
the particular societies where they occur, and this relationship has some role in
controlling, selecting, organizing, and redistributing them.
Since his earlier insistence on discourse’s autonomy led him to reject so
thoroughly the importance of the subject in discourse analysis, it is no surprise that
Foucault re-introduces the subject in The Discourse on Language. He does this
somewhat cryptically through a discussion of the will to knowledge. The will to
knowledge is a basic desire to know, to discover truth—a desire that imposes certain
limitations on what can be said or accepted as legitimate, and, therefore, the will to
knowledge acts as a system of exclusion. While this will to knowledge is not easy to
pinpoint and seems intangible—he described it during his first course as “anonymous and
polymorphous”21—it is, nevertheless, a will. While this is a far cry from the treatment of
practices of the self that Foucault turns to at the end of his career, it is the beginning of an
important shift. As Foucault scholar Eric Paras explains:
This move engendered two deformations in the archaeological perspective. It
placed historical and geographical limits on what had seemed to be a
metahistorical—and hence universally applicable—approach to knowledge.
And…it put nondiscursive aspects of knowledge production…squarely on the
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research agenda. Discourse was no longer to be treated, even provisionally, in its
autonomy.22
Foucault’s notion of archaeology still centered on an exploration of the discontinuities of
history and discourse, and the systems of exclusion created by discourse, but he now also
made room for materiality, albeit a discursively dominated form of materiality that he
called “incorporeal materialism.”23
Foucault’s transition away from the notion of autonomous discourse moved
further with his publication of an essay titled “Nietzsche, Genealogy, History” (1971).
Here, Foucault introduces genealogy, originally used by Friedrich Nietzsche in works
like On the Genealogy of Morals, as an important methodological tool. Beginning with
this essay, Foucault is laying the groundwork for his treatment of bodies in his two larger
works from the 1970s, Discipline and Punish and The History of Sexuality. This essay
continues the archaeological themes of discontinuity and the understanding of discourse
as a series of events, but incorporates the method of genealogy in a way that has
significant consequences for Foucault’s understanding of the body.
Part of Nietzsche’s genealogical method dealt with a critical delving into the past,
a reaching down into human history in order “to demonstrate that the past actively exists
in the present, that it continues secretly to animate the present, having imposed a
predetermined form to all its vicissitudes.”24 Nietzsche’s word for this was Herkunft,
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which Foucault maintains is best understood as descent. Foucault believes this
genealogical imperative of descent leads inevitably to the body. Descent, he claims,
“attaches itself to the body”; it reveals that the body is not something that remains
untouched by history, but bears its marks and is comprised of past events:
The body—and everything that touches it: diet, climate, and soil—is the domain
of the Herkunft. The body manifests the stigmata of past experience and also
gives rise to desires, failings, and errors….The body is the inscribed surface of
events (traced by language and dissolved by ideas), the locus of a dissociated Self
(adopting the illusion of a substantial unity), and a volume in perpetual
disintegration. Genealogy, as an analysis of descent, is thus situated within the
articulation of the body and history. Its task is to expose a body totally imprinted
by history and the process of history’s destruction of the body.25
This passage about the body was not possible in The Archaeology of Knowledge, because
Foucault in that work was unwilling to admit any active role for the body. To be sure, the
body is discussed in the above quotation primarily as a passive object, receiving the
imprint of past events, but it is also active in that it “gives rise” to certain things.
Foucault emphasizes this minor, active role of the body at the end of his career, but here
he mentions it only peripherally. The body’s passivity, as we shall see, is also
emphasized in Discipline and Punish and The History of Sexuality, but the mere
suggestion that the body is not only the passive recipient of a series of discursive events,
but also an active agent, is a departure from Foucault’s treatment of the subject and
nondiscursive objects in The Archaeology of Knowledge.
Foucault also draws on Nietzsche’s assertion that genealogy aims at producing
wirkliche Historie or “effective history.” Effective history differs from traditional history
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in that its founding assumption is that there are no constants, whereas traditional history
posits a natural development in history or narrative of unfolding progress. By rejecting
this, effective history continues archaeology’s emphasis on discontinuity. This, too, has
consequences for the body, for the assumed unity of history is essentially a confidence in
the unity and transcendence of the Western “man.” Therefore, when this unity is
troubled, it reverberates in the individual:
History becomes “effective” to the degree that it introduces discontinuity into our
very being—as it divides our emotions, dramatizes our instincts, multiplies our
body and sets it against itself. “Effective” history deprives the self of the
reassuring stability of life and nature…26
As is now clear, genealogy shares many of the goals or assumptions of archaeology, but,
in method, genealogy delves into the material world in a way archaeology does not. For
this reason, genealogy allows for a consideration of strategies, and the genealogist is able
to hold and actively move toward practical objectives. In fact, this is the point of
genealogy. Genealogy, Foucault claims, “allows us to establish a historical knowledge of
struggles and to make use of this knowledge tactically today.”27 Effective history is an
examination of the past with an eye toward changing the present.
Genealogy also leads Foucault to a subject that received little explicit attention in
his previous works: power. Archaeology’s detached analysis and its assertion that
discourse is autonomous seemed to isolate Foucault from a serious discussion of power.
With the modern subject disappearing behind the functions of discourse, Foucault’s early
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description of archaeology ignored or at least greatly minimized the idea that power
influences what subjects think, say, and do. The influence of Nietzschean genealogy
changed that.
Foucault credited Nietzschean genealogy with establishing a philosophy of power
that was neither rooted in nor tied to political theory.28 Nietzsche opened the door for
thinking about power outside of the usual scheme of one party ruling over another, and he
accomplished this largely through his adoption of what is now called a hermeneutic of
suspicion. Nietzsche believed that we place labels on power relations that make them
seem something other than what they are, and reserve the label of power for only one
exercise of power—the exercise that creates domination.29 Following Nietzsche by
rejecting this definition of power as something only always negative, Foucault argues that
power is present in all forms of relations; it is ubiquitous.
He began to develop this theory in his courses at the Collège de France in the
early 1970s and integrated it into his work Discipline and Punish. There, Foucault argues
for the omnipresence of power:
This means that these [power] relations go right down into the depths of society,
that they are not localized in the relations between the state and its citizens or on
the frontier between classes and that they do not merely reproduce, at the level of
individuals, bodies, gestures and behaviour, the general form of law or
government….Lastly, they are not univocal; they define innumerable points of
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confrontation, focuses of instability, each of which has its own risks of conflict, of
struggles, and of an at least temporary inversion of the power-relations.30
The negative definition of power—associated with domination—is not adequate because
power exists everywhere, whether domination is present or not. Furthermore, the
negative definition of power wrongly suggests that for liberation to be achieved, power
must simply be removed or overthrown. Foucault rejects this idea, insisting that, while
power can repress, it can also produce at the same time. This is the basis for Foucault’s
formulation of power/knowledge, “that power produces knowledge…that power and
knowledge directly imply one another; that there is no power relation without the
correlative constitution of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not presuppose and
constitute at the same time power relations.”31
The theory of power that emerges from Foucault’s newfound emphasis on
genealogy alters how he discusses discourse in relation to the body and the human
subject. Whereas his works from the 1960s, culminating in The Archaeology of
Knowledge, emphasized discourse to the exclusion of the body, his works throughout
most of the 1970s incorporate the body more directly. In his two major works from this
period, Discipline and Punish and The History of Sexuality, Foucault holds the body at
arm’s length. That is, Foucault discusses how power operating through discourse affects
the body and the subject, but does not suggest any significant possibilities of individual
bodies or subjects exercising power. He discusses the body and the subject more in these

30

Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York:
Pantheon Books, 1977), 27.

31

Ibid.

47
works because of his use of genealogy and the development of his theory of power, but
he mostly denies an active role to the body and the subjects despite these methodological
tools.
Discipline and Punish is a study of the development of penal systems in the west,
and Foucault uses the word “discipline” to describe a particularly modern form of
regulatory technologies. He notes that around the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
torture faded as an acceptable form of criminal punishment because the utility of it was
no longer clear. As societies moved toward participatory government (Foucault
especially has in mind post-revolutionary France), there was a shift in emphasis from the
people as subjects of an absolute sovereign to citizens of a republican society. In the
former, punishment was useful in that it subjugated criminals to the authority of the
sovereign, restoring the proper order of society. In the wake of the political
developments of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, however, the individual became
a citizen whose responsibility it was to contribute to society, the economy, and, to a lesser
degree, governance. Punishment was apt for producing obedient subjects, but not
responsible, fruitful citizens. Penal systems changed as a result, and began emphasizing
ways to transform criminals into good citizens (both in terms of obedience and economic
productivity), and reinsert them into the social body to produce a better society.32 The
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modern prison was born as the place for such reforms to occur. Foucault refers to the
technologies developed to actualize these reforms as discipline.
Discipline reveals a power that operates through various strategies and
technologies (both of which occur on a corporeal level, i.e. not on the level of detached
discourse) as well as through a heightened discourse about the criminal and criminality.
These discursive modalities of power are employed on the body and have effects on the
body. Bodies were trained and brought under observation and control in a way that made
them docile. A docile body is one that “may be subjected, used, transformed and
improved,” with the ultimate goal being to establish “in the body the constricting link
between an increased aptitude and an increased domination.”33 Discipline imposed
docility on bodies in the name of political economy. This effect was brought about
through a large variety of techniques and strategies that link power directly to the body.
Daily routines, forms of physical exercise, methods of observation were calculated to
produce the ideal transformation in an individual, i.e. making bodies simultaneously
productive and subservient. The “technologies of the body” that emerged from the penal
reforms could never have been the subject of Foucault’s earlier works, driven by
archaeological abstraction. Foucault’s discussion of technologies of the body shows that
he was interested in how power affects individuals in society. But this research program
did not discuss power in its manifold operations, only the expression of power as
domination.
Foucault further develops his theory of power in his next major work, The History
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of Sexuality. As we shall see, however, his discussion of subjects and bodies still treats
them mostly as docile recipients of repressive power. The few times in this book that
Foucault gives individuals an active role, he describes them as active participants in their
own repression, duped by power’s ruse. Before we delve into what this ruse is and how it
occurs, though, we must explore Foucault’s more mature articulation of power, as well as
his understanding of sexuality.
Foucault had already noted in Discipline and Punish that all relationships contain
power relations. In The History of Sexuality, though, he delineates the implications of
this statement. Power, Foucault claims, is multiplicitous. It does not emerge from one,
monolithic source.
The omnipresence of power: not because it has the privilege of consolidating
everything under its invincible unity, but because it is produced from one moment
to the next, at every point, or rather in every relation from point to another.
Power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it comes
from everywhere.34
If power did not come from everywhere, if it came from a singular source (government,
church, etc.) and exerted dominance over all others, then the potential for a total
overthrow of oppressive forces would be possible. The source of oppression could be
clearly identified and strategies of resistance could be formed and enacted. Within a
Foucaultian notion of power, however, oppression is more elusive and reasserts itself at
one point while being subverted at another. The concomitant operations of oppression
and subversion are made possible by this theory of power because, like oppression,
resistance is a form of power as well. Thus, Foucault asserts that “resistance is never in a
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position of exteriority in relation to power.”
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The expression of power, then, creates

matrices of oppression and subversion.
The History of Sexuality is an exploration of how the body becomes the site for a
deployment of regulatory power, what he calls bio-power.36 Foucault demonstrates one
way that bio-power operates when he analyzes and rejects what is called the repressive
hypothesis. Foucault examines sexuality much as he examined punishment in his
previous book. As a result, Foucault starts with a radical assumption: sexuality is a
historically constructed concept.37 There had certainly been scholars in the past who
argued for the constructed quality of gender,38 but sex and sexuality had most often been
left as a part of nature, something that remained historically constant. Foucault’s claim
allows an entirely different sort of analysis of human sexuality. Sexuality, as Foucault
defines it, is a way of interpreting, organizing, and regulating sexual desires, anatomy,
and acts—not an aspect of personhood that has inherent characteristics. It is important to
note that the form of sexuality that Foucault is describing is a modern one, its origins
dating back to the eighteenth century. Foucault finds that modern sexuality has often
been discussed only in terms of repression, that Victorian society in the West has
imposed a prudish silence on sex, and that we are basically sexually oppressed as a
people.
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It is this perception of Victorian repression—the repressive hypothesis—that
Foucault investigates with his Nietzschean cynicism. He claims that the Victorian
repression of sexuality is a façade that becomes exposed as such in light of what Foucault
terms the “incitement to discourse.” It is true that, in the Victorian era, certain words
were deemed inappropriate to utter and the boundaries of discretion were rigorously
defined. Despite this restriction, however, Foucault detects a “veritable discursive
explosion”39 concerning sex during this same period. While talking about sex became
improper in many contexts, it became not only acceptable, but imperative in many others.
“This is the essential thing,” Foucault states, “that Western man has been drawn for three
centuries to the task of telling everything concerning his sex.”40
The development of this telling, the expansion of sexual discourse, is easy to trace
in light of what has already been said about disciplinary discourse. The fascination with
observing prisoners, studying them, finding the delinquent lurking behind the criminal
act, parallels the development of sexual discourse. Sexual acts became merely physical
manifestations of something deeper, more profound, and around this underlying cause of
sex emerged a discourse seeking to uncover the “truth” concerning sex. To uncover it,
though, people had to have a motivation for disclosing the details of their sexual selves.
And so speech about sex was linked to a notion of progress through an increase in
knowledge. Foucault finds the origin of this connection in the Christian practice of
confession, which we will learn more about later, but for now it suffices to note that

39

Foucault, The History of Sexuality, 17.

40

Ibid., 23.

52
sharing the intimate knowledge of one’s sex life was associated with a project of
diagnosing and treating “aberrant” sexualities in the name of promoting healthy (i.e.
“normal”) sexuality. In this process, Foucault speaks of individuals as active agents, not
just docile bodies. The individual speaks from his own experience, tells his own story,
and makes an active contribution. But here, the individual has been inveigled into
contributing to his own repression. The incitement to discourse is a mechanism of a
power that aims to normalize the population, and the subject appears active only insofar
as he is actively complicit in his own subjection. Normalizing power, Foucault argues, is
so effective at hiding its mechanisms that we do not know when we are affected by it.
This is the overall point of the book. We think sex was repressed in the Victorian era, but
sexual repression diminishes the more we discuss sex openly, the more we deploy sexual
discourse. With his concluding sentence, Foucault asserts that thinking this way is naïve:
“The irony of this deployment is in having us believe that our ‘liberation’ is in the
balance.”41
Therefore, even as he presents his most mature articulation of power, Foucault
cannot escape his own tendency to limit the agency of the subject; power remains
personified as a negative entity, tricking us into thinking we are working toward our
liberation when we speak of sex. After the 1976 publication of The History of Sexuality,
though, we see a shift in Foucault’s emphasis and tone. His work in Discipline and
Punish and The History of Sexuality dealt with the strategies of power, but always from
the perspective of institutional or governmental discourse. For the remainder of his
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career, he took interest in the techniques that individuals used to understand and express
themselves.
To be sure, the influence of discourse remained, but Foucault now asked how
individuals interacted with the discourses that have such a large influence on their lives.
Eric Paras summarizes this change in Foucault’s treatment of the subject: “The
individual, no longer seen as the pure product of mechanisms of domination, appears as
the complex result of an interaction between outside coercion and techniques of the
self.”42 The individual in Foucault’s last works, then, is an integration of the autonomous
self of modern philosophy and the produced subject of postmodernity. This view emerges
in Foucault’s lectures at the Collège de France, as well as in interviews. It was so
significant a development in his thought that Foucault decided to completely reorganize
his project on the history of sexuality. The introduction to volume two, The Use of
Pleasure (1984), outlines his theoretical and methodological changes. These writings
complete Foucault’s movement from the abstract and immaterial nature of archaeological
analysis to the practical, bodily character of genealogy. This is not to say that Foucault
abandoned the former at the end of his life. As we shall see, he integrates the strengths of
archaeology into genealogy.
In the introduction to The Use of Pleasure, Foucault admits that he ran into
several problems in his initial attempts to move forward from volume one, and his
troubles revolve around the use of archaeology and genealogy in his research. He lists
three axes that structure his investigation of modern sexuality: “(1) the formation of

42

Paras, Foucault 2.0, 94.

54
sciences (savoir) that refer to it, (2) the systems of power that regulate its practice, (3) the
forms within which individuals are able, are obliged, to recognize themselves as subjects
of this sexuality.”43 In some ways, these axes illustrate the different contributions that
archaeology and genealogy make in Foucault’s work.
The first axis is firmly rooted in the archaeological analysis that drove his works
from the 1960s. Foucault discusses power in Discipline and Punish and The History of
Sexuality as it emerges from discourse and influences the body and subject, and so the
second axis connects the projects of archaeology and genealogy. The last axis is one that
Foucault had not explored in depth up to this point in his career, and it became the thing
that he would focus on until his death in 1984. It also shows the degree to which his
thought had developed since his earliest publications. The third axis required Foucault
“to look for the forms and modalities of the relation to self by which the individual
constitutes and recognizes himself qua subject.”44 This quotation reveals a marked
difference in how Foucault theorized the self. The self that Foucault began to study after
the publication of The History of Sexuality is one that is neither purely passive nor active
only through complicity (conscious or unconscious). Foucault now speaks of the self as a
full-fledged agent seeking to understand and articulate itself within the discourses and
power relations that seek to define and normalize it. Foucault states this best in an
interview shortly before his death: “Thought is freedom in relation to what one does, the
motion by which one detaches oneself from it, establishes it as an object, and reflects on
43
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Individuals have the ability to recognize themselves qua subjects of

discourse, and then can problematize that discourse.
Foucault’s reformulated project on the history of sexuality is an attempt to see
how this process had been done in different historical periods. He conducts this study by
integrating archaeology and genealogy in a way that is particularly important for my
dissertation. He centers his revamped history of sexuality on “the desiring subject” and
how individuals practice a “hermeneutics of desire” as they seek to understand
themselves as sexual subjects.46 While this approach does not dismiss the notion of biopower as described in The History of Sexuality, it does, to some degree, reverse the
direction of investigation. Rather than interpreting individuals primarily through the
structural discourses which individuals inhabit, he asks what individuals do with those
discourses, what practices—discursive and non-discursive—individuals develop to
decipher their own sexual subjectivity. Foucault also makes an important connection
between this process of understanding oneself as a subject of sexual desire and
discovering in that desire “the truth of their being.”47 This connection will be explored
below in the discussion of confession, but, for now, it is important to note that Foucault
believes there is more at stake than understanding different historical constructions of
desire. Foucault believes he is analyzing a—perhaps the—fundamental element in the
history of subjectivity in the West.
45

Michel Foucault, “Polemics, Politics, and Problematizations: An Interview with Michel Foucault,” in
Ethics: Subjectivity and Truth, ed. Paul Rainbow (New York: The New Press, 1997), 117.

46

Foucault, The Use of Pleasure, 5.

47

Ibid.

56
Foucault believes the hermeneutics of desire is best uncovered through a
combination of archaeological and genealogical analyses. He states, “this analysis of
desiring man is situated at the point where an archaeology of problematizations and a
genealogy of practices of the self intersect.”48 We have made sexual desire a problem in
different ways across time, and, through archaeology, Foucault proposes to isolate them
in order to “problematize” them by introducing discontinuity into a narrative of sex that is
often treated as transhistorical. Details are presented for analysis that remained hidden
under the hegemony of meta-narrative. The archaeological analysis of these forms is
complemented by a genealogical examination of the techniques and practices through
which individuals subjected themselves to moral standards or, sometimes, sought to
reform or resist moral standards.
In short, Foucault’s final publications, The Use of Pleasure and The Care of the
Self (1984), were exercises in analyzing the effects of society-wide discourses in
conjunction with the efforts of individuals to fashion for themselves an existence that
bears more than just the imprints of those discourses. Behind this project was Foucault’s
desire to create modes of resistance to various forms of repression. This process must
begin by understanding that we are embroiled in discourses that form our subjectivity in
fundamental ways. The individual, however, is able to make use of power for his or her
own purposes. And it is through developing techniques and practices of resistance within
these discourses (for we cannot simply step outside of them) that we can create lives of
meaning and beauty. As he said in a lecture from 1974, “We are subjected to the
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production of truth through power and we cannot exercise power except through the
production of truth.”49 The subject may only emerge as a production of discourses
beyond the individual’s control, but the self emerges in Foucault’s later works as the
creation of an individual who uses power to produce one’s own truth. To return to the
dichotomy of self and subject that I presented at the start of this chapter, Foucault at the
end of his career showed that he had not jettisoned the self in the process of describing
individuals as products of power relations and disciplinary discourse. The individual
contains elements of both, and only by understanding the nature of one’s subjectivation
can one seek to emerge from it.
My dissertation seeks to do something very similar by focusing on how Protestant
discourses about homosexuality have constructed an oppressive form of gay and lesbian
sexual subjectivity. We live in a society defined by heterosexism, and the church policies
examined are local expressions of that. They create the context in which gays and
lesbians are asked to decipher themselves as sexual subjects; they define the relationship
that a homosexual should have toward his or her own body. A diversity of responses has
emerged from this context: celibacy, the closet, open resistance. Many different paths to
fashioning oneself as a moral subject in the shadow of the label “incompatible.” Some of
these paths promote the abundant life to which Christians are called, and some do not.
All, however, grapple with a church that seeks to make homosexuality invisible.
Foucault’s project is not without its flaws, but it does provide the tools for analyzing the
harmful effects of this situation and evaluating the best response. However, beyond his
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methodological framework, Foucault offers observations that are particularly germane for
my project. If his methodology can be likened to a toolbox, we turn now to two specific
tools found within it.
Prohibition and the Production of Individuals
At the start of this chapter, I mentioned that the prohibitions against practicing
gay and lesbian clergy function in at least two ways. The first is through direct exclusion,
and is enforced by an ecclesial judicial system. The second is by producing the
homosexual subject it claims merely to describe. This operation is possible because, to a
large degree, an image of the homosexual subject already exists in society as a whole,
and so the church policies are able to rely on the acceptance of certain homosexual
tropes. More than that, though, this operation is enacted by an increase in localized (i.e.
intra-denominational) dialogues about homosexuality. Foucault provides an illustration
of how such discourses can produce individuals in Discipline and Punish.
We have already discussed how modern discipline creates docile bodies, but the
effects of discipline are more fundamental than the outward appearance of docility.
Foucault also argues that discipline shapes the fundamental constitution of individuals.
The goal is not simply to direct the actions of individuals, but to change their desires and
dispositions. “Discipline makes individuals,” Foucault states. “It is the specific
technique of a power that regards individuals both as objects and as instruments of its
exercise.”50 Foucault believes discipline so deeply affects the constitution of individuals
that he claims the study of penal discipline belongs to a genealogy of the modern soul.
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By “soul,” he does not mean the transcendent or immortal element of the human person.
For Foucault, the soul is a historical construct:
This real, noncorporal soul is not a substance; it is the element in which are
articulated the effects of a certain type of power and the reference of a certain
type of knowledge, the machinery by which the power relations give rise to a
possible corpus of knowledge, and knowledge extends and reinforces the effects
of this power. On this reality-reference, various concepts have been constructed
and domains of analysis carved out: psyche, subjectivity, personality,
consciousness, etc….The man described for us, whom we are invited to free, is
already in himself the effect of a subjection much more profound than himself. A
‘soul’ inhabits him and brings him to existence, which is itself a factor in the
mastery that power exercises over the body. The soul is the effect and instrument
of a political anatomy; the soul is the prison of the body.51
This is an incredibly broad claim, that disciplinary power has formed the modern soul.
Foucault makes clear that the effects of discipline reach far beyond the walls of the
modern prison. We live in a disciplinary society—what Foucault calls the carceral
archipelago—where the effects of discipline have been transmitted into the entire social
body.52
It is ironic, then, that Foucault finds one of the basic techniques of discipline to be
an intense process of individualization. By this, Foucault means that discipline works by
setting the individual apart as something to know and categorize. To study the individual
is to observe and examine it so that the increased knowledge of the individual may lead to
better strategies and technologies of reform. This is what Foucault means when he
writes, “In becoming the target for new mechanisms of power, the body is offered up to

51

Ibid., 29-30.

52

Ibid., 297.

53

new forms of knowledge.”

60
The criminal in the modern prison is a classic example of

this. As prison reforms were implemented, an entirely new field of sciences emerged to
study inmates. These discourses were not interested in the specific act for which the
prisoner was incarcerated. Rather, they were interested in his life and his character:
What was it about his soul that made him commit a crime? The result of these discourses
was the creation of an identity based upon criminal dispositions deep within the
individual—the delinquent. Foucault explains:
Behind the offender, to whom the investigation of the facts may attribute
responsibility for an offence, stands the delinquent whose slow formation is
shown in a biographical investigation. The introduction of the ‘biographical’ is
important in the history of penalty. Because it establishes the ‘criminal’ as
existing before the crime and even outside it. And for this reason, a psychological
causality, duplicating the juridical attribution of responsibility, confuses its
effects.54
Criminology claimed to have identified the soul of the offender: the delinquent. What
Foucault’s analysis points out, however, is that the “discovery” of the delinquent is
actually an illustration of the productive power of discourse. The delinquent was not
discovered after all; he was constructed by scientific discourses motivated by a will to
knowledge—knowledge of the incarcerated.
The disciplinary regime that gave rise to the production of the delinquent
employed three basic operations in its study of inmates: hierarchical observation,
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normalization, and examination.

61
These methods highlight the individualization that

disciplinary power brings about. Normalization, for example, may at first be understood
as something that homogenizes society. This may be the overarching goal, but it operates
in the interim by dividing the population, individualizing those who do not fit into the
norm, and offering these individuals up to intense study and scrutiny. Based on this
division, “abnormal” individuals are subjected to examination. These examinations
further individualize their subjects. Groups must be parsed, classifications created,
conditions diagnosed, and treatments prescribed. In all of this process, it is important to
remember that the “normal” are not subjected to the same inspection. Instead,
disciplinary discourse treated “normal” persons, which, in this case, means law-abiding
citizens, as a control group, that to which the incarcerated must be compared. As
Foucault points out, this pattern suggests that individualization operates in a
“descending” manner. Foucault elaborates:
In a system of discipline, the child is more individualized than the adult, the
patient more than the healthy man, the madman and the delinquent more than the
normal and the non-delinquent. In each case, it is towards the first of these pairs
that all the individualizing mechanisms are turned in our civilization; and when
one wishes to individualize the healthy, the normal and law-abiding adult, it is
always by asking him how much of the child he has in him, what secret madness
lies within him, what fundamental crime he has dreamt of committing.56
It is the less powerful that are individualized in society, set apart for examination.
In The History of Sexuality, Foucault adds to this list the homosexual and the
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heterosexual, and describes how the homosexual has been individualized by medical and
sexual discourse. He notes that modern discourse on sexuality took heterosexual
monogamy as its norm and sought to reinforce it. He bases this on the fact that
heterosexuality seems immune from examination: “the legitimate couple, with its regular
sexuality, had a right to more discretion. It tended to function as a norm, one that was
stricter, perhaps, but quieter.”57 Sexual expressions or activity that disrupt the
heterosexual couple, then, become the subjects of intense scrutiny, and so the group that
came to be scrutinized the most and for the longest period of time is the one that appeared
to the professional observers of the nineteenth century as the opposite of heterosexuality.
This led to what Foucault describes as “an incorporation of perversions and a new
specification of individuals.”58 The homosexual in medical discourse—just like the
delinquent in criminological discourse—was defined less by actions and more by inner
dispositions:
As defined by the ancient civil or canonical codes, sodomy was a category of
forbidden acts; their perpetrator was nothing more than the juridical subject of
them. The nineteenth-century homosexual became a personage, a past, a case
history, and a childhood….Nothing that went into his total composition was
unaffected by his sexuality. It was everywhere present in him: at the root of all
his actions because it was their insidious and indefinitely active principle…it was
consubstantial with him, less as a habitual sin than as a singular nature. We must
not forget that the psychological, psychiatric, medical category of homosexuality
was constituted from the moment it was characterized…less by a type of sexual
relations than by a certain quality of sexual sensibility, a certain way of inverting
the masculine and the feminine in oneself. Homosexuality appeared as one of the
forms of sexuality when it was transposed from the practice of sodomy onto a
kind of interior androgyny, a hermaphrodism of the soul. The sodomite had been
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a temporary aberration; the homosexual was now a species.

With the advent of nineteenth century sexology, Foucault detects a sea change in how
same-sex acts and desire have been understood and constructed.
This passage has received much attention over the years, and its appropriators
have been as fervent as its critics. The dominant interpretation, as noted by David M.
Halperin, has been that Foucault is establishing a temporal line of demarcation: prior to
the nineteenth century sex was thought of only in terms of acts and since that time sex
has come to represent something fundamental about one’s identity.60 Halperin suggests
that Foucault’s passage does not foreclose the possibility of multiple historical
connections between sex and identity across different eras of Western civilization, but
scholars have interpreted it that way because they mistake Foucault’s claim for an
historical assertion, when it should be understood as an example of discursive analysis.61
Foucault is providing an example of how power operates through discourse in ways that
are productive, not simply negative or prohibitory. Abnormal sexualities were implicitly
prohibited by the very fact that they were labeled abnormal, but this was not power’s
primary mode of operation. Rather, the discursive mechanisms of power worked by
increasing the visibility of these new perversions and requiring that they be implanted
59

Ibid., 43.

60

David M. Halperin, “Forgetting Foucault: Acts, Identities, and the History of Sexuality,” Representations
63 (Summer 1998): 95; Mark D. Jordan challenges Foucault's historical claim by exploring medieval
discussions of sodomy, showing that the sodomite had taken on a kind of character or identity within
Christian penitentials. He corrects Foucault, stating that "the idea that same-sex pleasure constitutes an
identity of some kind is clearly the work of medieval theology, not of nineteenth-century forensic
medicine." See Jordan, The Invention of Sodomy in Christian Theology (Chicago: University of Chicago
Press, 1997), 163-164.

61

Halperin, “Forgetting Foucault,” 111.

64
into bodies, incorporated into individuals. The difference between these two modes of
power is that prohibition is not concerned with details. It operates through law, which is
announced from afar. This new manifestation of power probes every facet of the
individual, and, thereby, exerts its normalizing influence through an intimate connection
with the species it has invented. Foucault refers to this operation of power as an
“instrument-effect” because the power effects the very thing its instruments seek to
regulate.62 Halperin summarizes Foucault’s description of this new manifestation of
power as “the historical triumph of normalization over law.”63
It is important to place Halperin’s quote in context by considering what Foucault
has in mind when he discusses “the law,” for it would seem that he places normalization
and prohibition at odds with one another. Were this true, it would obviously cause
problems for my analysis, which deals with the prohibition of homosexual practice.
Foucault’s notion that power vis-à-vis normalization has eclipsed power vis-à-vis the law
is rooted in a historical period, when the category of homosexual was just coming into
existence, and homosexuality as a sexual orientation had yet to gain traction in society.
To speak of homosexuality as repressed by the law during Foucault’s period of analysis is
anachronistic, for, as Foucault scholar Didier Eribon notes, “to speak of repression is to
imagine that whatever reality is repressed…would have preexisted whatever discourse
seized on it in order to pick away at it or prohibit it.”64 The prohibitive language I
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analyze takes the concept of sexual orientation as a given. In this context, prohibition of
homosexual “practice” does not work separately from normalization, but in conjunction
with it. The details of homosexual existence that Halperin suggests are overlooked by
law in the nineteenth century are enveloped in the language of “practice.”
The irony is that in order to normalize aberrant sexualities, the medical discourses
of the late nineteenth century actually gave them a kind of permanent reality that they did
not have before. By inscribing these “perversions” into embodied subjects and
establishing them as a species, medical discourses unknowingly created the conditions for
resistance. Foucault does not trace this development in his introductory work, but the
“homosexual species” (the abject subject of medical examination) gave way to an identity
that opposes the heteronormative assumptions of its invention and provides the
foundation for a movement of social and political resistance, a fact that supports
Foucault’s claim that oppression and resistance are inextricably linked.
Confession, Avowal, and the “Truth” of Sexuality
Foucault’s discussion of individualization as a mechanism that produces subjects
for the purpose of regulation and normalization is an important tool in my analysis. A
second tool that stands out from Foucault’s work is his theory about the function of
Christian confession in the formation of subjectivity in the West. As stated earlier, in The
History of Sexuality, Foucault rejects the repressive hypothesis by describing what he
calls an “incitement to discourse” and links this “discursive explosion” to the obligation
to speak the truth concerning sex. Foucault claims that the origins of this obligation lie in
the Christian practice of confession, and this assertion has implications for how the
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language of avowal functions within prohibitions of homosexual ordination.
Foucault argues that there have been two ways that societies have produced the
“truth of sex.” One is ars erotica, which he associates with eastern societies. Here sex is
treated as an erotic art that links truth to pleasure. Sexual pleasure is experienced not as
part of a moral law but on its own terms. Pleasure signifies only itself, and the truth
found in it is passed down by one who has mastered the art. The art is esoteric, to be
sure, for an indulgence in the secrets of pleasure cheapens it; pleasure is more intense
when kept in reserve, its truth held and shared secretly. But Foucault does not find any
evidence for this form of sexual truth production in the West. Instead, he finds a different
system, a scientia sexualis. This procedure for producing truth about sex also relies on
secrecy, but in a very different way. The secrets of sexual pleasure are not to be learned
from a master, but confessed to a priest. According to Foucault, the confession—the
injunction to tell everything one thinks, desires and does—is at the heart of the West’s
procedures for producing the truth, not just of sex, but truth in general. “The confession
has spread its affects far and wide….Western man has become a confessing animal.”65
Confession functions by transforming acts labeled sinful into discourse. A key
development in the practice of confession was an increasing importance, not just on
confessing acts committed, but also the thoughts and desires behind them.66 Everything
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impacting one’s state of purity had to be told; acts were only external manifestations of
the more significant inner-stirrings. (We have seen a similar observation in Foucault’s
analysis of the modern prison.) This emphasis, and the discourse it generated, had an
impact on the Christian—and Western—approach to sex:
Discourse, therefore, had to trace the meeting line of the body and the soul,
following all its meanderings: beneath the surface of the sins, it would lay bare
the unbroken nervure of the flesh. Under the authority of a language that had
been carefully expurgated so that it was no longer directly named, sex was taken
charge of, tracked down as it were, by a discourse that aimed to allow it no
obscurity, no respite.67
And the goal of this “taking charge of sex” was not simply to hear about people’s desires,
but to transform them under the guidance of the confessor.
Confession reverberates far beyond the institutional church. Just as Foucault
posited the emergence of a carceral archipelago in Discipline and Punish, he sees
confessional discourse permeating all facets of Western society.68 In fact, it is so
ingrained that we no longer recognize the origins of our desire to confess. Foucault
writes:
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The obligation to confess is now relayed through so many different points, is so
deeply ingrained in us, that we no longer perceive it as the effect of a power that
constrains us; on the contrary, it seems to us that truth, lodged in our most secret
nature, “demands” only to surface….Confession frees, but power reduces one to
silence; truth does not belong to the order of power, but shares an original affinity
with freedom…69
We must be careful to note that Foucault is assuming the voice of those who have been
duped by the “internal ruse of confession.”70 Not only do we desire to confess without
knowing why, but, Foucault argues, we mistakenly believe that liberation is achieved
through that process. Modern man, the “confessing animal,” associates truth with the act
of confession and sees power as that which inhibits the surfacing of truth.
The scientia sexualis makes confession necessary if one is to know, to discover
the truth about oneself. In The History of Sexuality, Foucault provides an introduction to
this idea. He intended to elaborate upon it in a volume “Confessions of the Flesh,” which
was near completion at the time of his death, but his will ordered the unfinished
manuscript be destroyed. However, we do have significant interviews and materials from
the courses he taught at the Collège de France which provide the crux of his concern with
confession. Confession is predicated on the notion of sin, that certain acts are prohibited.
Thus the essential difference between ars erotica and scientia sexualis: the former is
based on method, the mastering of sexual techniques, while the latter is based on rules
and operates through the internalization of those rules. What Foucault found troubling,
then, is that within confession there was a relationship between sexual prohibition and the
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truth of sex. In order to discover the truth of oneself, one had to acknowledge the
legitimacy of prohibition and define oneself in relationship to it. The constitution of
sexuality in the West, Foucault argues, is produced by this troubling relationship:
“…sexuality is related in a strange and complex way both to verbal prohibition and to the
obligation to tell the truth, of hiding what one does and of deciphering who one is.”71
Truth through renouncing the flesh, which Foucault roots in ancient Christian
asceticism, became for Christianity the central technology of the self, i.e. how one makes
sense of oneself. Foucault believes that Christians (and Westerners more generally) find
themselves in a cycle of self-discovery and renunciation:
The more we discover the truth about ourselves, the more we must renounce
ourselves; and the more we want to renounce ourselves, the more we need to
bring to light the reality of ourselves. That is what we would call the spiral of
truth formulation and reality renouncement which is at the heart of Christian
techniques of the self.72
In light of this cycle, what Foucault also describes as “the link between the obligation to
tell the truth and the prohibitions weighing on sexuality,” he framed his investigation of
Christianity around one question, “How had the subject been compelled to decipher
himself in regard to what was forbidden?”73 This question must be placed in the context
of his reformulated project on the history of sexuality. In other words, how did this
relationship between sexual prohibition and the truth of oneself contribute to a uniquely
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Christian “hermeneutics of desire,” a uniquely Christian configuration of sexuality as a
domain of moral experience?
This question is of key importance for my analysis. Foucault, by discussing
confession in these terms, makes a fundamental connection between the terms “practice”
and “avowal.” In the heterosexist milieu of contemporary society and church, “practice”
has emerged as the language that codifies the prohibition of gay and lesbian sexual
expression, and “avowal” demands that gays and lesbians define themselves in
relationship to it. Furthermore, this prohibition is all the more potent because it has
become more visible as prohibitions or taboos relating to heterosexual “practice” have
eroded. Protestant denominations have been describing (hetero)sexuality in language that
is increasingly positive and affirming over the past several decades, while at the same
time publicly labeling homosexuality as incompatible with Christian teaching. The
phrase “self-avowed practicing homosexual,” then, is a complex summation of different
operations of power. On the one hand, “practice” enforces a moral definition of
homosexuality that individualizes gays and lesbians as objects to be analyzed and
subjected to discipline. Within a dimorphic structure of sexual orientation, the law
functions as a tool of normalization, seeking to hide homosexuality by prohibiting the
practices that would make it visible. On the other hand, “avowal” demands that those
gays and lesbians who refuse to remain invisible define themselves according to a
prohibition that embodies a suspicion of their sexual subjectivity. The overall effect is
similar to what Foucault describes as psychagogy, a term that he distinguishes from
pedagogy. Pyschagogy is "the transmission of a truth whose function is not to endow any
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subject whomsoever with abilities, etcetera, [that is pedagogy] but whose function is to
modify the mode of being of subject to whom we address ourselves." This psychagogic
modification of the subject is achieved not through a recognition of the divine within
oneself, but through a continual and fundamental suspicion of oneself.74 The language of
avowal stipulates that gays and lesbians ask themselves, “What is the ‘truth’ of my
sexuality?” and that they answer this question within the context of the prohibition of
homosexual practice.
Foucault and the Development of Queer Theory
If queer theory has a patron saint, it is Michel Foucault. Foucault’s works,
especially The History of Sexuality, are unquestionably a centerpiece of the queer theory
canon, and his life and thought have been chronicled not only by biographers but
hagiographers as well.75 Beyond Foucault, though, two scholars are viewed as
foundational to the discipline for their contributions to the study of gender and sexuality:
Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick and Judith Butler. It is not possible here to review the myriad
contributions of these scholars or their import for my analysis. Nevertheless, some of
their theories must be recognized before proceeding. Broadly speaking, both share
Foucault’s belief that society and individuals are constructed to some degree by discourse
and both conduct analyses of gender and sexuality that are poststructuralist and
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deconstructive in tone. Regarding their specific theories of note, I will confine my
comments to the aspects of their work that bear on the two analytical tools that I have
discussed from Foucault, the process of individualization and the connection between
confession and subjectivity.
Sedgwick’s influential book Epistemology of the Closet (1990) asserts that “many
of the major nodes of thought and knowledge in twentieth century Western culture as a
whole are structured—indeed fractured—by a chronic, now endemic crisis of
homo/heterosexual definition.”76 Among the characteristics that Sedgwick finds in the
homo/heterosexual definition is a two-fold effect that is contradictory in nature. It is a
contradiction “between seeing home/heterosexual definition on the one hand as an issue
of active importance primarily for a small, distinct, relatively fixed homosexual minority
(what I refer to as a minoritizing view), and seeing it on the other hand as an issue of
continuing, determinative importance in the lives of people across the spectrum of
sexualities (what I refer to as a universalizing view).”77
The language of sexual orientation, then, at once minoritizes homosexuals as, in
Foucault’s words, “a species” and yet simultaneously makes the gender of one’s object
choice a universal hermeneutic of sexual acts. The incoherence of minoritizing and
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universalizing discourses is often hidden by separating them, so that only one is
emphasized at a time. But one is never effected by only one at a time. The impact is
always a fusion of the two. Sedgwick uses an example from the legal context of the time
of the book’s publication. On the one hand, the U.S. Supreme Court case Bowers v.
Hardwick (1986)78 allowed states to prohibit acts that they defined as “sodomy,” and, on
the other hand, a circuit court case used the category “homosexuality” to argue that the
homosexual is a person protected under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. As Sedgwick notes, “to be gay in this system is to come under the radically
overlapping aegises of a universalizing discourse of acts and a minoritizing discourse of
persons…the former of these prohibits what the latter protects.”79
Sedgwick’s exploration of this double-bind can be used to build on Foucault’s
notion of disciplinary discourses that individualize certain groups, especially in the
context of today’s prohibitions of homosexual practice. On the one hand, the language of
practice claims not to be homophobic or heterosexist because it applies to acts, not
orientation, and, as we shall see, several ecclesial courts rely on this (il)logic to claim that
the prohibitive language is not discriminatory. On the other hand, the language of
practice, in conjunction with the heterosexual definition of marriage, also claims that
there is something unique about homosexuality that deserves special attention.
Homosexual practice is a real phenomenon separate from any other type of sexual
practice. Sedgwick’s concept of minoritization, then, is akin to Foucault’s concept of
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individualization, in that they both describe a process of being set apart in a heterosexist
taxonomy of sexual dispositions. Sedgwick’s concept of universalization shows how the
oppressive force of the former concepts are buttressed by a process that conceals
homosexual discrimination within a discourse that claims to bear relevance for all.80
Sedgwick also discusses binaries like secrecy/disclosure and public/private that
contribute to an analysis of the homosexual closet and the language of avowal. If
Foucault provides an important connection between avowal and confession, allowing us
to ask how the language demands that gays and lesbians define themselves primarily by a
renunciation of their sexualities, then Sedgwick’s work allows us to ask how the language
imposes a silence on those who refuse to avow, and what the effects this silence has on
subjectivity and identity. To be sure, Foucault mentions that silence is a function of
discourses, but he does not develop this notion extensively. Sedgwick suggests that the
silence of the closet and its ostracism of homosexual expression out of the public realm is
perhaps the fundamental element of the homo/heterosexual definition that she
interrogates in her works.81
Judith Butler, who draws on Foucault more extensively than Sedgwick,
contributes to an analysis of avowal by directly discussing and expanding Foucault’s
80
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theory about confession. Her discussion of confession is especially important because
she illustrates the ways in which confession is a bodily act and directly impacts the body.
She notes that speech, in general, is a bodily act, but “whatever is said not only passes
through the body but constitutes a certain presentation of the body” and is “a certain
synecdoche of the body.” The guilt implied by the context of a confession, therefore, is
felt in the body, has effects on the body. Confession achieves this because “the body that
speaks its deed is the same body that did its deed, which means that there is, in the saying
a presentation of the body, a bodying forth of the guilt, perhaps, in the saying itself.”82
Butler explores this idea in a different context by discussing the U.S. military
policy “Don’t ask, don’t tell.” The policy fuses conduct and status by claiming that
homosexual status carries a propensity of conduct, understanding “such status as always
culminating in an act.”83 In this way, the confession of homosexual status becomes a
confession of homosexual practice. Furthermore, the act of confession—to say, “I am a
homosexual”—recognizes the authority of the confessor to define what that status is.
Butler writes:
The term is to remain a term used to describe others, but the term is not to be used
by those who might use it for the purpose of self-description….The term
‘homosexual’ thus comes to describe a class of persons who are to remain
prohibited from defining themselves; the term is attributed always from
elsewhere. And this is, in some ways, the very definition of the homosexual that
the military and the Congress provide. A homosexual is one whose definition is
to be left to others, one who is denied the act of self-definition with respect to his
or her sexuality, one whose self-denial is a prerequisite for military service.84
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It is this loss of control over one’s body and one’s self that is most injurious, and, while
“Don’t ask, don’t tell” is not perfectly analogous to the language analyzed in this
dissertation, there is a similar suspicion involved and an identical attempt to wrest the
definition of homosexuality out of the hands of those being defined as homosexuals.
Of course, all of Butler’s arguments move from her theory that gender and
sexuality are performative, not innate. Gender is not what one is, but what one does.85 If
this is even partially true—and I believe that it is—it begs the question: How can the
prohibition of homosexual practice—not a single practice, or a set of practices, but
practice—do anything but harm gays and lesbians in a fundamental way? After all, the
language analyzed here may produce a homosexual subject, but this discursive subject
comes into conflict with the ways gays and lesbians understand themselves. That is to
say, as gays and lesbians in the church seek to assert self-identities in their public lives,
they are forced to confront the fact that the actions by which they assert these identities
(or, at least, their sexual identities) are labeled incompatible with their faith and
prohibited. While I do not have the space to discuss Butler’s theories of performativity
and subjectivity at more length86, this summary is sufficient to show that Butler
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articulates a relationship between being and doing—or, for the focus of this dissertation,
let us say a relationship between sexual identity and sexual practice—that reveals part of
the way these ordination policies inflict or inflicted harm.
The Limits of Foucault for Christian Ethics
For all the contributions he makes to a critique of sexuality, the utility of
Foucaultian theory has often been called into question. One serious critique of Foucault
revolves around the issue of resistance. As already noted, underlying Foucault’s ethics is
a desire to resist the forms of normalization that he thinks permeate modern society. And
yet, many of Foucault’s proponents have criticized him for offering only a weak form of
resistance. Edward Said makes this observation, claiming that Foucault’s theory of
power as complex matrices of relations creates an “unmodulated minimization of
resistance.”87 Even if the power to resist is as ubiquitous as the power to oppress,
Foucault seems to suggest that any attempt to organize politically leads to collusion with
forces of domination.88
In feminist scholarship, this critique has been taken very seriously. Many
feminist scholars have found in Foucault’s work the tools to distinguish between appeals
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to experience that essentialize women and those that do not, but many have also
recognized the limitations of Foucault for feminist politics. Johanna Oksala, for example,
notes that Foucault’s inability to offer a traditional route to political resistance is due to
his view of the subject and the body. She interprets Foucault’s theory of the body as one
that—in its most mature representations—starts with an experiential body that is neither a
material object nor a purely discursively produced, passive body. Foucault, according to
Oksala, puts forth a sexual ethics of bodies and pleasures that works at “the limits of
intelligibility” and, thus, “cannot be properly named or described at all.”90 Existence at
the limits of intelligibility is a form of resistance for Oksala, because it is only here that
normative practices and discourses can be contested. However, Oksala recognizes that
such an existence is not conducive to large-scale political resistance. It is an embodiment
that occurs within the individual and is unable by itself “to rearticulate the cultural
meanings of women’s experience.”91
Oksala’s recognition of the limits of Foucaultian ethics draws attention to the
individualism in Foucault that renders his work by itself incapable of providing the
framework for my dissertation. Foucault best defined his own ethics in an interview he
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gave the final year of his life, and the title given to this interview in its English translation
is descriptive of Foucault’s ethical framework: “The Ethics of the Concern of the Self as
a Practice of Freedom.” Here, Foucault stresses that the idea of morality as a law, a code
to receive and live by, is in decline, or at least should be.92 What he is interested in,
rather, is an aesthetics of existence—the creative expression of the self, embodied by
what he calls “practices of freedom.” This statement is ambiguous, and only receives
some clarity when Foucault discusses how practices of freedom might take shape in
relation to sexuality. He writes: “With regard to sexuality, it is obvious that it is in
liberating our desire that we will learn to conduct ourselves ethically in pleasure
relationships with others.”93 This emphasis on pleasure had a strong aesthetic
component, interpreting life as a work of art, and the goal of the individual is to create or
invent oneself with this in mind.
This is not to say that there was no sense of community—or something larger than
the individual—in Foucault’s thought. As Timothy O’Leary has noted in a summary
statement of Foucault’s ethics: “That art of freedom, the aesthetics of existence, is the
hard-won skill (techne) of analyzing, untying and reconstituting the forms of individual
and collective life which we inherit.”94 Foucault, then, did intend for the ethical life to be
one that reverberated into one’s community or society in general. However, this is not
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the same as saying that the ethical life is accountable to something larger than oneself.
For Foucault, determining how to create oneself and determining what the beautiful and
pleasurable life looks like is rooted entirely in the individual. In fact, Foucault seems
suspicious of any power that does not emerge from the individual’s quest for meaning.
This dissertation, a project emerging from my commitment to the church, cannot
adopt Foucault’s ethical individualism. As a critic he is cogent. As an ethicist, he lacks
accountability to a community. In the next chapter, I integrate theologies of embodiment
into my Foucaultian framework because, rooted in and accountable to the community of
the church, it serves as a strong corrective to Foucault’s ethical individualism.

CHAPTER THREE
THE BODY AND THE DIVINE
In the previous chapter we explored how the works of Michel Foucault
demonstrate the effects that discourse has on the body. The body, Foucault declares, is a
site of power—a place where power (discursive and otherwise) is exerted on the body,
and a place where the individual can exercise a power of resistance. In what follows, we
pair this notion with another—the body as a site of the divine.1 We will explore the body
as a site of the divine through body theology, a corpus of scholarship that takes the
critical reflection on embodiment as the starting point for theology and ethics. Body
theology explores the connections between the body and the divine, and demonstrates
how the designation of the “self-avowed practicing homosexual” harms gays and lesbians
in a religious context.
It is compelling to pair body theology with Foucault for several reasons.
Obviously, body theology dovetails well with Foucault’s attention to the body. More
importantly, though, body theology corrects for the individualism that pervades
Foucault’s ethics. Foucault’s ethics lack the capacity to make normative claims on
others, and so is insufficient by itself. Body theology is rooted in the concrete
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community of the church, and, thus, one who takes body theology seriously will always
be accountable to more than oneself. For the theologian of embodiment, the
transformation and liberation of the individual is one goal moving toward the larger goal
of transforming and liberating society as a whole. One might argue that body theology is
not unique in this; Christian theology and ethics of any kind is ultimately rooted in the
church and, therefore, would provide the same corrective to Foucault as body theology.
While there is merit to that argument, I would point out that body theology, as we shall
see, relates the necessity and importance of community in ways that other theological
movements have not, mainly by linking the creation of a just community to the proper
understanding of embodiment. And here is where body theology’s importance is acute.
As Diane L. Prosser MacDonald has noted, Foucault at no point defines “what might
constitute healthy, human relatedness.”2 Body theology does just that.
It should also be noted that, whereas body theology serves as a corrective to the
aforementioned flaw in Foucault’s ethics, Foucault serves as a corrective to a flaw in the
overall attitude that body theology takes toward the body. As we will see, body
theologians tend to be incredibly optimistic about one’s ability to experience the body as
good. They certainly acknowledge power structures that obstruct one’s ability to
experience the body as good (e.g. patriarchy), but in their efforts to put forward an
alternative, positive vision of the body, body theologians are overly confident in the
degree to which people may switch one vision of the body for another. Foucault’s
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assessment of the influence of power on the body is more sobering and reminds us that
overcoming oppressive views of the body is seldom as easy as choosing a conception of
the body that is more appealing. My own view strives to meet somewhere in the middle.
A Christian ethic must always hope for personal and social transformation, but a
Panglossian worldview distorts our understanding of reality and obstructs meaningful
change. Combining Foucault and body theology holds much prospect, then. To
summarize this prospect in the context of my analysis, Foucault provides the theoretical
underpinnings of how language harms, and body theology demonstrates the shapes that
that harm takes in a religious context as well as providing the basis for making normative
proposals.
This chapter is divided into five sections. The first explores the intellectual
context in which body theology emerged and summarizes its basic objectives. Sections
two and three detail two of the major themes present in body theology: the body as the
locus of relationality and the body as a source of theological and moral knowledge.
These sections should not be viewed as an exhaustive account of the contributions made
by theologians of embodiment. Rather, they describe the aspects of body theology that
are most germane for my own project, for they show that, by defining the sexual feelings
and experiences of gays and lesbians as untrustworthy, the policies studied here restrict
the degree to which gays and lesbians are able to contribute to the theology and mission
of the church. Section four examines one weakness found in the works of many or most
body theologians, namely that body theologians are often overly confident in the ability
of an individual to experience one’s body as good. Section five concludes the chapter by
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suggesting how body theology and the work of Foucault can be integrated into a
Christian ethical analysis.
The Origins and Objectives of Body Theology
Before explicating the content of body theology in more detail, it is important to
note the milieu in which body theology emerged as well as its primary goals. In many
disciplines within the humanities and social sciences during the twentieth century
(especially the second half of the twentieth century), scholars have incorporated the
everyday experience of individuals into the subject matter and/or methodologies of their
respective fields.3 The “cultural turn” in historical studies, for example, emphasized that
the study of cultural practices on a micro level was just as crucial an element in the
unfolding of human history as major events like wars and political movements.
Christian theology and ethics witnessed a similar development over the course of
the twentieth century. There has been a growing recognition among Christian scholars
that sources of Christian teaching like scripture and the larger tradition are not sufficient
by themselves for making moral judgments today. James Gustafson, for example, has
argued that general human experience can serve as a basis for answering ethical
questions, and numerous appraisals of the role of experience in Christian ethics have been
published in recent decades.4 However, the issue of human experience as both an object
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of study and a component of scholarly method has been addressed most compellingly by
liberation theologies. Since the second half of the twentieth century, theological
movements have formed around the experience of marginalized groups. Liberation
theologies have asserted that it is not enough to include human experience as a factor in
theological and ethical method. We must ask whose experience is to be included and
prioritized. Movements like black theology, feminist theology, womanist theology,
mujerista theology, queer theology, and others highlight the indispensability of human
experience in moral deliberation and discernment; and each has, in different ways, dealt
with the meaning and nature of the human body, and how oppressive power harms the
bodies of the marginalized in distinct ways. To take just one example, Kelly Brown
Douglas has shown how white culture, driven by a fear of black sexuality, created images
of black women and men (e.g. the Jezebel, the violent black buck) that portray black
sexuality as dangerous. In the face of these manifestations of racism, African Americans
have repressed their own sexualities, because to express sexuality too openly would make
them more vulnerable to the stereotypes.5
Body theology has its origins in this methodological shift, a fact that can make it
difficult to establish body theology as a category. Indeed, many scholars that I describe
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in this chapter as body theologians would describe themselves first as feminist
theologians, queer theologians, etc. before identifying themselves as theologians of
embodiment. Nevertheless, body theology does have a recognizable identity among the
various theological movements named above. Body theology takes as its starting point
not the experience of oppression due to gender or ethnicity or any other characteristic
(though these are taken into account as well), but, rather, the oppression of the body as a
category. The oppression of the body is deeply rooted in Western thought, namely in the
dualism of mind over body. Dating back to Greek philosophy, the mind and the body
have been placed in an antagonistic relationship. In Plato’s Phaedo, the mind is viewed
as the superior part of the human soul, meant to rule over its “baser” components, which
include emotions and bodily desires like sexual desire. The goal in life, then, was to
exert the mind to control the body; the body was merely a necessary and temporary
habitation of the soul.
The effects of this mind/body dualism are myriad. For starters, it is the
intellectual foundation for fearing and repressing our own bodies, and this, in turn, has
led to a negative valuation of human sexuality over the centuries. In theology and ethics
(academe in general, really), this dualism has asserted not only that knowledge is only
formed deductively, but also that elements of human experience not associated with the
mind (e.g. emotions, desires) are deemed irrational and unfit for intellectual disputation.
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In many ways, therefore, the mind/body dualism contributes to our alienation from our
bodies.6 Body theology assumes the task of overcoming body alienation.
Body alienation harms how we understand ourselves and each another. In a
religious context, body alienation means the denial of the body’s holiness, something that
Carter Heyward refers to as the root of all evils.7 As extensive as the harm of body
alienation is, it must be said that it has had an especially harmful effect on marginalized
groups. For example, feminist scholars maintain that, not only has male-dominated
Western thought separated the mind from and defined it as superior to the body, but that
it has also associated the mind—i.e. the thinking subject—with the masculine. Luce
Irigaray, for example, deconstructs the Western canon, stating that “the subject has
always been appropriated by the ‘masculine,’” and woman, as a result, renounces her
distinctness if/when she accepts such a theory of the subject.8 In a theological context,
Rosemary Radford Ruther describes how the Christian notion of salvation has long been
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thought of as an escape from the body or from nature. Consequently, salvation, for
women, entails a flight from the feminine.9
Related to the ways in which body alienation perpetuates sexism are the ways in
which it perpetuates heterosexism and homophobia. Both forms of oppression are
integrally linked to the disparagement of the body and a patriarchal understanding of
gender roles, and heterosexism is often manifested somewhat differently for gay men and
lesbians. For gay men, there has long been a negative association with being penetrated
during anal intercourse. To assume this role (to be a “bottom”) was to assume the role of
the woman, which was inferior to the “masculine” role of the one penetrating.10 For this
reason, gay men have been labeled effeminate, which, within the mind/body dualism of
Western culture, is tantamount to saying they are “failed men, no better than females.”11
For lesbians, the very meaning of the word “lesbian” has been hijacked by male dominant
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society to mean a non-compliant female. Clearly, the very idea of lesbianism so threatens
male control that the term is used as a pejorative to reassert dominance over women.12
Both manifestations of homophobic oppression depend upon the abjection of the body.
The culture of “compulsory heterosexuality”13 alienates gays and lesbians from their
bodies by controlling how their bodily experiences are to be interpreted.
The ways in which body alienation has impacted the lives of gays and lesbians in
the church is illustrated by the sociological work of Dawne Moon. Moon’s book, God,
Sex, and Politics: Homosexuality and Everyday Theologies, studies congregations
debating the acceptableness of same-sex relationships and shows how homophobia and
heterosexism employ the division of mind (or soul) and body.14 The members of the
congregations that participated in the study associated homosexuality with the physical
and the bodily, and placed it at odds with spirituality. When gays and lesbians came out
in a congregation and sought public recognition of same-sex relationships, other church
members viewed them as introducing something unspiritual into a sacred space. In
essence, this distantiation of queer sexuality from spirituality says that one part of an
LGBT individual’s personhood is incompatible with another.15

12

Patricia Beattie Jung and Ralph F. Smith, Heterosexism: An Ethical Challenge (Albany, NY: State
University of New York Press, 1993), 100; Ellison, Erotic Justice, 54-55.

13

This term is widely used today but was originally used by Adrienne Rich. See Rich, “Compulsory
Heterosexuality and Lesbian Existence,” in Blood, Bread, and Poetry: Selected Prose 1979-1985 (New
York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1994), 23-75.

14

Dawne Moon, God, Sex, and Politics: Homosexuality and Everyday Theologies (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2004).

15

Several other sociological studies also illustrate how attitudes of Christians toward homosexuality set
homosexuality contrary to spirituality. Thus, for LGBT Christians, their sexualities are in conflict with

90
Body theology, aimed as it is at overturning the mind/body dualism, is an
important resource for responding to such objections. Body theology is not reserved,
however, for academicians. Indeed, the everyday theologies of gay and lesbian
Christians who affirm both their faith and their sexualities as good are more influential in
congregational and denominational debates than professionally trained theologians and
ethicists. Moon notes the challenge that gays and lesbians pose to the hierarchy of mind
over body:
To the extent that church members associated homosexuality with the body,
openly gay members highlighted the fact that church members go to church in
their bodies, and not just with their souls. As they did so, they brought out the
physical and other material distinctions that separate people into hierarchies….
They are challenging the church to come up with a new basis for transcendence,
one that does not depend on a spirit/body opposition, one that can acknowledge
hierarchies and address them, rather than render them unspeakable.16
Negating the mind/body dualism will ultimately take place not in theological treatises
(though they are important too!) but in congregational and individual practices.
In light of the fact that body alienation is the foundation for so many forms of
oppression in church and society, including the oppression of gays and lesbians, body
theology becomes a crucial theological resource. One of the central concepts of body
theology attempts to correct for this alienation and is articulated by James Nelson in his
1978 book, Embodiment: An Approach to Sexuality and Christian Theology. Here,
Nelson argues that we should not view ourselves as minds inhabiting bodies, but rather as
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To see oneself as a bodyself requires that one reject the mind/body dualism

of Western philosophy and theology. From this recognition, we realize that we can no
longer isolate the mind as the sole fountain of knowledge. The body as a whole is a
source of knowledge, and, therefore, what we feel, sense, and desire moves to the center
of the process of Christian moral discernment. By recognizing this, Christian theology
can do away with the hierarchical dualisms that have permeated its historical
development. While embodiment is not restricted to any one sphere of human
experience, body theologians have often focused on sex and sexuality, mainly because
countless theologians and church authorities have described sex as the basest of human
desires and actions and, so, it is in the most need of reappraisal. In this context, Nelson
points out how an integration of embodiment influences the doing of theology. As
theologians, he notes, we have long asked, “what does Christian faith have to say about
our lives as sexual beings?” But body theology insists that we pair this question with
another, equally important one: “what does our experience as sexual human beings mean
for the way in which we understand and attempt to live out the faith?”18 It is this
question that identifies what is unique about body theology, and it has produced equally
unique theological insights.
For example, the focus on experience has led theologians of embodiment to
expand the doctrine of incarnation, suggesting that God’s embodiment in Jesus Christ
should shape how we regard our own embodiment. In orthodox Christian theology, the
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doctrine of the incarnation is an exploration of the humanity of Jesus Christ, emphasizing
that Christ was both fully God and fully human, without either being compromised.
Within the earliest elaborations of this doctrine is the positive assertion that the sacred
and the carnal are not mutually exclusive elements, as evidenced by the rejection of the
Docetic notion that Christ’s humanity was apparent and not real. Yet, theologians of the
early church fell short of implying that the human body is capable of making positive
contributions to the work of the church. To be sure, the human body played an important
role in Christian discipleship, but the emphasis was overwhelmingly on controlling the
body, especially through sexual renunciation. Paul makes this point in 1 Thessalonians
4:3-4 and then develops it further in 1 Corinthians 7. The body is made holy by purging
it of its passions.19 Peter Brown, in his study of sexual renunciation in the early church,
shows how this conflicted view of the body was born out in the writings and lives of
many theologians, martyrs, and ascetics.20 In short, there is within the Christian tradition
the paradoxical notion that the way to honor our bodies is to reject them.
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Body theology, however, insists that the incarnation affirms that not only is the
body not contrary to the divine, it is actually a site of the divine. Christians look to Jesus
Christ as the highest revelation of God, and the fact that this revelation is embodied
means that our own embodiment is not simply a temporary, perishable vessel. The
incarnation qua divine revelation means, in Nelson’s words, that embodiedness is “the
norm of God’s presence, the measure of our humanity.”21 Thus, God is experienced
today in and through our bodies just as Christ was experienced by those who saw him in
the flesh.22 The incarnation was not just a one time, historical event; it signaled how God
chooses to relate to us in the world. The incarnation is, thus, “repeatable and
continuing.”23 Nelson summarizes the implication of this renewed understanding of
incarnation:
God is uniquely known to us through human presence, and human presence is
always embodied presence. Thus body language is inescapably the material of
Christian theology, and bodies are always sexed bodies, and our sexuality is basic
to our capacity to know and experience God.24
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The Christian faith is an incarnate faith, and, thus, it is as bodyselves that we experience
the divine and participate in its reality. In other words, bodily experience is revelatory of
God.25
But what does a theological and ethical reflection on the body reveal about the
language used to bar gays and lesbians from ordained ministry? In short, since these
reflections show the degree to which we experience God and participate in the life of the
church as bodyselves, they also demonstrate the degree to which language that denies the
legitimacy of gay and lesbian bodily experiences does violence to gays and lesbians, as
well as the church in general. To “flesh out” this claim, I distill the contributions of body
theology into two larger themes—the body as the locus of our relationality and the body
as the source of theological and moral imagination—that have emerged from the works
of Nelson and other body theologians. These themes are not independent of one another;
in fact, they are complementary, and they prove that the ordination prohibitions in
question are incompatible with a theological anthropology that defines sexuality as Godgiven and good.
The Body as Source of Relationality
If there is a dominant leitmotif that has emerged over the decades from the “body”
of body theology, it is that the body is the locus of our lives in relation with others and
with God. Reflections on the body have shown that we experience deep within us a
longing to be in relation with others. Body theologians make this point especially in the
context of sexuality and the erotic. As sexual beings, we are drawn into a life-in-
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relation—relation with other individuals, with communities, and with God. Such an
expansive understanding of sexuality means sexuality cannot be relegated to what we do
with our genitals, as it has been for much of the Christian tradition. Reflections on
sexuality from those who choose celibate lifestyles make this point abundantly clear. For
example, Keith Clark, a Capuchin monk, describes numerous meaningful relationships
with family and friends as manifestations of his sexuality “because they all had to do with
establishing and maintaining a relatedness and connectedness to other human beings in
varying degrees of personal intimacy.”26 Sexuality, thus, shapes much more than sexual
relationships; it suffuses the ways in which we relate to the world.
James Nelson provides one of the earliest explorations of this relation-oriented
understanding of human sexuality. Sexuality is a dimension of our selves that pervades
all the relationships in our lives. We communicate in and through our bodies, expressing
our hopes, fears, pains, and pleasures with the people we encounter. But, more than this,
we feel in our bodies a longing to share these experiences with others. This longing
points to God’s intention for humanity—we exist for one another and for God.
Therefore, Nelson writes, “the mystery of our sexuality is the mystery of our need to
reach out to embrace others both physically and spiritually. Sexuality thus expresses
God’s intention that we find authentic humanness in relationship.”27 When we are
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harmonized as bodyselves—when we do not fall into the trap of alienating our bodies—
we are open to one another in powerful ways.
Nelson finds this potentiality to be especially acute in sexually intimate
relationships. The experience of sexual pleasure reunites the self and the body in the
individual, overcoming the dualism of mind over body. But, more than that, Nelson
writes, “in my own experience of body-self reunion I simply, and miraculously,
experience reunion with the beloved other.”28 However, desire in general—not just
desire for a sexual partner—is an expression of openness to others. We communicate
much of our feelings for others through sensuality; the impulse to embrace one another
and touch one another is a powerful mediator of relationships as well as a reminder that
with intimacy comes vulnerability. For this reason, sexuality is integral to community:
healthy sexuality seeks community through mutual relationship and participation,
whereas repressed or wounded sexuality inhibits or destroys community by withdrawing
from others or by seeking ownership and control (e.g. patriarchal sexuality) rather than
participation .29
Another poignant way to discuss the relational nature of the bodyself is through a
focus on the erotic. Eros has often been denigrated within the Christian tradition as a
lesser form of love. Theologians in the past (and present, for that matter) have depicted it
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as an acquisitive and selfish form of love and contrasted it with agape, which they depict
as a superior, selfless form of love. They have argued that the ultimate expression of
agapic love is the crucifixion of Christ, the ultimate form of sacrifice. Furthermore, since
God saw fit to express love for humankind in this way, agape is depicted as godly love.
Eros, then, is defined as the selfish, human alternative to agape.30
Other theologians and ethicists have sought to redeem eros from such a
marginalized value. Mark D. Jordan, for example, finds the exploration of eros to be a
necessary step in understanding and expressing agape.31 However, most of the
theological and ethical works that reclaim eros as a source of religious significance have
emerged from feminist scholarship. I will not survey all of these works,32 but will focus
instead on what I consider to be the most significant of them, Carter Heyward’s Touching
Our Strength. Heyward argues for a sexual theology that is grounded in and pursues
justice. Justice has long been defined as a virtue that deals with how we relate to others.
Aristotle, for example, defines justice in general terms as virtue in relation to someone
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Heyward expands upon this tradition from a feminist perspective, placing justice

in the realm of radical relationality. “In this realm,” she writes, “justice is right relation,
and right relation is mutual relation.” Justice involves mutual love, joy, and respect. “To
experience ourselves genuinely as friends: This is justice.” Furthermore, justice is not
simply a term dealing with the social order; it is infused with the divine. God and
justice—neither can be understood fully without the other. Indeed, for Heyward, God is
“our relational power—our power in mutual relation.”34 Thus, in Heyward’s sexual
theology founded on a vision of justice as right relation, the bodyself is the place where
the divine becomes incarnate; it is the ground of God’s presence within and among us.
Central to recognizing and pursuing divine justice, then, is a robust appraisal of
the erotic. Heyward argues that to divide love into categories of divine and human—
agape and eros (and philia, though Heyward does not use this term with much
frequency)—is to misunderstand what love is. Love is both divine and human at once,
not either/or. Thus, rather than relegate the erotic to second-class status, Heyward
celebrates it as crucial to a Christian understanding of love.
The erotic is our most fully embodied experience of the love of God. As such, it
is the source of our capacity for transcendence, the “crossing over” among
ourselves, making connections between ourselves in relation. The erotic is the
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divine Spirit’s yearning, through our bodyselves, toward mutually empowering
relation, which is our most fully embodied experience of God as love.35
If the framework of Heyward’s theology is a vision of justice as mutual relation, then the
erotic is what makes us long for and move toward that vision. The erotic helps us sense
that mutuality is something we already experience but will experience more fully in the
future. Thus, the movement of the erotic within us is both immediate and eschatological.
These theological descriptions of the body as the locus of our lives in relation
provide specific examples of what is at stake in discussing and writing denominational
policies concerning human sexuality. There is a fundamental connection between how
we view our bodily desires and how we experience God and participate in the life of the
church. For this reason, a crucial element of spiritual and social life is being able to value
and trust one’s own experience of embodiment. To be sure, there are many factors that
harm how one experiences embodiment,36 and this dissertation claims that the
homophobic and heterosexist language prohibiting gays and lesbians from ordination is
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one such factor. Because the language operates not only through labeling homosexual
acts incompatible with the Christian faith, but also by creating an image of the
homosexual that casts suspicion on homosexuality as a sexual orientation, it effectively
demands that the bodily experiences of gays and lesbians not be trusted. When such is
the case, the ability of gays and lesbians to express their relationality fully and openly is
compromised, and the church becomes less a place of communion and more a place of
exclusion and objectification. Furthermore, if, as Heyward argues, God is experienced
most deeply in the erotic, then the foreclosure of homoerotic expression damages or
severs the connection between queer bodies and the divine. God is not experienced as
immanent and incarnate, but, rather, as detached and aloof.
The Body as Source of Theological and Moral Imagination
Another theme that has emerged from body theology is the body as a site of
theological and moral imagination. This claim is at heart an epistemological one,
asserting that the body is inseparable from how we think, know, and imagine. It suggests
that the dichotomous struggle between thinking and feeling is not only false but harmful
and that the process or state of knowing is fundamentally embodied. In other words,
bodily knowledge is a mode of theological and moral knowledge. Note that this claim is
not the same as asserting that bodily experience should be included in the formation of
theological and moral assertions; it goes beyond such a statement. Bodily knowledge is
not simply something to be known, though it is also that. It is how we know.
Embodiment is both an objective source to be considered in and an epistemological
foundation of theological and moral discernment. Carter Heyward, for example, states
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that our sensuality is a type of knowledge that connects us to God. “Our senses and the
feelings that are generated by them,” she writes, “become primary spiritual resources. In
knowing one another through our senses, feelings, and intelligence—and intuition is a
form of intelligence—we come to know God.”37 Likewise, James Nelson states that
“Moral knowledge…is bodily knowledge: if we cannot somehow feel in the gut the
meanings of justice and injustice, of hope and hopelessness, those terms remain abstract
and unreal.”38 Body theology, thus, emphasizes the myriad ways that we arrive at
knowledge through our bodies and not despite them. Relying on the work of science
historian Donna Haraway, Gary David Comstock argues that we must include “embodied
objectivity” as a significant contributor to theological and moral dialogue. Embodied
objectivity relies on “situated knowledge,” which emerges from our experiences in our
particular social situations.39 Pain, pleasure, sadness, joy, anger, etc. offer their own
forms of knowledge that cannot be achieved or arrived at through disembodied thinking
detached from the particularities of our lives.
Nelson contrasts disembodied thinking with an approach to knowledge grounded
in embodied community. Building from his aforementioned understanding of sexuality,
he says that communion is the deepest expression of our sexuality. It is also crucial for
the task of theology and ethics because communion is how we experience or arrive at
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He finds that when our

concept of knowledge, especially theological knowledge, is not approached as embodied
communion, we likely succumb to a subject-object dichotomy that views knowledge as
possession; we approach knowledge acquisitively, rather than experientially. Regarding
knowledge as possession cannot but impact the relationship between the individual, the
community, and God. Nelson writes,
God is no longer experienced, when this happens, as vital indwelling presence,
permeating and giving life to the relationships and the basic stuff of everyday life.
When God is only object over against subject, immanence recedes. And when
immanence fades, even God’s transcendence becomes less real.41
Thus, denying the role that our bodies play in the formation of knowledge and
communion affects the very core of Christian spirituality because our ability to detect the
presence of God in our lives is stymied.
Beverly Wildung Harrison provides perhaps the strongest illustration of how we
know with and through our bodies. She asserts unequivocally that “all our knowledge,
including our moral knowledge, is body-mediated knowledge.”42 Furthermore, to
appreciate bodily knowledge, feelings and emotions—both of which have been
denigrated in the Christian tradition and Western civilization—have to be taken
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Feelings are too often dismissed as too subjective and, therefore, unreliable

as a source of knowledge. Harrison rejects this notion, claiming that the confusion results
from assuming that respecting feelings means treating them as ends in themselves.
Harrison does not define feelings this way, and instead insists that feelings are basic
ingredients “in our relational transaction with the world.”44 She offers anger as a
powerful example. Anger is “a feeling-signal that all is not well in our relation to other
persons or groups or to the world around us….To put the point another way: anger is—
and it always is—a sign of some resistance in ourselves to the moral quality of the social
relations in which we are immersed.”45 Harrison’s point is cogent. Too often, oppressive
systems and acts are justified by the abstract rationalization of the privileged (examples
of the abstract justification of oppression abound: Africans are better off as slaves in the
civilized New World than free persons on the “dark continent”; women are passive in
nature and, thus, not fit for public leadership; the only function of sex is procreation and,
thus, homosexuality is unnatural), and the outrage expressed in word and deed by the
oppressed is paternalistically dismissed as hysterics. Anger is not recognized for what it
often is—the knowledge that something is unjust—and the disembodied rationalism of
those who have authority is deemed true. Harrison connects the bodily knowledge of
anger to the work of Christian love. Anger is not an end in itself, but moves the
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individual toward acts of love. Thus, when we deny our anger and ignore the moral
knowledge it represents, we undermine our capacity to love, and our capacity to imagine
a just world.
Thus, body theology demonstrates that our moral knowledge is formed in part
from our bodily experiences, not despite them, and that our bodies are the center of how
we relate to others interpersonally and communally. That being the case, since, as I
argue, the ecclesial language analyzed in this dissertation casts suspicion on the bodily
experiences of gays and lesbians, it also severs the connection between queer bodies and
Christian morality. The bodily experiences of gays and lesbians are not admitted to the
witness of the church or are viewed as contrary to that witness, and, thus, the ability of
gays and lesbians to contribute theologically and morally to the church is diminished.
Moral knowledge and moral imagination are essential for the church to be a prophetic
voice in society. And, as Marvin Ellison reminds us, “Respect for the body is
foundational to moral life.”46 The language of “self-avowed practicing homosexual”
betrays a deep and fundamental disrespect to the bodies of gays and lesbians, and so
damages the moral power and prophetic witness of the church in society today.
Before moving on, it is worth emphasizing that what is at stake is the very
personhood of gays and lesbians in the eyes of the church. As this dissertation argues,
the ordination policies that prohibit gays and lesbians from ordination do more than
simply describe a “type” of homosexual who is barred from ordained ministry. They
produce a homosexual subject rooted in a suspicion of homosexuality and a negative
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judgment of acts associated with homosexuality. The “self-avowed practicing
homosexual” is, then, a discursive production that allows church authorities to denigrate
the personhood of gays and lesbians and call into question their sexual subjectivity. And,
since this homosexual subject is interiorized by many gays and lesbians, it also deeply
impacts the individual subjectivity of gays and lesbians. The phrase “self-avowed
practicing homosexual”, to borrow the terminology of Didier Eribon, is an “insult” that
“creates an interior space of contradiction in which are found all the difficulties a gay
person will meet before being able to assume his or her identity, before being able to
accept being indentified with or identifying with other gay people.”47 In many ways,
then, to deny the bodily experiences of gays and lesbians any moral or theological
validity is to deny them their personhood and subjectivity.
This point is illustrated well by Paula M. Cooey. In her book Religious
Imagination and the Body: A Feminist Analysis, Cooey provides an in-depth account of
how the socially constructed facets of the human body can be a source of immense harm.
Religious Imagination and the Body is not an example of body theology per se, though
Cooey’s works have engaged theologies of embodiment.48 Nevertheless, the book’s
conviction that religious experience is intimately connected with our bodies gives it a
strong connection with body theology.
At the center of Cooey’s argument is her conception of the body. She
foregrounds a postmodern understanding of the body that emphasizes the ways in which
47
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language and symbols construct how we value and interpret our own bodies and the
bodies of others. To use her language, the body is at once a location of human
imagination (we imagine through our bodies) and an artifact of human imagination (our
bodies are constructed and/or interpreted by our own imagination and the imagination of
others). The basic question explored in Religious Imagination and the Body is, what is
the relationship between “the ‘bodied’ imagining subject and the body as cultural
artifact?”49 Cooey finds that this relationship, which she explores in the context of
religious experience and expression, produces tension and carries with it the potential for
both oppression and resistance. Furthermore, it always unfolds in a context of value,
which, Cooey finds, “reflects power arrangements that often stand in dissonant relation to
the experiencing subject.”50 (Her argument sounds very Foucauldian on this point,
though she rarely references him. In any event, the similarities with Foucault’s
discussions of the body and power make Cooey’s work particularly germane for my
project.) Indeed, Cooey describes the body as a crucible of conflicting values where
bodily experiences are either granted or denied epistemological legitimacy.51
Cooey’s argument has numerous implications, all of which cannot be explored
here. What is of particular importance for analyzing the language of “practice” and
“avowal” is the way in which the dual nature of the body regarding religious imagination
(i.e. the body as location and artifact of religious imagination) creates the potential for
49
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harm. The underlying issue for Cooey is the authoritativeness of human experience.
That the experiences of some are not considered authoritative, Cooey argues, is rooted in
the dual nature of the body regarding imagination. The body as artifact of imagination
makes it susceptible to being shaped by external forces (e.g. general forces like culture,
but also specific ones like a hegemonic group), while the body as location of imagination
grants the individual a level of subjectivity that potentially shapes how oneself and others
interpret one’s body. The relationship between the two is never complete and it is an
open question as to which aspect plays a greater role in self-perception and the perception
of others. What Cooey focuses on is how one affects the other, and she offers a powerful
explanation for how the separation of the imagination from the “body lived” harms an
individual’s subjectivity and sometimes results in a total denial of personhood.
On the one hand, too much sensation, particularly pain, destroys the capacity to
imagine self, world, and the possibility of transcendent realities; in short, extreme
sensation annihilates even the possibility of subjectivity for the sufferer….On the
other hand, extreme distantiation of the imagination from the body that locates it
threatens or actually destroys the capacity of an imagining subject to recognize
the subjectivity of another; the body of another ceases to signify potential and
actual status of the other as subject as well as object of cognition. Under these
latter circumstances the other, reduced solely to object, serves as icon to support a
fiction of power, an assertion of hegemony….In short, extreme distantiation
between the body lived and the imagining subject produces an identification of
the body imagined with whatever or whoever is other at the expense of the other’s
subjectivity.52
To put Cooey’s argument in the context of my own study, the icon is the “self-avowed
practicing homosexual,” which is used by the denominations to support compulsory
heterosexuality, “the fiction of power.” The icon does not recognize the subjectivity of
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the persons it is meant to signify, and those persons experience a form of suffering and
oppression that may very well diminish their ability to imagine themselves as something
other than the icon that objectifies them.
A Caveat for Theologians of Embodiment
For all the positive contributions of body theology, it is not without its
weaknesses. The tendency in body theology is to see the body as a place of liberation.
This makes sense, for body theologians often begin with the observation that the body
has been and is oppressed in the Christian/Western tradition. Despite this oppression,
body theologians claim, there is an inherent goodness and sacredness to the body, and so
reflecting on our embodiment in a positive light can liberate ourselves to experience our
bodies as we are meant to. Many body theologians do note that embracing embodiment
involves risk, especially for those whose bodies are subjected to a greater degree of
oppression based on race, ethnicity, gender, or sexual orientation.53 Nevertheless, body
theology is marked by an optimism in the individual’s ability to draw on positive
assessments of the body to liberate one’s own experience from oppression. If one can
grasp and put into practice the correct understanding of embodiment, then one can
experience one’s body as good and fulfilling. However, the optimism placed in the body
can cause body theologians to overlook problems inherent in the body. In short, body
theologians are at times overconfident in the liberating potential of embodiment. The
dangers of this overconfidence become clear when we consider, first, the physical
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limitations of the body, which affect how one regards embodiment; and, second, the
limitations that negative constructions of the body impose on the experience of
embodiment. Though the latter consideration is more apropos of this dissertation, both
establish the boundaries of body theology’s influence by highlighting the limitations of or
problems inherent in different bodies and bodily experiences.
Physical and mental disabilities can shape one’s experience of the body in ways
that are negative or painful. Jackie Leach Scully explores the reality of embodiment from
this perspective. “Not all embodiment is good,” she writes, and genetic disabilities
illustrate her point powerfully.54 While the treatment of disabled persons by individuals
and society can exacerbate their suffering or limitations, genetic disorders add a
predetermined quality to the suffering and/or limitations that a disabled person may
experience. She writes:
It is much harder to conceive of God’s amazing gift of cystic fibrosis, and it
becomes offensive to use that language about Lesch-Nyhan syndrome, or any of
the other numerous genetic conditions where the person affected has neither the
intellectual ability nor, often, the lifespan to come to any metaphysical
conclusions of their own.55
For some, the body is a physical obstacle—regardless how the disability is perceived
socially—to abundant life, and it is this form of impaired bodily experience that body
theologians are apt to neglect.56 They often overlook the simple fact that not all bodies
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are the same. A similar point can be made about the ways that physical impairments are
often treated as negatively impacting one’s embodiment. Consider, for example, the
debate over cochlear implants for persons who are deaf. While some view the possibility
of giving a deaf person the ability to hear as a great improvement to that person’s life,
others claim that such a view is predicated on the demeaning notion that deaf persons are
in need of repair and argue that deafness should be treated as part of one’s identity rather
than a disability.57 In any case, body theologians who too quickly make assumptions or
generalizations about the physicality of embodiment risk overlooking certain bodily
limitations and/or demeaning people who live with those limitations.
Scully’s discussion reveals the limitations of body theology’s characteristic
optimism toward the body, and deserves a more thorough consideration than this
dissertation allows room for.58 Nevertheless, raising Scully’s point begs a question that
bears on the subject of this analysis. Scully shows that what one person points to as
liberating can be experienced by another as oppressive or, at least, restrictive. Is the same
true when we move to the less tangible realm of sexual desire and the erotic? Is it

abundant life apart from the body. To separate the abundant life from bodily existence in that way is to
separate our eschatological hope from the incarnate character of Christian spirituality and discipleship.
57

For more on this issue, see Shelli Delost and Sarah Lashley, “The Cochlear Implant Controversy”
(presented at the Drury University Interdisciplinary Research Conference, Springfield, MO, April 1, 2000),
http://www.drury.edu/multinl/story.cfm?ID=2442&NLID=166, accessed October 18, 2010.

58

For recent theological and ethical explorations on the limits and possibilities of physical and mental
disabilities, see Jennie Weiss Block, Copious Hosting: A Theology of Access for People with Disabilities
(New York: Continuum, 2002); Thomas E. Reynolds, Vulnerable Communion: A Theology of Disability
and Hospitality (Grand Rapids, MI: Brazos Press, 2008); Nancy L. Eiesland, The Disabled God: Toward a
Liberatory Theology of Disability (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 1994); Deborah Beth Creamer,
Disability and Christian Theology: Embodied Limits and Constructive Possibilities (Oxford, UK: Oxford
University Press, 2009).

111
possible that the celebration of human sexuality found in embodiment-centered
theologies is naïve, or unknowingly perpetuating sexual oppression?
In her book Constructing the Erotic, Barbara Blodgett suggests that, in some
contexts, the answer to that question is yes. Blodgett offers a critique of several authors
discussed above in an effort to propose a sexual ethic for adolescent girls. She does not
identify her object of criticism as body theology, per se, but the scholarship she
engages—what she terms “feminist theologies of the erotic”59—fits into my own
description of body theology, and from her critique we can identify a problem to avoid
when doing body theology. Blodgett claims that feminist theologians of the erotic
oversimplify human sexuality in a harmful way by reducing it—and, in some ways,
personhood in general—to the erotic and by being overconfident in the ability of the
erotic (rightly understood, of course) to compel us toward fullness in life. The goal of
these theologians, then, is to free the erotic from patriarchal and heterosexist forces that
repress it. In short, as Blodgett summarizes, the conviction underlying these theologies
is: “To liberate the erotic is to liberate the person.”60 Thus, feminist theologians of the
erotic put forth a narrative of sexuality that is a simple movement from oppression to
liberation. This is not to say that feminist theologians of the erotic suggest that liberation
is easy to achieve. The narrative is simple in that it claims to have identified the nature of
sexual oppression and the key to its liberation. This (over)confidence in the power of the
erotic, Blodgett argues, is why feminist theologies of the erotic are ultimately
59
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unsuccessful in formulating a workable sexual ethics. She states, “We must admit that
however much we want to affirm the goodness of the erotic, it may not always be entirely
seemly and may occasionally be maddening…While it may no longer be taboo, neither
will the erotic ever be the key to all liberation.”61
Blodgett supports this argument by examining how adolescent girls understand
the erotic, demonstrating that, for many girls, the erotic cannot help them navigate their
sexualities and make sexual choices because the erotic is itself the problem. Consider the
world of conflicting expectations that adolescent girls face:
On the one hand, within many communities the assumption still operates that girls
who act on their erotic impulses and desires are wrong to do so, whether because
sex is dangerous terrain for them or because double standards still suggest that
girls who desire sex are depraved. On the other hand, even where these
assumptions are not in place, the distinction between which impulses and actions
girls are free to act on and which ones are wrong has become significantly
blurred. Girls still hear, for example, that they should save themselves (that is,
reserve the act of intercourse) for Mr. Right, and yet they see the scorn men give
to women who wait.62
The erotic and its correlative relationality are beset with risks for adolescent girls. Thus,
eros cannot serve as its own moral guide, as feminist theologians try to suggest. Rather
than embracing the erotic, Blodgett concludes, “These girls seem to need some relief
from their self-imposed burden of finding and sustaining intimate relationships (at least
romantic ones),” and she suggests a paradigm of “friendly distrust” to protect adolescent
girls from harmful sexual experiences.63
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This dissertation does not address adolescent sexuality directly, but Blodgett’s
argument is important because she identifies a tendency that is present in body theology.
On the one hand, most body theologians acknowledge that our bodily experiences are
socially constructed to some degree. On the other hand, body theologians too often do
not discuss the constructed quality of our bodies and sexualities critically enough.
Blodgett’s criticism of feminist theologians of the erotic illustrates this situation.
Feminist theologians of the erotic argue that women have long suffered from an
essentialism that defined female sexuality in patriarchal terms. Their discussion of the
erotic is a project grounded in social construction; it is an attempt to re-construct
sexuality and/or sexual orientation in a way that is free from the sexist, misogynistic, and
heterosexist aspects of patriarchy. However, by describing the erotic with an unbridled
optimism, these theologians essentialize their own interpretation of the erotic, suggesting
that once women uncover the true nature of the erotic, they can embrace it to liberating
ends. Such a view undermines their affirmation and use of social construction theories,
and many body theologians tend to make this same mistake. Theories of social
construction are often marshaled for the purpose of refuting oppressive construals of
sexuality and gender, but then fade into the background or disappear altogether. Once
they have separated themselves from the patriarchal and heterosexist confines of an
essentialist view of gender and sexuality, body theologians freely re-cast gender and
sexuality in a positive light to show how these categories can contribute to the flourishing
pedophilia, an example I also used in note 129, that should be foreclosed because they are inherently
immoral, and for someone suffering from such feelings, distrust of the erotic might be necessary or at least
prudent. The theological implication of this statement is that there are times when the erotic does not move
us closer to God or into community with one another. Anyone drawing on body theology, then, must be
careful not to assume that the concept of the erotic serves as its own heuristic in all moral situations.
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of individuals and communities. I am not opposed to this type of argument. In fact, it is
a crucial exercise of the moral imagination, without which our understanding of sexuality
would be impoverished. But an uncritical or perfunctory use of social construction
theory can perpetuate or complicate oppression, rather than overturn it.
Of course, there are theologians and ethicists of embodiment that integrate social
construction in ways that avoid this pitfall. Christine Gudorf, for example, distances
herself from responses to oppression perpetrated by the Christian tradition that do not
grapple with it in critical ways. In making the case that Christian spirituality should be
grounded in embodiment, Gudorf writes, “Perhaps the first thing to be observed is that
the dominant cultural narrative in our post-modern society—the narrative of therapeutic
well-being—is, in many ways, an inadequate reaction to many of the more repressive,
neurotic, and masochistic (and, of course, then, sometimes sadistic) inclinations in
traditional Christian spirituality.”64 To be clear, she is not equating “therapeutic wellbeing” with the methods of body theologians, but her statement does show an awareness
of the fact that, due to the complicated nature of oppression, one’s response to oppression
must be nuanced. One implication of social construction theory is that identity is
constantly being constructed and reconstructed, and for this reason one’s response must
also be revisited frequently. Dismantling oppression also means constructing new ways
of understanding our bodyselves that perhaps open as many new questions as they close
older forms of oppression. Take, for example, Gudorf’s rejection of sexual dimorphism.
In place of the male-female paradigm for understanding sex and gender, she suggests a
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polymorphic paradigm. This paradigm is necessary, she states, but it also complicates
how we navigate the terrain of identity, which in turn impacts our ability to identify and
address forms of oppression. As she writes, “a paradigm of polymorphous sexuality
gives us much less guidance in constructing/analyzing/envisioning our own sexual
identity, much less help in discovering/understanding/naming objects of our sexual
desire.”65 Thus, Gudorf recognizes that addressing oppression is vital yet dangerous
business, and living into our solutions to one problem may lead us into others.
When integrating body theology into one’s theological and ethical method, then,
one must be wary of views of the body that are too simple or idealistic. Foucault’s theory
of the body is helpful in this regard.
Integrating Foucault and Body Theology
Having described the most relevant contributions of body theology as well as its
weakness, it remains to discuss more fully how body theology and the work of Foucault
can be integrated in fruitful ways. As stated at the start of this chapter, the two bodies of
work serve as mutual correctives. To summarize this relationship: Foucault’s theories
qualify the confidence that body theology places in the potential for bodily liberation, and
body theology qualifies Foucault’s cynicism toward the possibility of large-scale
liberation. The relationship between Foucault and body theology, then, is fraught with
tension, though this tension need not lead to a vicious cycle of indecision. As much
overlap as there is between them, they resist one another constantly. Where body

65

Christine E. Gudorf, “The Erosion of Sexual Dimorphism: Challenges to Religion and Religious Ethics,”
in Sexuality and the Sacred: Sources for Theological Reflection, ed. Marvin M. Ellison and Kelly Brown
Douglas, 2nd ed. (Louisville, KY: Westminster John Knox Press, 2010), 159.

116
theologians engage a personal exploration of sexuality that moves from the individual to
the interpersonal and to the community—an ever-expanding movement from one’s own
body to the body of Christ—Foucault pushes back, approaching the body from the level
of discourse, emphasizing that discourse shapes and influences the most personal aspects
of our lives. And where Foucault views society as an obstinate labyrinth of discursive
systems and, thus, treats resistance and liberation as a matter of personal aesthetics, body
theology pushes back with the conviction that, since our bodies connect us to the divine,
and since the divine is interwoven throughout creation, bodily liberation does indeed
contain the potential to reverberate throughout the church and society in order to establish
sexual and social justice.
One underlying assumption of my method is that this tension is fruitful. It
challenges me to combine a discursive analysis of denominational statements and court
decisions with the stories of those affected by them. What remains is an analysis of the
language in question, and we will begin with the notion of sexual “practice.”

CHAPTER FOUR
THE RHETORIC OF HOMOSEXUAL PRACTICE
When, in 1984, the United Methodist Church (UMC) passed a resolution
prohibiting “self-avowed practicing homosexuals” from serving as ordained ministers,1
the policy faced an immediate challenge from those who opposed it. Citing another
policy of the UMC that prohibits discrimination based on race or status,2 opponents of the
new ordination standard argued that it violated the anti-discrimination policy by
discriminating against gays and lesbians on the basis of their status as homosexuals. In
light of this concern, the UMC Judicial Council was asked to rule whether the prohibition
of “self-avowed practicing homosexuals” from ordained ministry was constitutional. In a
decision made that same year, the Judicial Council upheld the prohibition. The Council
did not, however, try to deny that homosexuality should be protected as a status. Instead,
it stated that status was not the issue. One member of the Council, James M. Dolliver,
noted in a concurring opinion, that “while, arguably, to be a homosexual is to be within a
protected status…[the UMC] does not per se bar homosexuals from ordained ministry.”
Rather, the prohibition “is directed toward those persons who are ‘self-avowed practicing
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homosexuals,’ which is an entirely different thing.” In other words, since a homosexual
3

can still be ordained, albeit a non-practicing homosexual, the standard cannot be said to
discriminate against homosexuals. The ordination standard addresses conduct, not sexual
orientation.
Dolliver’s remark is telling. He demarcates homosexual identity from
homosexual conduct in order to regulate homosexual expression without condemning—
or, at least, appearing to condemn—homosexuals. This way of speaking about
homosexuality is characteristic of Protestant debates on the issue that have taken place
over the past four decades. Protestant churches have sought to prohibit homosexual
practice while affirming the inherent dignity of homosexuals as persons.4 The
proponents of the prohibition of homosexual practice, then, do not intend to discriminate
against or condemn gays and lesbians as a group. Most often, proponents are motivated
by a desire to remain faithful to what they feel is the appropriate interpretation and
application of the Bible and the Christian tradition, and at the same time respect changing
medical and cultural views that understand homosexuality to be a legitimate sexual
orientation. This balance often results in an emphasis on actions over sexual orientation,
which many claim is a reflection of the Bible’s references to same-sex sexual activity.5
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The rhetoric of homosexual practice, thus, is used to shift the focus from the personhood
of the individuals in question to particular actions that may be subjected to church
discipline.
I obviously disagree with the basic assumption that homosexual practice is
inherently condemnable. Sexual activity should be evaluated by the same standard, be it
homosexual, heterosexual or otherwise. Making that case, though, is not the main subject
of this dissertation. I argue that the language of practice—together with the language of
avowal, to be discussed in the next chapter—participates in the construction and
perpetuation of an oppressive view of homosexuality and the homosexual subject. The
discursive consequences of this language, then, are not limited by the intentions of its
authors. This chapter examines the different ways that the rhetoric of homosexual
practice functions or did function within denominational policies and ecclesial courts.
These functions are two-fold and related to one another in a paradoxical way. I have
already alluded to the first: the language of homosexual practice is used to separate
homosexual conduct from the status of identifying as a homosexual. The language of
homosexual practice, however, also operates by doing the exact opposite—it conflates
homosexual conduct and identity. That is, homosexuality as an identity is so closely
associated with prohibited homosexual practice in public debate and church discipline
that the distinction between the “practicing” and the “non-practicing homosexual” is

sex impulses." Gagnon, The Bible and Homosexual Practice (Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press, 2002), 3738. It should also be noted that Gagnon errs when he implies that homosexual intercourse and homosexual
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nugatory. Thus, the claim that the prohibition of homosexual practice does not
discriminate against gays and lesbians is disingenuous.
These paradoxical functions of the rhetoric of homosexual practice put forth a
convoluted definition of the homosexual subject. At its core, this homosexual subject is
one for whom sexuality is something that is part of one’s deepest sense of self—indeed, it
defines the homosexual self—yet also something that can be turned on and off, made
visible and invisible, by choosing to act like a homosexual or choosing not to. And so,
for the homosexual subject that emerges from debates about homosexual practice, sexual
identity and sexual expression relate to one another in a complex and oppressive way.
This chapter analyzes the language of homosexual practice in the context of this
relationship and is divided into five sections. The first section explores the
separation/conflation of homosexual conduct and identity in secular law and public
policy. Far from an exhaustive survey of this phenomenon, this section is meant to
provide parallel illustrations of how I argue the language of homosexual practice
functions in mainline Protestantism. For example, legal arguments made by the U. S.
Supreme Court in cases like Bowers v. Hardwick (1986) demonstrate the ease with which
criminalized acts associated with a marginalized identity (i.e. sodomy and
homosexuality) can be construed so broadly as to encompass any perceived expression of
that identity. These illustrations also lend credence to the idea that the language of
homosexual practice in mainline Protestantism functions by separating and conflating
homosexual identity and conduct. Church policies regarding homosexuality, like their
secular counterparts, are mirrors of cultural changes in people’s attitudes toward
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homosexuality. So, if the separation/conflation of homosexual identity and conduct has
occurred in secular law, its occurrence in ecclesial courts is to be expected.
The second section introduces how the separation/conflation of homosexual
identity and conduct has occurred in Christian theology. The way of speaking about
homosexuality that is captured by the language of homosexual practice has a history, and
it is important to understand the theological origins of it, if one is to understand its
subsequent theological development. To illustrate this theological position, I will
describe and critique the discussion of homosexuality by Helmut Thielicke in his work
The Ethics of Sex, first published in English in 1964.6 Thielicke’s work holds much
relevance for this study. The language of homosexual practice did not emerge in a
vacuum, but developed and is developing over time. “Homosexual practice” entered the
mainline Protestant lexicon in the late 1960s and 70s, and Thielicke’s work provided the
theological moorings for theologians and church leaders seeking to chart a middle way on
the issue of gays and lesbians in the church. That The Ethics of Sex was influential in
Protestant theological circles in America at that time is evidenced by its numerous
reviews in professional journals, and the fact that it still receives attention from scholars
today is a testament to its enduring impact.7
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Thielicke provided guidance for denominations taking up the issue of
homosexuality by dividing his treatment of homosexuality into two parts—a theological
evaluation and a moral evaluation—in a way that mirrors the separation of homosexual
status from conduct. The thing that separates Thielicke from his predecessors and many
of his contemporaries on this point is his assertion that homosexuality is an unchosen
constitution or predisposition. He evaluates homosexual acts as morally different from
heterosexual acts because they are inherently opposed to God’s created order. Separating
the assessment of homosexuality into theological and moral categories thus lays a
theological foundation for separating homosexual identity from homosexual conduct in
the church documents that began to appear in the years following the English publication
of Thielicke’s work. Thielicke’s discussion, however, also demonstrates how the
division collapses in upon itself. The “constitutional homosexual,” in Thielicke’s
description, is clearly a sexual subject uniquely inclined/destined to act on that
constitution. Thielicke, then, is relevant to this analysis historically and theologically: his
work introduces into Protestantism a theological framework for separating homosexuality
and homosexual conduct, and illustrates how easily this separation breaks down.
The third and fourth sections trace the development of the language of
homosexual practice in the UMC, PC (USA), and the ELCA. Section three looks first at
the official policies as they have developed over the years and examines how these
policies operate within the ordination processes and ecclesial courts. Section four
considers recent developments in the PC (USA) and the ELCA that admit the possibility
of practicing gays and lesbians being ordained.
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The final section interprets the development and deployment of the language of
homosexual practice through the lens developed in chapters two and three. As discussed
in chapter two, Foucault’s discussion of how disciplinary discourse individualizes its
subjects is particularly germane to an analysis of homosexual practice, and I discuss the
separation/conflation of homosexual identity and conduct as an example of
individualization. The contributions of body theology reveal how the language of
homosexual practice cuts gays and lesbians off from the life of the church. Because it is
prohibited and because it is conflated with homosexual identity, the language of
homosexual practice creates a homosexual subject who is abject on a theological and
moral level and alienated from the life of the church.
The Separation/Conflation of Identity and Conduct in Secular Law and Society
Some of the clearest examples of how homosexual practice is conflated with
homosexual identity come from U. S. Supreme Court decisions. Consider, for example,
analyses of how the status of being a homosexual in secular society carries with it the
presupposition of “practice.” While sodomy laws in the United States were struck down
by the 2003 Supreme Court decision Lawrence v. Texas, legal cases prior to this decision
reveal how being a homosexual makes one susceptible to being charged with certain
homosexual acts. The circumstances of the 1986 Supreme Court decision Bowers v.
Hardwick illustrate the slippage from being a homosexual to being a practicing
homosexual.
The case involved the arrest by Atlanta police officer K. R. Torick of Michael
Hardwick and another man for being engaged in oral sex in the privacy of Hardwick’s
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bedroom. Hardwick was charged with committing acts of sodomy, which was
criminalized under Georgia law. What is interesting, however, is that, while he was
arrested for a particular act, the arrest was the last in a series of events that occurred prior
to Hardwick’s arrest.8 Hardwick initially encountered Officer Torick outside the gay bar
where he was a bartender. Torick saw Hardwick throw away a beer bottle in a trashcan
outside the bar, and then proceeded to question him. Hardwick mentioned to Torick that
he was a bartender at the bar, which immediately identified him as a homosexual.
Officer Torick then ticketed Hardwick for drinking in public. Due to a discrepancy on
the ticket concerning when he was to appear in court, Hardwick was not present on his
court day. Torick came by Hardwick’s apartment with a warrant the following day—
which was technically impossible because it should have taken Torick forty-eight hours
to get the warrant processed—but Hardwick was not home. Learning of Torick’s visit,
Hardwick immediately went to court and paid the fifty-dollar fine. Almost one month
later, Torick returned to Hardwick’s home and entered Hardwick’s bedroom, where he
found him engaged in oral sex with another man. When Torick mentioned he had a
warrant for Hardwick’s arrest, Hardwick said the warrant couldn’t be any good because
he had paid the fine. Torick arrested him and his partner anyway, and charged them
under Georgia’s sodomy law.
The details of Hardwick reveal how the criminalization of homosexual acts often
has less to do with the act itself, and more to do with a fear of homosexuality and
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homosexuals. The law pertaining to homosexual acts, in other words, becomes a vessel
for persecuting gays and lesbians for being homosexual. As legal scholar Kendall
Thomas notes about the series of events leading up to Hardwick’s arrest:
In my view, this aspect of the case provides some basis for a belief that the
officer’s visit on the day of the arrest had less to do with what Hardwick had
done, than with his discovery some weeks before of who and what Hardwick was.
Had Michael Hardwick not first been ascribed a homosexual identity, it is
unlikely that he would ever have been observed or arrested for engaging in
prohibited homosexual acts.9
Thomas argues that this connection between being identified as homosexual and then
arrested for engaging in homosexual acts has drastic legal and social consequences. It
effectively “interdicts (homo)social identity and (homo)sexual intimacy” and “enjoins
homosexual existence and homoerotic acts.”10
Thomas is not alone in identifying how the prohibition of homosexual acts is
tantamount to discriminating against homosexuals as a group. As Francisco Valdes
writes in his study of sexual minorities in the military: “…despite the intuitive sense of
distinction between sexual orientation and sexual behavior generally, American law and
society collapse status into conduct strategically in order to rationalize and exonerate the
punishment of the disfavored status of homosexuality. Indeed, conduct becomes a means
to an end.”11 The now-repealed military policy “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” (DADT) is a
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perfect illustration of status collapsing into conduct, where saying one is a homosexual is
likened to a form of sexual act.
This conflation is possible, in part, because of the elasticity of terms like sodomy
and homosexual practice. In a religious context, Mark D. Jordan notes that since the
invention of the term sodomy in early medieval theology, it has been used to mean
“whatever anyone wanted it to mean.”12 In many legal cases, sodomy has been construed
broadly as homosexual conduct, a category that is easily manipulable. The minority
opinion of the 1996 Supreme Court case Romer v. Evans, written by Justice Antonin
Scalia, demonstrates how broadly homosexual conduct can be construed. The majority
opinion struck down a Colorado constitutional amendment that overturned all state and
local anti-discrimination ordinances protecting gays and lesbians from discrimination
based on sexual orientation.13 In his dissent, Scalia casts gay and lesbian political speech
as a form of homosexual conduct, and the Supreme Court had argued in Hardwick that
homosexual conduct does not fall under the purview of Constitutional protection.14 The
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rationale for Scalia’s argument seems to be that homosexual conduct is defined less by
the specific action being done and more by the sexual orientation of the person doing it.
As Scalia’s argument makes clear, the consequences of criminalizing homosexual
practice in the American legal system restricts not just the private actions of gays and
lesbians, but how they represent themselves in public as well. The rhetoric of
homosexual practice, then, reinforces the notion that public space is heterosexual space.
Feminist and queer theorist Cheshire Calhoun argues this point in her book, Feminism,
the Family, and the Politics of the Closet: Lesbian and Gay Displacement. She agrees
that homosexual practice is conflated with homosexual identity, and finds that the
conflation has the effect of pressuring gays and lesbians to remain closeted by displacing
them from the public sphere and prohibiting queer speech.15 Calhoun shows how this is
the case by comparing discrimination against public gay and lesbian identity to
discrimination against other, more visible identities like gender and race. She asks us to
imagine a military policy similar to DADT, but one that bans women from publicly
identifying themselves as women.
Women would be subject to discharge both for engaging in womanly activities
(say, joining the National Organization for Women or wearing women’s clothing)
and for making the self-identifying statement: “I am woman”….While not
discriminating on one level (one may be a woman), this fictional policy clearly
discriminates on another. It would burden women with the task of managing their
public identities so that they appear to be men. And it would prohibit women
from doing what men may do, namely, represent themselves as having the
identities that they do have.16
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The illustration is striking in how it asks one to imagine a woman who cannot act
publicly like a woman, and the relevance of the illustration hardly needs to be pointed
out. When homosexual practice is criminalized (in civil law) and/or banned (among
clergy in mainline Protestant churches) and at the same time conflated with homosexual
identity, then gays and lesbians are in the same position as the woman in Calhoun’s
analog. The one difference being that it is easier for a gay or lesbian person to pass as
straight than a woman to pass as a man.
Calhoun takes the illustration even further. Gender is a constitutive part of the
speaking subject, she argues. And so prohibiting a woman to speak qua woman does not
simply limit what a woman may say, but it denies that a woman may speak at all.
Calhoun claims that the same can be said of sexual orientation, and, thus, “prohibiting
lesbian, gay, and bisexual self-representation in the public world not only restricts the
content of speech, but more importantly denies that lesbian, gay, or bisexual subjects may
speak at all. Only heterosexuals, real and pseudonymous, may.”17
The impact of discrimination on self-representation leads Calhoun to
problematize the way we speak of legally protected statuses like gender, race, and sexual
orientation. With respect to sexual orientation, she argues, we need to distinguish
between the right to be gay or lesbian in public and the right to represent oneself in
public as gay or lesbian. Status-based anti-discrimination policies protect the former but
do little to protect the latter. As we shall see, the claim that policies prohibiting
practicing homosexuals from ordination are not discriminatory is open to a similar
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critique. While technically a gay or lesbian person can be ordained in these
denominations, the degree to which a homosexual is free to represent her or himself as a
homosexual is limited by the ambiguity of what homosexual practice is, the idea that a
homosexual is guilty by association of being a practicing homosexual, and the everpresent threat of ecclesial discipline.
The Separation/Conflation of Identity and Conduct in Christian Theology
Helmut Thielicke’s discussion of homosexuality in The Ethics of Sex represents
both the historical and theological origins of the homosexual identity-conduct distinction
in mainline Protestantism. Thielicke argues that a Christian evaluation of homosexuality
must be two-fold. One must first understand homosexuality as a “predisposition” or
“constitution” and ask what the theological standing of such a condition is. The moral
evaluation of homosexual behavior is a separate matter. Thielicke, thus, divides the
theological from the ethical: the theological evaluation speaks to the personhood of the
constitutional homosexual, and the moral evaluation to the way a homosexual chooses to
express that personhood.
Perhaps the clearest way to understand the uniqueness of Thielicke’s discussion
of homosexuality at that time is to provide a counterpoint. Thielicke takes Karl Barth to
task for his discussion of homosexuality in Church Dogmatics, III, 4. There, Barth offers
an explanation of homosexuality rooted not in a predisposition beyond the control of the
individual, but a conscious choice to refuse to recognize God’s will for humanity. When
such a choice is made, the man-woman relationship is disregarded for “the ideal of a
masculinity free from woman and a femininity free from man.” Barth sees this as a
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turning inward to oneself, where one feels so fully satisfied with himself that he neglects
to consider his fellow human being. Barth continues
And because nature or the Creator of nature will not be trifled with, because the
despised fellow-man is still there, because the natural orientation on him is still in
force, there follows the corrupt emotional and physical desire in which—in a
sexual union which is not and cannot be genuine—man thinks that he must seek
and can find in man, and woman in woman, a substitute for the despised
partner....But the decisive word of Christian ethics must consist in a warning
against entering upon the whole way of life which can only end in the tragedy of
concrete homosexuality.18
The homosexual is still at heart heterosexual, as the italicized portion makes clear, and,
thus, Barth seems not to consider the possibility of one having a homosexual
“constitution,” as Thielicke states. I am not trying to toss Barth’s short treatment of
homosexuality into the debate over whether homosexuality is chosen or genetic or
whatever (a debate that I feel is fraught with more pitfalls than potential19). I mean
simply to draw attention to the fact that, because Barth views homosexuality as the result
of one’s disregard for God—a conscious choice that one makes during one’s lifetime—
homosexuality is condemned a priori as sinful. Barth conflates but does not separate
homosexual identity and conduct. A homosexual is one who commits homosexual acts,
and so condemning the latter, by implication, condemns the former.
18
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Thielicke criticizes theologians like Barth for making the statement that
“homosexuality is sinful.” He claims that their error is to project their own antihomosexual prejudices into their assessment of homosexuality, and this leads to
evaluating homosexuality the same way one evaluates homosexual conduct. Rather than
rejecting homosexuality outright, Thielicke argues, the Christian theologian and ethicist
must take seriously the notion that homosexuality can be or is a constitutional
predisposition. That being the case, Thielicke asks a question unique for his time and
vocation:
What is the person who is so constituted by “fate” to think of himself from the
theological point of view? This is after all the real question. And then how shall
he act on the basis of this self-understanding?20
Thielicke’s answer to the first question is that the homosexual need not think of himself
as more sinful or corrupt than anyone else, because homosexuality is a predisposed
condition for which the homosexual is not culpable. Thus, he makes the analogy that just
as original sin is to be distinguished from the actualization of a concrete sin, so is the
homosexual predisposition to be distinguished from homosexual acts.21 Thielicke’s
analogy is fitting for his argument because he sees the homosexual constitution as a
product of the disordered state of this postlapsarian world. It is a “symptomatic
participation in the fate of the fallen world,” and, Thielicke claims, this fact means that
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homosexuals should not be evaluated as inherently more sinful than “us ‘normal’
persons.”22 As he writes
The predisposition itself, the homosexual potentiality as such, dare not be any
more strongly depreciated than the status of existence which we all share as men
in the disordered creation that exists since the Fall (post lapsum)….Consequently,
there is not the slightest excuse for maligning the constitutional homosexual
morally or theologically.23
Theologically, then, Thielicke prefers to speak of all humanity bearing the same fallen
status, with no room for singling out one group of persons over any other. For this
reason, Thielicke argues that homosexuality as the phenomenality of one’s existence is
immune from the condemnation that is leveled against homosexual acts.
While Thielicke’s discussion of homosexuality as a predisposition is noteworthy
for its “qualified acceptance”24 of the homosexual, the heterosexist underpinnings of his
theological anthropology are not difficult to detect. Thielicke stresses that homosexuals
and heterosexuals share the same postlapsarian existence, but by no means does this place
both sexual orientations on equal footing. Theologically speaking, heterosexuality is
good because it is part of the orders of creation. Indeed, Thielicke’s theological sexual
anthropology is based on the view that the sex differentiation referenced in the first
chapters of Genesis carries normative weight; it establishes God’s intention for man and
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Thus, while the expression of heterosexuality always occurs in

this fallen world and is mired by sin, the heterosexual’s sexuality rests on the sure footing
of God’s intention for humankind. The expression of homosexuality is also sinful, but
homosexuality as an orientation is rooted not in God’s intention, but human sinfulness. It
is a “distortion or depravation”26 of the created order of the sexes.
This theological difference cannot be underestimated, for it has an immense
impact on Thielicke’s description of the homosexual and his moral evaluation of
homosexual practice. Thielicke’s discussion of the theological and phenomenological
situation a homosexual finds himself in depicts an individual who has little choice in how
he conducts himself sexually. Indeed, the constitutional homosexual, beset as s/he is with
a sexuality in discord with God’s intention for creation, is troubled by “the slippery
ground of his existence” and caught in “a situation of permanent conflict.” He goes on
The temptations of the homosexual which we have described are so great that we
must appreciate why it is that Christian theologians often despair in the face of the
minimal chances of being able to live ethically with homosexuality and achieve
an acceptable partnership. And we ourselves do not venture to credit these
chances with anything more than being a possible exception.27
The implication of this description of homosexual personhood, which Thielicke does not
seem to appreciate, is that the sovereignty of the moral agent is compromised by a
homosexual constitution. The homosexual is not in complete control of his or her
actions, and is defined by an inherent, dubious capacity to give in to sexual temptations
and engage in homosexual practice.
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To Thielicke’s credit, he displays a pastoral sensitivity to homosexuals that many
of his contemporaries did not. Since he believes homosexuality is a predisposition, he
rejects the idea that homosexuality is something than can be cured and finds it unfair to
ask a homosexual simply to repress homosexual feelings. He recommends instead
rigorous spiritual guidance for those few homosexuals who are willing to accept it.
Under such guidance, homosexuals may be able to attain a “relative ethical order” if they
can maintain homosexual relationships that are marked by the same characteristics as
responsible heterosexual relationships.28 Here, though, the theological evaluation of
homosexuality places severe limitations on such homosexual relationships. Because
homosexuality is outside the orders of creation and its existence is directly attributable to
human sinfulness, these tolerated homosexual relationships “cannot be an open and
public thing.”29 Tolerating certain homosexual relationships is simply a way to make due
while we reside in the penultimate character of this fallen world.
Thus, the homosexual, in Thielicke’s mind, is one who must come to terms with
an abnormal sexual predisposition, yet does not possess the ability to do so without the
proper religious guidance and care. The ethical possibilities for the homosexual are very
few, and the chance that a homosexual will come to live ethically within the confines of
such a questionable sexual predisposition is remote. Here, then, in a theological and
ethical assessment of homosexuality written at a time of changing medical, political, and
cultural understandings of homosexuality, the delineation of a homosexual predisposition
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from homosexual conduct is paired with the notion that homosexuals are bound to act on
their sexual predisposition, a consequence of its origins as a departure from God’s created
order. The things that Thielicke intends to evaluate separately are elided in the course of
his analysis. This elision undermines Thielicke’s claim that the homosexual
predisposition is theologically and morally neutral, and establishes a heterosexist
definition of the homosexual subject at a time when mainline Protestant denominations
were beginning to discuss how to respond to the growing visibility of gays and lesbians
in church and society.
The Separation/Conflation of Identity and Conduct in Mainline Protestantism
The division of homosexuality into a homosexual identity and homosexual
conduct that Thielicke helped introduce in modern Protestant theology and ethics soon
found its way into American publications in theology and ethics, and then into the initial
statements on homosexuality adopted by the UMC and the predecessor denominations of
the PC (USA) and the ELCA. Consider briefly an example from American Christian
scholarship around that time. The first edition of A Dictionary of Christian Ethics,
published in 1967 by Westminster Press, included an entry for homosexuality. Actually,
it was a dual entry for homosexuality and “homosexualism.” The entry treats these two
terms as separate yet related phenomena.
Homosexuality is a personal condition, not a kind of behaviour (for which the
term homosexualism is used here)…. Homosexuality generally disposes the
subject to self-expression in physical acts with others of the same sex, and when
moral or social restraints are weak or absent there may be occasional or habitual
indulgence in some kind of homosexualism.30
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The entry supports the idea that homosexuality as a condition is to be evaluated
separately from homosexual behavior.
This division took on a certain utility in light of the changing views of the medical
establishment regarding homosexuality and the rise of the modern gay rights movement.
As the gay rights movement began to coalesce in the late 1960s, especially following the
1969 Stonewall Riots, gays and lesbians began to reject publicly the stigma attached to
being gay. Frank Kameny, for example, coined the term “Gay is good” (inspired by the
phrase “Black is beautiful”) to offer an understanding of homosexuality not defined by
frameworks of pathology or sin. The gay community was becoming more visible in
society and arguing for equal rights and equal protection under the law.
Coinciding, not coincidentally, with these political and cultural movements was a
shift in the official position of the medical community regarding homosexuality. The
pathological definition of homosexuality fell out of favor with the medical community in
the 60s and early 70s, culminating in the decision of the American Psychiatric
Association to remove homosexuality from its list of mental disorders in 1973.
Homosexuality was no longer a medical condition to be treated. Mainline Protestant
denominations took the opinions of the medical community seriously, and so the question
became how to balance biblical authority and the consensus of the professional
community. As Heather White has noted in her historical study of modern Christian
views of homosexuality, the separation of conduct from the sexual orientation itself
played a crucial role in this regard:
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The distinction between homosexuality as a neutral orientation and homosexual
conduct as a sinful breach of Christian teachings functioned in more complicated
ways to provide Protestant churches a provisional stance amid conflicting
frameworks of medical science and biblical morality….By distinguishing
orientation from practice, they could continue to embrace medical frameworks
that questioned homosexual pathology while also upholding doctrines of
homosexual sinfulness.31
Thus, the language of homosexual practice provides a vocabulary that takes seriously the
modern concept of homosexuality as a deeply ingrained, non-pathological aspect of
personhood, but also considers biblical references to homosexuality as a binding
proscription of homosexual conduct.
Mainline Protestant denominations in America began adopting statements
regarding homosexuality around the same time that codified this vocabulary. These
statements embodied the division of homosexual identity and conduct by, on the one
hand, expressing the need to protect gays and lesbians from violence and discrimination
in the church and society and asserting the basic human dignity of gays and lesbians as
creatures of God; and, on the other hand, stating unequivocally that homosexual practice
was against Christian teaching.
Along these lines, the UMC passed a resolution in 1968 that included a statement
arguing for the decriminalization of sex acts between persons of the same gender, a
sentiment that is rearticulated in a passage from the Book of Discipline that advocates for
respecting basic human rights and civil liberties for gays and lesbians.32 Furthermore, the
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UMC amended its Book of Discipline in 1972 with a statement on homosexuality that
affirms that homosexuals no less than heterosexuals are persons of sacred worth, but
labels the practice of homosexuality incompatible with Christian teaching.33 This
statement was incorporated into the UMC’s ordination standards in 1984, when the
General Conference adopted ¶ 304.3, banning self-avowed practicing homosexuals from
ordination.
The United Presbyterian Church in the United States of America (UPCUSA)—a
predecessor denomination of the PC (USA)—used the entry from the Dictionary of
Christian Ethics in its statement on human sexuality adopted in 1970, stating, “There is a
difference between homosexuality as a condition of personal existence and
homosexualism as explicit homosexual behavior.” The document relies on Thielicke’s
The Ethics of Sex to articulate where homosexuality as an identity stands, theologically
speaking. It notes that, while Scripture does not single out homosexuality as more
heinous than other sins, it is indicative of “man’s refusal to accept his creatureliness.”34
This statement did not address the ordination of gays and lesbians, but the UPCUSA took
up this issue in its 1978 statement, “The Church and Homosexuality.” Regarding
ordination, the denomination stated: “…our present understanding of God’s will
precludes the ordination of persons who do not repent of homosexual practice.” But it
also made clear that homosexuals who repent of homosexual practice—either by
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adopting a celibate way of life or redirecting their sexual desire toward heterosexual
relationships—can be ordained. What is more, a non-practicing homosexual who seeks
ordination is encouraged to disclose his or her sexuality.
Indeed, such candidates must be welcomed and be free to share their full identity.
Their experience of hatred and rejection may have given them a unique capacity
for love and sensitivity as wounded healers among heterosexual Christians, and
they may be incomparably equipped to extend the church’s outreach to the
homosexual community.35
This statement shows the degree to which the denomination sought to protect homosexual
orientation from the label “sinful,” which it confers on homosexual practice. Two years
after the PC (USA) was formed, a ruling of the General Assembly Permanent Judicial
Commission (GAPJC), the denomination’s highest court, declared that the 1978
statement was “definitive guidance” for the church, giving it the force of law.36 In 1993,
the General Assembly, the denomination’s highest legislative body, reinforced the
GAPJC’s decision by making the 1978 statement an “Authoritative Interpretation” of the
Constitution of the PC (USA). This Authoritative Interpretation set the ordination
standard regarding homosexuality until the General Assembly amended the Constitution
in 1997 by adopting G-60106b, a clause that prohibited persons from ordination who
refuse to repent from a practice—i.e. homosexual practice—that the PC (USA) considers
sinful. That policy was tweaked in 2006 by a policy that allowed gays and lesbians to
seek ordination by stating their disagreement with the discriminatory policy and was
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altogether revoked in June 2011, opening the door for gays and lesbians to seek
ordination.
Several predecessor denominations of the ELCA passed legislation during the
1970s and 80s similar to those of the UMC and the Presbyterian denominations. The
Lutheran Church in America issued a statement in 1970 that identified homosexual
behavior, not homosexuality, as sinful,37 and the American Lutheran Church adopted a
statement in 1980 that stated more explicitly the distinction between sexual orientation
and behavior. It stated: “We believe it appropriate to distinguish between homosexual
orientation and homosexual behavior. Persons who do not practice their homosexual
erotic preference do not violate our understanding of Christian sexual behavior.”38 This
document also expressed concern that members of the church decry injustices committed
against gays and lesbians and affirmed their basic human dignity. When the ELCA
formed in 1988, the ordination of gays and lesbians was a very public, very controversial
topic, and the denomination soon established standards for ministry that prohibited the
practice of homosexuality.39 The central document was the Definitions and Guidelines
for Discipline, which labeled the practice of homosexuality “conduct incompatible with
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the character of the ministerial office” and subject to discipline. The 2009 Churchwide
Assembly changed the denomination’s policies regarding homosexuality, making it
possible for gays and lesbians to be ordained in some circumstances. These changes will
be discussed in the next section along with the Presbyterian policies already mentioned.
These documents formalized the position that being homosexual is protected as a
status, but acting homosexual is sinful. However, while the denominations that prohibit
the practice of homosexuality do so in order to separate conduct from status, the language
of homosexual practice participates in a larger cultural and legal history that conflates
homosexual identity with certain sexual acts. The practicing homosexual that emerges
from this history is one for whom sexual orientation is set aside as a defining
characteristic of personhood—over and above other characteristics—and sexual practice
is isolated as a nonessential and troublesome aspect of personhood. And, despite the fact
that theologians and denominational bodies have described homosexuality as an inner
disposition—something that one is—they have also associated the status of being a
homosexual so closely with same-sex sexual activity and erotic expression that being a
homosexual implies acting like one.
This view of homosexuality makes or did make the conflation of identity and
practice an unstated and ever-present condition of the homosexuality debate in these
denominations, something that becomes especially problematic when carrying out church
discipline. To put it simply, the conflation enables a rhetorical bait and switch, where
condemnation and prohibition of homosexual practice effectively condemns homosexuals
for being homosexual. The line between person and practice, which proponents of these
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ordination policies declare to be clear and justifiable, is obscure at best. Since the UMC,
PC (USA), and ELCA, or their predecessor denominations, began drafting statements
about homosexuality in the 1970s, numerous examples have emerged from church
policies and judicial hearings that demonstrate how a policy regarding homosexual
practice comes to define homosexuals as persons.
In the UMC, the conflation of identity and practice has occurred in various ways
in the decisions of the Judicial Council. An early instance of ecclesial discipline against
an openly gay UMC minister provides an illustration of this conflation. In 1971, the year
prior to the UMC adopting legislation calling homosexual practice “incompatible with
Christian teaching,” F. Gene Leggett, an ordained minister in the Southwest Texas
Annual Conference, announced at a meeting of the Conference that he was a homosexual.
The following month, “in light of this statement and its implications,”40 the Conference
suspended Leggett’s ordination, finding him “unacceptable in the work of the ministry.”41
This action did not initially involve church courts because of the UMC’s practice of
annually appointing clergy, meaning that each year an Annual Conference reaffirms (or
does not) each clergyperson’s ordination credentials. The Conference then asked the
Judicial Council to rule on the constitutionality of its action, and the Judicial Council
upheld Leggett’s suspension. Leggett only stated that he was a homosexual, but his
colleagues were troubled by the implications of such a statement. What, one must ask,
were the implications of Leggett stating that he was a homosexual? That he would
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represent himself in public as a homosexual? That he would engage in homosexual sex?
Whatever the answer, Leggett’s suspension shows how just being a homosexual makes
one susceptible to church discipline.
Of course, Leggett’s suspension occurred before the ban on homosexual practice
was established. But the introduction of this ban, allowing discipline to focus—
presumably—on actions rather than status, only changed the situation slightly. As
mentioned in the analysis of U. S. Supreme Court decisions, one of the factors that allows
identity and practice to be separated in theory but conflated in practice is the fact that
terms like “sodomy” and “practice” are ambiguous and easily manipulable. While it is
easy to assume that practice refers to sex with someone of the same sex or gender, the
term has proven harder to define than that in the UMC. Since the 1984 adoption of ¶
304.3 banning self-avowed practicing homosexuals from ordination, at least nine
decisions of the Judicial Council42 either emphasize the need for the General Conference
or Annual Conferences (the General Conference is the national legislative body of the
UMC and Annual Conferences are regional legislative bodies) to define the phrase “selfavowed practicing homosexual” or adjudicate the definitions offered by different Annual
Conferences.
Some of these decisions deal directly with the correct understanding of “selfavowal,” to be discussed in the next chapter, but two decisions are particularly important
regarding the definition—or lack thereof—of homosexual practice. The first, decided in
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1995, dealt with a definition of the phrase “self-avowed practicing homosexual” that was
adopted by an Annual Conference, the California Pacific Conference. The Conference’s
definition read, in part:
A self-avowed homosexual is one who makes it known by affirming publicly that
she/he engages in genital sexual behavior with a person of the same
gender….“Practicing” does not mean behavior such as friendship or persons
living together as roommates, socializing or meeting with homosexuals, or
speaking in support of or agreement with homosexuality.43
Though it does not address the basic injustice of prohibiting homosexual practice, a
definition such as this would go along way to prevent ecclesial rulings comparable to
cases in secular law like Bowers v. Hardwick and Romer v. Evans (analyzed earlier) that
interpreted sodomy so broadly as to include any public representation of one’s status as a
homosexual. The Judicial Council ruled the definition was invalid, but chose not to
address the portion of the definition that dealt specifically with homosexual practice.
Instead, it stated that the definition was invalid because its definition of “self-avowal”
was insufficient insofar as it did not specify to whom the avowal is to be made. The
Council continued: “The failure of the definition to include such identification renders the
definition invalid. For this reason, it is unnecessary to address the other questions
presented.”44 One of those questions, of course, dealt directly with the definition of
practice. That the Council turned down an opportunity to clarify what homosexual
practice refers to is curious, since it took the initiative to give guidance concerning how
to proceed in defining self-avowal. If the Council placed an importance on defining the
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phrase “self-avowed practicing homosexual,” as it had stated it had in Decisions 544 and
702, its inaction regarding a proposed definition of homosexual practice is inexplicable.
The irony of the attention the Judicial Council has paid to defining properly the
language of ¶ 304.3 is that it has also maintained that, in the absence of any precise
definition or in the presence of multiple definitions, ¶ 304.3 is no less enforceable. In
2005 the California-Nevada Annual Conference passed a statement that addressed the
language of homosexual practice. It read: “The California-Nevada Annual Conference
hereby specifically refuses and declines to define the word ‘practicing’ or ‘practicing
homosexual.’”45 After its passage, a member of the Annual Conference submitted a
query to the conference bishop asking if the item called into question the enforceability of
¶ 304.3. The bishop responded that it did not, and the Judicial Council was then asked to
review the bishop’s ruling on the matter. In Decision 1020, the Judicial Council ruled,
“the refusal of an annual conference to define ‘practicing’ or ‘practicing homosexual’
does not void or violate the enforceability of ¶ 304.3.”46 This ruling would make sense if
¶ 304.3 offered a definition of homosexual practice. If it did, there would be no reason
for an Annual Conference to offer its own definition. But ¶ 304.3 does not. A footnote
to ¶ 304.3 offers a definition of the entire phrase—“‘Self-avowed practicing homosexual’
is understood to mean that a person openly acknowledges to a bishop, district
superintendent, district committee of ordained ministry, Board of Ordained Ministry, or
clergy session that the person is a practicing homosexual”—but the definition is silent on
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what does and does not constitute homosexual practice. It is concerned only with
specifying what constitutes self-avowal. Thus, there seems to be no official definition.
At the very least, the lack of a definition of homosexual practice in the UMC
makes it unclear what is being prohibited and what is being prosecuted in disciplinary
cases. An example from the Book of Discipline further demonstrates this ambiguity. In a
section that lists offenses with which ordained ministers may be charged, all offenses but
one name specific actions: sexual abuse, harassment, racial discrimination, etc. The one
exception concerns homosexuality. “Being a self-avowed practicing homosexual” is a
chargeable offense in the UMC.47 The wording suggests that it is not a specific act, but
being a specific kind of person—the kind of person who commits such acts—that is a
chargeable offense in the UMC. The convoluted wording of this passage indicates the
difficulties in pinpointing what homosexual practice means and reveals the ways that
prohibiting homosexual practice is more about the sexual orientation of the individual
than it is the specific sexual acts being forbidden.
The confusion created by the wording of the Discipline and the ambiguity
surrounding the precise definition of homosexual practice blur the division between
identity and practice, the crux of the contention that homosexuals as a group are not
discriminated against by the ordination policies banning self-avowed practicing
homosexuals. The practicing homosexual, in other words, becomes indistinguishable
from the non-practicing homosexual. Being a homosexual places one in danger of being
charged with homosexual practice.
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We find a very similar situation in the PC (USA) during the years it prohibited
gays and lesbians from ordination. Between the denomination’s formation in 1983 and
the overturning of its heterosexist ordination policy in 2011, numerous decisions of the
GAPJC, despite the court’s efforts to protect homosexuality as a status, created
circumstances that allowed gay and lesbian ordinands, ministers, and church officers to
be questioned and/or disciplined based on the knowledge that they were homosexual.
One of the first significant cases in this judicial history involves Lisa Larges. Larges’
struggle to become an ordained minister began before the current ordination policy of the
PC (USA), G-6.0106b, was adopted in 1996, and her struggle continues still today.
Larges became a candidate for ordination in 1986 in the Presbytery of the Twin Cities
Area. Over several years, she completed the preliminary requirements for ordination
(e.g. ordination exams). In 1991, prior to the final interview with her Committee on
Preparation for Ministry (CPM), she informed the CPM that she was a lesbian. The CPM
conducted the interview and voted to continue with her ordination process. Later that
year, the CPM recommended to the Presbytery that Larges be certified as ready to receive
a call. The Presbytery, aware that Larges had identified herself as a lesbian, certified
Larges as ready to receive a call. After the vote, thirty-two members of the Presbytery
who voted “no” filed a complaint with the Permanent Judicial Commission (PJC) of the
Synod of Lakes and Prairies—the synod to which the Presbytery of the Twin Cities Area
belongs—arguing that the certification of Larges was “irregular” and should be revoked.
The Synod PJC ruled that the provisions of “The Church and Homosexuality” that
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banned “self-affirming, practicing homosexuals” from ordination —which, since these
48

events occurred prior to the 1996 adoption of G-6.0106b, provided definitive guidance on
ordination standards regarding homosexuality—applied to Larges and that, therefore, her
certification was irregular and should be rescinded. The Synod PJC was aware that
Larges had identified herself as a lesbian and not as a “practicing lesbian,” but it argued
that it found sufficient evidence to believe her to be a “practicing homosexual,” though
no such evidence was presented. Since the evidence was never produced, it seems the
rationale of the Synod PJC was that her sexual orientation made her accountable for
homosexual practice, regardless of whether or not she was currently “practicing.” One
study collecting data on ordination standards asserts that the Synod PJC “made a
judgment call guessing as to what Ms. Larges might do in the future, not on any activity
she was doing at the time.”49
The Presbytery promptly appealed the Synod PJC’s decision to the GAPJC. In
the decision, LeTourneau, et al. v. The Presbytery of the Twin Cities Area (hereafter
LeTourneau), the GAPJC acknowledged that Larges never claimed to be a practicing
lesbian but nevertheless upheld the Synod PJC’s decision to revoke Larges’ certification
for ordination. The GAPJC was careful to point out that Larges was to remain a
candidate for ordination, but her presbytery could not certify her as “ready to receive a
call” until Larges had satisfactorily shown that she was not a practicing homosexual. The
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decision affirms, in other words, the notion that a homosexual orientation is reason
enough for a presbytery to refrain from certifying a candidate as ready to receive a call.
And, again, the rationale seems to be that being a homosexual arouses a reasonable
suspicion that one is also/will become a practicing homosexual. To this end, the GAPJC
stated, “Sexual orientation and practice is relevant to a candidate’s qualifications for
ordination and must be investigated by a presbytery’s [CPM] when, as here, the candidate
has taken the initiative in declaring his or her sexual orientation.”50 The 1992 GAPJC
clearly viewed homosexual identity as something that calls one’s fitness for ordination
into serious question. Larges was guilty of homosexual practice until proven innocent,
and her CPM had not conducted sufficient inquiries to sustain her innocence.
G-6.0106b, the policy adopted in 1997 that prohibited “self-acknowledged
practicing homosexuals” from ordination, clarified the church’s ordination standards
somewhat and made it more difficult—though not impossible—for sexual orientation
alone to keep someone from ordination. Indeed, a 2000 GAPJC decision basically
overturned part of the rationale of the 1992 GAPJC, ruling that a gay ordinand who was
currently celibate but who also stated he would not refrain from homosexual practice
were he to enter a relationship with another man in the future was not in violation of G60106b because the clause only applies to actions being committed, not actions that may
be committed in the future.51 This standard was solidified even further in the 2002
decision Ronald L. Wier v. Session, Second Presbyterian Church of Ft. Lauderdale, FL
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Nevertheless, the 1992 GAPJC represents the ease with which

sexual orientation can be associated and conflated with sexual practice. A homosexual is
surely a practicing homosexual, so assumed the Presbyterian courts in the early 1990s.
That the language of homosexual practice operates this way is evidenced by the number
of cases that have been initiated based on the mere fact that a candidate for ordination
was a self-acknowledged homosexual, although not a “self-acknowledged practicing
homosexual.” Most of these cases in the PC (USA) have not resulted in any change in
the candidacy of the ordination candidate, but the shear number of cases where
wrongdoing is asserted due to one’s sexual orientation shows that the effects of the
language of homosexual practice are not confined to the decisions of the GAPJC.
One direct consequence of the GAPJC’s decision in the 1992 case regarding Lisa
Larges was to set a judicial precedent allowing CPMs to question ordination candidates
about their sexual orientation and, presumably, their sexual history. Coming out to one’s
denomination not only could, but should entail an investigation of orientation and
practice, according to the 1992 GAPJC. Over time, this imperative to question gay and
lesbian candidates about their sexualities was upheld by the GAPJC, though the specific
circumstances under which an investigation becomes warranted has changed from case to
case.
A key decision in this history is Wier 2. This decision, which involved the
ordination of a church member to the office of deacon or elder (the decision does not
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specify which), the GAPJC upheld the responsibility of an ordaining body to question
ordination candidates regarding homosexuality, and the way it did so highlights the
convoluted nature of the identity/conduct distinction. On the one hand, the GAPJC
seemingly offered protection to gay and lesbian candidates from unwarranted, invasive
questions by ordaining bodies. It emphasized that the ordination standard in G-6.0106b
stipulates that only those who refuse to repent from “self-acknowledged practice” are
disqualified from ordination, and that such self-acknowledgment must be “plain,
palpable, and obvious”53 before any special inquiry is warranted. The GAPJC stressed
this point to prevent a recurrence of what happened in the LeTourneau case from 1992,
where Lisa Larges was charged based on the suspicion that she would engage in
homosexual practice at some point. To file charges against someone under these
circumstances, the GAPJC argued in Wier 2, is “to single out a category of persons above
and beyond other persons as more likely to sin.”54 By making this statement, the GAPJC
is essentially making the case against conflating sexual orientation and practice,
something that had not been done before in the PC (USA).
On the other hand, the GAPJC then provides justification, as in the 1992 case, for
questioning a candidate concerning his or her sexual orientation and potential practice.
Since the ordaining and installing governing body best knows the life and
character of the candidate, initial and further inquiry as to compliance with all the
standards for ordination and installation belongs to that governing body. If that
governing body has reasonable cause for inquiry based on its knowledge of the
life and character of the candidate, it has the positive obligation to make due
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inquiry and uphold all the standards for ordination and installation. Consideration
for inquiry is to be made solely on an individual basis….Therefore, if
notwithstanding the requirement of individualized inquiry based on reasonable
cause, a governing body makes a line of inquiry to a candidate without reasonable
cause, all candidates currently before that governing body must undergo the same
inquiry.55
The language in this statement shows that, despite providing a strong definition for what
constitutes self-acknowledgement, the GAPJC did not do much to guard how an
ordaining body might go about getting a candidate to acknowledge homosexual practice.
If an ordaining body had reason to suspect someone of homosexual practice, then making
inquiries of that individual was the ordaining body’s positive obligation. If the ordaining
body did not have reasonable cause, questions could still have been asked, but must have
been asked of everyone being considered for ordination to avoid singling out, in the
GAPJC’s own words, “a category of persons above and beyond other persons as more
likely to sin.”
It is easy to see how these guidelines could have been abused. If an ordaining
body, for example, was considering three persons for ordination, and one of them was
known or thought to be a homosexual, just ask specific questions of all three candidates
to avoid appearing discriminatory. Whether or not this was the intention of the GAPJC,
some have interpreted it just this way.56 And despite the fact that the GAPJC spoke
against investigating someone simply because of his or her sexual orientation, the ruling
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included guidelines so broadly construed that the possibility for such an inquiry was still
very much alive.
The latitude that the GAPJC granted ordaining bodies in Wier 2 to question
ordination candidates about homosexual practice—with or without reasonable cause—
was scaled back by a decision issued the following year. In Presbytery of San Joaquin v.
Presbytery of the Redwoods (hereafter San Joaquin), the GAPJC first affirmed the
comments in Wier 2 that sexual orientation could not by itself prohibit someone from
ordination. It then made clear that ordaining bodies must have reasonable grounds to
conduct special investigations of candidates, and the reasonable grounds “must include
factual allegations of how, when, where, and under what circumstances the individual
was self-acknowledging a practice which the confessions call a sin.”57 Wier 2 had stated
something very similar, but the loophole it opened—that ordaining bodies could
investigate candidates about homosexual practice without reasonable cause as long as
they asked questions of all candidates—was effectively closed by the GAPJC in 2003.
That is, the loophole was closed from 2003 to 2006, when the GAPJC issued
another decision that seemingly overturned portions of San Joaquin. The circumstances
of the 2006 GAPJC decision, Colonial Presbyterian Church v. Grace Covenant
Presbyterian Church, began in 2004 with the election of church officers at Grace
Covenant Presbyterian Church (hereafter, Grace Covenant). Between the election and
installation of said officers, members of the Committee on Ministry (COM) of Heartland
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Presbytery, to which Grace Covenant belonged, expressed concern over one officer-elect
who was “thought to be a lesbian.”58 The COM met with representatives from Grace
Covenant to discuss the officers elected but did not report any concerns about the officers
elected. The ordination and installation of officers took place at Grace Covenant several
weeks after the meeting.
Several months later, the session of Colonial Presbyterian Church (hereafter,
Colonial), another church in the presbytery, requested from the session of Grace
Covenant that the church address an alleged delinquency in the ordination of one or more
of its elders. Grace Covenant did not comply, at which time the session of Colonial
submitted a complaint to Heartland Presbytery that the election, ordination, and
installation of an elder at Grace Covenant was irregular and delinquent. The PJC of
Heartland Presbytery dismissed the case without holding a trial, arguing that the
complainant did not state a claim upon which relief could be granted. In short, because
there was not a claim that homosexual practice had occurred—as stated earlier, the case
was initiated because one elected officer was thought to be a lesbian, not a practicing
lesbian—there was no cause to question whether the election, ordination, and installation
of the elder was constitutional. Colonial challenged that ruling, appealing to the PJC of
the Synod of Mid-America. The Synod PJC upheld the ruling of the Presbytery PJC, and
used the precedent from San Joaquin to argue its case, citing that decision’s assertions
that sexual orientation was not sufficient grounds for a special investigation of ordination
candidates and that factual allegations of the self-acknowledgement of homosexual
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Colonial appeared to be

acting off of the belief that one elected elder was a lesbian and did not provide any
evidence that said elder had self-acknowledged homosexual practice.
Colonial, however, appealed to the GAPJC. The GAPJC overturned the decisions
of the Synod and Presbytery PJCs, applying the Wier 2 ruling to argue that Grace
Covenant knew enough of the “life and character of the candidate” to inquire of the
candidate in question whether she was willing to comply with the ordination standard in
G-6.0106b. To be clear, the GAPJC ruling was very narrow in scope; it suggested that,
based on a 2003 decision that stated the alleged facts of a complaint must be assumed
true when a PJC is deciding on whether the complaint has enough merit to warrant a
trial,60 the lower court rulings were wrong to dismiss the case without holding a trial. It
ordered that Heartland Presbytery PJC look into the examining practices of Grace
Covenant and, if necessary, hold a trial.
In issuing this ruling, the GAPJC did not seem to consider the fact that the
complaint did not suggest that homosexual practice was self-acknowledge by the elected
elder. Furthermore, Wier 2 and San Joaquin stated that the ordaining body was in the
best position to decide if a candidate needed to be questioned to determine his or her
readiness for ordination. Grace Covenant did not see the need to examine the elder-elect
on her fitness for ordination regarding G-6.0106b, yet, the GAPJC basically ruled that
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Colonial should have been able to initiate a trial, even without producing any evidence to
suggest that Grace Covenant had reasonable grounds to investigate the elder in question.
These rulings in the PC (USA) judicial system show that, while the denomination
maintained a distinction between homosexual orientation and homosexual practice, the
distinction often had little practical consequence. Prior to the 1997 adoption of G6.0106b, the conflation of homosexual orientation and homosexual practice had been
made explicit in the LeTourneau decision, which prevented Lisa Larges from being
declared ready to receive a call simply because she was a lesbian. From 1997 to 2011,
during which time the language of G-6.0106b precluded self-acknowledged practicing
homosexuals from ordination, the association between being a homosexual and practicing
one’s homosexuality became more tacit. GAPJC decisions tried to stress that sexual
orientation was not a bar to various ordainable offices in the church, but it also gave
committees that supervise and approve candidates for ordination leeway to investigate
candidates who were gay. The investigations were clearly meant to determine if the
candidate in question is a practicing homosexual and, thus, ineligible to hold a church
office. But the lack of clarity in terms of when such an investigation was appropriate
created an environment where any gay or lesbian candidate for ordination was treated as
a potential practicing homosexual. While candidates may have had a good feel for
whether a committee overseeing their ordination processes would have insisted on
conducting such an inquiry into their personal lives, the surfeit of church court cases
dealing with this very question—not all of which have been discussed here—prove that
there was a legitimate cause for concern. After all, many of the cases were initiated by
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persons who were not a part of the ordination process and who were simply concerned
that an ordained officer in the church was in violation of G-6.0106b. Thus, during the
time that the PC (USA) expressly prohibited practicing homosexuals from being ordained
and provided the opportunity for gay and lesbian candidates to be questioned about
whether they were practicing, there was little or no respite for gays and lesbians from the
suspicion that the policy and its judicial enforcement embodied. A gay or lesbian who
was ordained or a candidate for ordination was always at risk of having his or her sexual
subjectivity brought under ecclesial adjudication. The neat division between
“homosexual” and “practicing homosexual” was, thus, meaningless from the perspective
of the person who does not feel protected by it.
The role that examination played in the PC (USA) has a counterpart in the ELCA.
To be sure, after the 2009 Churchwide Assembly, where the ELCA adopted a new
ordination policy that allows room for different views of homosexuality to coexist within
the denomination, the harmful consequences of the language of homosexual practice and
the examination of gay and lesbian candidates have diminished. These considerations
will be discussed in the next section along with a policy that was active in the PC (USA)
from 2006 to 2011, but the history of the prohibition of homosexual practice in the ELCA
prior to the 2009 Churchwide Assembly is nevertheless important for several reasons.
Because the condemnation of homosexual practice is still an accepted view in the ELCA,
the language will continue to be a part of the denomination’s dialogue, and understanding
how it has already functioned may illumine how it will continue to function in
conservative Synods of the church. Furthermore—and perhaps more importantly in light
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of the argument of this dissertation—the discursive consequences of the rhetoric of
homosexual practice impact more than just those on whom it is exercised in the
ordination process or in disciplinary hearings.
As Chris Scharen has shown in his study of the ordination process in the ELCA,61
the formation of the ELCA in 1988 coincided with the issue of gay and lesbian ordination
receiving national attention within the denomination. The attention began when three
seminarians at Pacific Lutheran Seminary in Berkeley, California, who were candidates
for ordained ministry came out as openly gay. The episode galvanized leaders in the
denomination to clarify the ordination process so as to ensure the exclusion of practicing
homosexuals. The immediate response was to subject the three seminarians to a special
examination about their fitness for ministry (i.e. their willingness to remain celibate),
after which they were removed from the list of active candidates for ordination. The
long-term response was to develop a document governing the candidacy process, which
evolved into what is now called Vision and Expectations: Ordained Ministry in the
Evangelical Church in America. Scharen makes an important observation about the
functionality of this document within the candidacy process:
…the introduction of a “special examination” about sexuality during candidacy
interviews has been at the heart of developing documents—including Vision and
Expectations—allowing direct questioning of the candidate’s familiarity with the
church’s position without “inappropriate” questions about personal life. Under
the guise of respectability, the committee members don’t ask; the documents carry
the questions by which the candidates question and shape themselves. The
document itself takes on the disciplinary role of inquisitor.62
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The institutionalization of candidacy procedures introduces anonymity to the production
of candidates, allowing individuals overseeing the candidates to defer to the policy when
faced with questions regarding the ordination of gays and lesbians.
Scharen’s study focuses on candidates for ministry, which is why he names Vision
and Expectations in the above quote. However, if we broaden Scharen’s focus to the
disciplining of clergy in addition to the production of suitable candidates, we can add the
ELCA document Definitions and Guidelines for Discipline to his observation. Before
this document was revised in light of the 2009 Churchwide Assembly, it defined the
practice of homosexuality as conduct “incompatible with the character of the ministerial
office.” When a bishop prior to the 2009 Churchwide Assembly was confronted with a
clergyperson who was a “self-acknowledged practicing homosexual,” she or he could
defer to the Definitions and Guidelines as the judge in such matters. It was the duty of
the bishop to file charges under such circumstances.
A case in point is the trial and defrocking of Brad Schmeling in Atlanta, GA.63
Ordained in 1989, Schmeling entered the roster of clergy in the Southeastern Synod of
the ELCA in 2000. At that time, he acknowledged to his bishop that he was gay, though
he also stated that, as a single gay man, he was in compliance with the ELCA’s
ordination standards. He began a relationship with another man in 2005, and reported

Discipline and the Candidacy Manual, were revised in April 2010 by the ELCA Church Council to reflect
the policy changes made in 2009.
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this to his bishop, Ronald B. Warren, in 2006. Warren filed charges against Schmeling in
August of that year and, in a letter to the clergy of the Southeastern Synod, explained that
Schmeling was in violation of the Definitions and Guidelines and that his own actions as
bishop were determined by this document.64
The deferral to ELCA documents continued in Schmeling’s ecclesial trials. In his
trial before the Discipline Hearing Committee (DHC), the presentation of the facts of the
case defined Schmeling in the terms of these documents:
Pastor Schmeling is, in the Language of Definitions and Guidelines, a practicing
homosexual person. In the language of Vision and Expectations, he is an
ordained minister in his self-understanding who is not abstaining from
homosexual sexual relationship.65
Schmeling argued before the DHC that this language did not require the DHC to defrock
him; the ELCA Constitution stipulated that disciplinary hearings could also result in
private censure or suspension. The DHC disagreed. It lamented its decision and even
advised the ELCA to revise Vision and Expectations and Definitions and Guidelines so as
to remove the language that precluded practicing homosexuals from ordained ministry.
Nevertheless, the DHC felt that “the stipulated facts leave them no choice but to
determine that the Rev. Bradley E. Schmeling is a practicing homosexual person within
Definitions and Guidelines section b.4 and is therefore precluded from the ordained
ministry of this church.”66 Schmeling appealed this decision to the Committee on
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Appeals, which upheld the DHC’s decision to remove Schmeling’s ordination
credentials.67
Just as ELCA documents carry out the examination of ordination candidates, the
documents also preside over disciplinary hearings as judge and jury. And this
observation is not restricted to the ELCA. Decisions from the courts of the UMC and the
PC (USA) contain similar deferrals to ordination policies. It is not uncommon for courts
to explain that the courts are not making moral judgments about homosexuality or
homosexual practice, but are simply carrying out the duties with which they have been
charged. Under the “guise of respectability,” as Scharen puts it, ecclesial bodies enforce
discriminatory ordination policies while holding them at arms length. In the context of
this chapter, which argues that the rhetoric of homosexual practice produces a
homosexual subject for whom sexual identity and conduct are simultaneously separated
and conflated, this observation reveals one way that this homosexual subject has been
sustained in each of these denominations even as popular support for the policies in
question has waned. The incompatibility of the practicing homosexual with ordained
ministry is established in the documents of the church, and courts and ordination
committees need only defer to them. Each deferral, though, strengthens the conflation of
identity and conduct that the rhetoric of homosexual practice embodies.
Homosexual Practice and the Protestant Conscience
The ordination policies of the PC (USA) and the ELCA have both shifted in
recent years in ways that permit the possibility of gay and lesbian ordination. In fact, the
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policies of the PC (USA) have shifted twice in only five years. The PC (USA)
completely reversed its anti-homosexual ordination policy in 2011, but before that
development, it adopted a policy in 2006 that did not overturn G-6.0106b but allowed gay
and lesbian candidates to pursue ordination by declaring a scruple from the
denomination’s teachings as long as the scrupled teaching was not considered an essential
of Reformed faith and polity. In the ELCA at the 2009 Churchwide Assembly, the
denomination adopted a resolution that puts forth four acceptable positions on the matter
of homosexuality and the ordination of practicing homosexuals. The rationale for
enumerating four different positions was to allow room for all within the denomination to
honor their consciences on the matter of homosexuality and the ordination of gays and
lesbians. Both policies focus on a basic tenet of Protestantism, the centrality of the
Christian’s conscience in matters of faith and morality.
The PC (USA) adopted a new “Authoritative Interpretation” at the 2006 General
Assembly that followed the final report of the Theological Taskforce on Peace, Unity,
and Purity of the Church,68 which recommended allowing ordination candidates to
declare a scruple or departure of conscience from the denomination’s ordination
standards. The ordaining body could have allowed the candidate to proceed in the
ordination process if it decided that the scruple did not violate an essential of Reformed
faith and polity. Between the adoption of this policy in 2006 and the overturning of the
ban on gay and lesbian clergy in 2011, gay and lesbian ordination candidates tested the
scrupling policy by declaring scruples with G-6.0106b, and, in just a few short years, the
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PC (USA) witnessed a judicial and legislative roller coaster regarding the status of G6.0106b within the denomination.
Numerous gay and lesbian candidates in the PC (USA) sought ordination under
the 2006 scrupling policy by declaring a scruple with G-6.0106b. The scruples of two
candidates, Lisa Larges and Paul E. Capetz, were initially approved by their respective
Committees on Ministry, but their progress in the ordination process was stalled by a
2008 GAPJC ruling. That ruling, Bush et al. v. Presbytery of Pittsburgh, shut the door
(temporarily) on scrupling G-6.0106b. The circumstances of the case involved a
resolution passed by the Presbytery of Pittsburgh which declared that the standards for
ordination were considered to be essentials of faith, thereby foreclosing the possibility of
declaring a scruple with G-6.0106b. While the GAPJC declared the resolution
unconstitutional, it did so only on the grounds that such a resolution was confusing and
unnecessary and thus an obstruction to constitutional governance. However, the GAPJC
basically agreed with the Presbytery’s interpretation, stating that G-6.0106b is a part of
the ordination standards that place limits on the conscience and cannot be scrupled.
…the church has required those who aspire to ordained office to conform their
actions, though not necessarily their beliefs or opinions, to certain standards, in
those contexts in which the church has deemed conformity to be necessary or
essential. Section G-6.0106b contains a provision where conformity is required by
church officers “to live either in fidelity within the covenant of marriage between
a man and a woman (W-4.9001), or in chastity in singleness.” The church has
decided to single out this particular manner of life standard and require
churchwide conformity to it for all ordained church officers. Therefore, the
specific “fidelity and chastity” standard in G-6.0106b stands in contrast to the
provisions of G-6.0106a, including those concerning faith, discipleship, belief and
manner of life in the church and the world, and also the remainder of G-6.0106b.
The candidate and examining body must follow G-6.0108 in reaching a
determination as to whether the candidate for office has departed from essentials
of Reformed faith and polity, but that determination does not rest on
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distinguishing “belief” and “behavior,” and does not permit departure from the
“fidelity and chastity” requirement found in G-6.0106b.69
The GAPJC suggests that, as a standard of behavior, G-6.0106b could not be scrupled by
candidates. It interpreted the actions of the 2006 General Assembly as relevant only
concerning matters of faith or belief, not behavior. The GAPJC reaffirmed this view in
another ruling issued the same year.70
Months later, participants at the 2008 General Assembly sought to address these
GAPJC rulings by amending the Authoritative Interpretation adopted in 2006. They
passed Item 05-12, which stipulated that a candidate can declare a scruple from an
ordination standard “in matters of belief or practice,”71 presumably overturning the
GAPJC decision Bush v. Presbytery of Pittsburgh from earlier that year. This action by
the 2008 General Assembly does not ensure that a candidate’s scrupling of G-6.0106b
will be accepted; each candidate’s declaration of departure must still be evaluated on an
individual basis by his or her ordaining body. But it clarifies that a candidate is allowed
to scruple G-6.0106b.
After the 2008 General Assembly, Paul E. Capetz’s scruple of G-6.0106b moved
forward. Caeptz’s case was a unique test, though, because he was not seeking ordination
but reinstatement. Capetz was ordained in 1991, and his ordination was held in the
Presbytery of the Twin Cities, where he served as associate professor at United
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Theological Seminary. After G-6.0106b was adopted in 1996, Capetz struggled to
reconcile his sexual orientation and his status as an ordained minister. While he was not
in violation of the ordination policy, he applied to the Presbytery to be removed from the
list of ordained ministers in objection to the celibate life that was imposed on him.72 The
Presbytery granted his request. After the authoritative interpretation allowed candidates
to declare a scruple against specific ordination standards, Capetz applied for
reinstatement in August 2007. The COM of the Presbytery approved the request, and
three individuals thereafter filed charges against the Presbytery, arguing that the Bush
decision nullified Capetz’s scruple and request for reinstatement. The Synod PJC, which
heard the case before the 2008 General Assembly, upheld the reinstatement because Bush
was not relevant (it applied to ordination, not reinstatement).73
The case was appealed to the GAPJC, and it ruled in 2009 that Capetz’s
reinstatement to the office of ordained minister was in order. However, despite the fact
that Capetz had declared a scruple regarding G-6.0106b, the GAPJC ruled that Capetz,
who was not in a relationship at the time of his request for reinstatement and subsequent
trial, would still have to abide by the standard elaborated in G-6.0106b: “Having been
restored to the exercise of the office of Minister of Word and Sacrament, Capetz is fully
accountable under all standards and requirements for ministers of Word and Sacrament to
abide by the Constitution of the PC (USA), including G-6.0106b.” Furthermore, the
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GAPJC stated it could not rule on whether the Bush decision of 2008 still applied in light
of the Authoritative Interpretation adopted by the 2008 General Assembly.74 So, while
the decision was essentially a victory for Capetz in that it approved his restoration to
ordained ministry, the court’s equivocation on the heart of the issue provided little clarity
going forward. If one was allowed to disagree with an ordination standard but still had to
abide by that standard, the policy of scrupling seemingly had little practical significance
where standards of behavior are concerned.
The candidacy of Lisa Larges unfolded in similar fashion when she scrupled G6.0106b in 2007. Concurrent with the judicial and legislative tug-of-war of 2008, Larges’
Presbytery examined her departure and decided to move her forward in the ordination
process, declaring her “ready for examination, with a departure.” Members of the
Presbytery who opposed this action filed charges against the Presbytery. The case made
its way to the GAPJC, which issued its ruling in 2009. As in the Capetz case, the
GAPJC’s ruling was essentially a victory for Larges, in that it upheld the Presbytery’s
declaration that Larges was ready for examination. However, also as in the Capetz case,
the decision left many questions unanswered. Larges was also not currently in a
relationship when she scrupled G-6.0106b and, therefore, was not in violation of the
behavioral standard she disagreed with. In the Capetz case, the GAPJC declared that he
would have to abide by the standard even thought he declared a scruple with it. The
GAPJC did not make a such an explicit statement in the Larges case, but it did remind the
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Presbytery that, “Freedom of conscience for officers of the church is bound by standards
of the church.”75
The scrupling policy of the PC (USA) opened a door for gays and lesbians to
move toward ordination while remaining true to their consciences, and was celebrated by
LGBT advocates within the denomination. Nevertheless, during the years when that
policy was in place, the status of gays and lesbians was far from clear. After all, the
official policy of the denomination had not changed. G-6.0106b was still the official
ordination standard, and candidates who scrupled it placed themselves at odds with the
denomination’s official position on homosexual practice. Furthermore, it should be noted
that the freedom to declare a departure from G-6.0106b did not mean that one’s
ordination committee would accept the departure. It is safe to assume that a gay or
lesbian candidate whose membership was in a conservative presbytery would not have
been able to declare a scruple against G-6.0106b with any success. The GAPJC had
consistently stated that the ordination committee is in the best position to evaluate
individual candidates, and the decision of an ordination committee not to accept one’s
departure from G-6.0106b would in all likelihood have been upheld by the GAPJC.
The ELCA adopted legislation in 2009 that was similar to the PC (USA)’s
scrupling policy. The denomination began an ambitious study and discernment process
on human sexuality that led to the publication and circulation of the three part series,
Journey Together Faithfully, and a social statement on human sexuality that came to be
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This social statement was brought before the

2009 Churchwide Assembly and was adopted by a two-thirds majority with minor
amendments.77 It embodies the Lutheran principle that the Christian is free, but Christian
freedom is orientated always toward the neighbor. The social statement states: “we
therefore seek responsible actions that serve others and do so with humility and deep
respect for the conscience-bound beliefs of others.”78 To respect the different
conscience-bound beliefs79 within the ELCA regarding homosexuality, Human Sexuality:
Gift and Trust delineates four different acceptable positions on homosexuality and the
role of gays and lesbians in the church. (This approach differed from that of the PC
(USA)’s scrupling policy in that the official position of the PC (USA) did not change; it
only allowed individuals to dissent from the official position. In the ELCA, rather, there
is no longer one official position on homosexual relationships.) The four positions range
from the belief that homosexual behavior is sinful and gays and lesbians must remain
celibate to the belief that scriptural references to homosexuality do not address the
understanding of sexual orientation that we experience today and same-sex relationships
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can be celebrated by the church and held to the same ethical standards and status as
heterosexual marriage.80 (Note that the latter does not explicitly bestow the title
“marriage” on same-sex couples.)
In order to implement the changes made to church policy, the ELCA made
revisions to its ordination documents—Vision and Expectations, Definitions and
Guidelines, and the Candidacy Manual—to allow for individuals in “publicly
accountable life-long monogamous same-gender relationships” to pursue ordination. The
ELCA Church Council completed these revisions in April 2010. The revised version of
the Candidacy Manual states that in order to respect differing opinions on the matter of
homosexuality, it may be necessary for a candidate to transfer to a synod that is willing to
ordain someone in a publicly accountable lifelong monogamous same-gender
relationship.81 Part of the ordination process—for heterosexuals and homosexuals
alike—involves providing proof that one’s relationship is held to public accountability
within the church, and the Candidacy Manual lists six different categories of acceptable
evidence. The document also acknowledges that the circumstances of same-sex couples
might vary a great deal (e.g. differing state laws regarding same-sex relationships), and
the list is not so much a checklist as suggested guidelines to be considered on an
individual basis. Most importantly, the document emphasizes: “Insofar as it is possible
heterosexual and homosexual applicants and candidates shall be treated equitably.”82
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Since these changes were integrated into the candidacy and ordination documents,
openly homosexual ministers in committed relationships have indeed been able to enter
the candidacy process or be reinstated to ordained ministry. Bradley Schmeling, who
was defrocked in 2007 for being in a committed relationship with another man, and Darin
Easler, who left his parish call in 2003 and was removed from the clergy roster after
being without a call for three years, were both reinstated in the summer of 2010 due to
the change in policy. Two other ministers previously defrocked for being practicing
homosexuals, Ross Merkel and Steven Sabin, were approved for reinstatement the same
summer into the Sierra Pacific Synod. That Synod has also approved for ordination six
pastors from Extraordinary Lutheran Ministries, an organization that has provided a
parallel process for credentialing openly gay and lesbian candidates for ordination. In
December 2010, two more openly gay men, Jay Wiesner and Stephen Keiser, were added
to the clergy roster by the Southeastern Pennsylvania Synod.83
To be sure, questions still remain, especially regarding synods not willing to
consider someone for ordination who is in a same-gender relationship. If that person is
not able to transfer to another synod due to geographical constraints, what options are
available to him or her? Nevertheless, the 2009 policy of the ELCA has been
implemented more smoothly than was the scrupling policy of the PC (USA). In my
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opinion, the reason for this difference is that the official stance of the ELCA regarding
homosexual practice has changed, whereas the official position of the PC (USA) under
the 2006 scrupling policy did not. Under that policy, PC (USA) candidates and former
clergy were able to declare a scruple with G-6.0106b, but they placed themselves at odds
with their denomination by doing so. ELCA candidates and former clergy who are in
publicly accountable lifelong monogamous same-gender relationships have more
denominational support.
The fact that the changes the PC (USA) made to its ordination policies from 2006
to 2011 did not significantly alter the way the rhetoric of homosexual practice functioned
within the denomination (especially its judicial system) reveals the strength and tenacity
of that rhetoric. During that five-year period, the GAPJC declared in at least one case that
an ordained minister who declared a scruple to G-6.0106b must still behave according to
that sexual standard, implying that the prohibition of homosexual practice remained in
place. The change in the ELCA is more significant than was the scrupling policy of the
PC (USA). Since one of the denomination’s official positions on homosexuality allows
partnered gays and lesbians to be ordained, the Definitions and Guidelines no longer lists
homosexual practice as conduct incompatible with ordained ministry. However, because
the position that homosexual practice is sinful is still an accepted position in the ELCA, it
is still and will continue to be present in church dialogue on the issue. But if, as it seems,
homosexual practice is not in and of itself a chargeable offense, the rhetoric of
homosexual practice loses some of its force. This observation is even truer in the PC
(USA) today, since it has overturned its ban on gay and lesbian clergy without also
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declaring the opposition to gay and lesbian ordination an acceptable position within the
denomination.
Foucault, Body Theology, and the Rhetoric of Homosexual Practice
Since the emergence of the homosexual subject in modern society—that is, the
establishment of same-gender desire as a definitive aspect of one’s identity—Christian
theology and mainline Protestant churches have defined this subject in negative terms.
Initially, Christian theologians that bothered to mention homosexuality condemned
homosexuality as sinful (e.g. Karl Barth’s treatment of homosexuality in Church
Dogmatics) and denominations simply ignored its existence, at least insofar as their
official policies were concerned. Eventually, theologians like Helmut Thielicke took up
“the question of homosexuality” in a way that sought to divide an evaluation of
homosexuality as a constitution from specific homosexual behaviors, even though this
division rested upon a heterosexist sexual anthropology. Protestant churches began to
adopt social statements and ordination policies that codified this definition of the
homosexual subject, seeking to honor the personhood of homosexuals while prohibiting
homosexual practice.
Despite the intentions of these theologians and denominations to evaluate
homosexuality and homosexual conduct separately, the rhetoric of homosexual practice
enacts a conflation of homosexual identity and conduct. The consequences of this
separation/conflation can be analyzed fruitfully as a form of disciplinary power that
Foucault referred to as individualization, described in chapter two. Power that
individualizes, in short, acquires knowledge of individuals by making each of them a case
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to be studied and uses this knowledge to place individuals into categories that facilitate
discipline. As Foucault wrote, disciplinary power imposes “a technique for constituting
individuals as correlative elements of power and knowledge.”84 The prohibition of
homosexual practice sets this power in motion and, therefore, is the key element in the
homosexual subject that emerges from mainline Protestantism. It establishes the impetus
for clergy, ordination committees, and laity to gain knowledge of gays and lesbians who
make themselves visible in the church. The key question: Is she or he a practicing
homosexual? This question embodies the separation of homosexual identity from
conduct and enacts a homosexual taxonomy in mainline Protestantism, where
homosexuals are one of two kinds: practicing or non-practicing.
The need to ask this question generates discourse about homosexuality at every
level of the denomination. Many of the documents cited here are decisions of the highest
courts in these three denominations, but these decisions are the culmination of a series of
events—accusations, public and private debate, and trials—that begin on a very local
level. A minister comes out to a congregation, an ordination committee is confronted by
the homosexual orientation of a candidate, a congregation disagrees with the decision of
another congregation to install a gay member as deacon, and so on. These events and the
discourses they begin make the prohibition of homosexual practice an ever-present fact in
the lives of these churches. They also ensure that debate about homosexuality in the
church centers on homosexual practice. The question most important to those overseeing
ordination candidates and disciplinary processes is not, “Should homosexual practice be
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considered wrong?,” but “Is this person a practicing homosexual?” The prohibition
structures the church’s response to its gay and lesbian members.
Furthermore, the ubiquity and structure of church discourse about homosexuality
produces and perpetuates the key component of the individualization of homosexuals:
sexuality and the practice of sexuality is made the primary and determinative trait of the
identity of gays and lesbians in the church. If one identifies as homosexual, every other
part of one’s life and sense of self is eclipsed by it. The same is not true for
heterosexuality, the norm to which homosexuality is compared. It is the default
sexuality; one need not even explicitly identify as heterosexual. That is what you are
until you state otherwise, and you are afforded much more discretion, sexually
speaking.85 Since heterosexual identity is assumed and, therefore, remains mostly
unspoken, it blends into one’s identity as part of the whole. Even in the ELCA, which
has begun ordaining gays and lesbians who are in relationships, homosexuality is still
treated as a special case, requiring special rules and accommodations. Debates about
homosexuality in the ELCA, then, will likely continue to describe homosexuality in a
way that isolates sexuality as the thing that defines the homosexual, not just as a sexual
person, but as a person.
Thus, despite the fact that these denominations wish to evaluate homosexual
practice and the homosexual person separately, the prohibition of homosexual practice
has more to do with the sexual orientation of the practitioner and not the character of the
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person or practices in question. In the 2005 decision of the UMC Judicial Council that
resulted in the defrocking of Beth Stroud, two members of the Council offered a minority
opinion that illustrates this point. The authors of the minority opinion, Susan T HenryCrowe and Beth Capen, argue that ¶ 304.3 of the Discipline, the ordination standard that
prohibits homosexual practice, establishes an a priori judgment of homosexual
candidates. “Only in ¶ 304.3,” they write, “is there a prohibition which relates to
prejudged ‘conduct’ prior to examination of character. Is this not categorical
discrimination?”86 Lisa Larges, in her statement of departure from the PC (USA)’s
ordination standard G-6.0106b, also makes this point. She argues that the standard in G6.0106b makes an idol of heterosexuality, and “by elevating this standard above any
others it has caused our church to be mired in inappropriate and scandalous inquiries into
the sexual acts of persons seeking ordained office.” Heterosexual practice is not
condemned outright, and identifying oneself as a heterosexual does not generate the
suspicion of one’s candidacy for ordination. But the prohibition of homosexual practice
creates this environment for gay and lesbian candidates and clergy, and so the impact of
such a policy reaches far beyond those individuals on whom it is officially exercised.
Larges, again, explains: “[G-6.0106b] has unjustly prevented untold numbers of gay,
lesbian, bisexual, and transgender persons called by God to serve the church from the
possibility of fulfilling that calling,” and “has caused others to live in fear and under the
constant threat of judicial actions.”87
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The prohibition of homosexual practice is, ultimately, not concerned with
distinguishing homosexual identity from homosexual practice, and the homosexual that
emerges from the enforcement of this prohibition looks the same regardless what
taxonomic category s/he occupies. The language of homosexual practice blurs what is
important. The non-practicing homosexual is in the same situation as the practicing
homosexual, and so the categories are a ruse. They do not differentiate between the
practicing and non-practicing homosexual. The real differentiation is between the
homosexual and the heterosexual. What really matters is sexual orientation—that is what
defines not just the character of a person’s sexual expression, but the person in general.
Perhaps the irony of the argument of this chapter is that the conflation of conduct
and identity is not in and of itself a bad thing. Divorcing being from acting in such a
strong way is something criticized by body theology. To think of who we are as
something separate from how we choose to express who we are is to root our sense of
self in the abstract, detached from the daily realities of our lives. But the conflation of
homosexual identity and conduct is made oppressive by the prohibition of homosexual
practice. If one’s sexual identity is viewed as the definitive aspect of one’s identity as a
whole, and if that identity is defined by a practice labeled sinful and incompatible with
Christian teaching, then the homosexual’s subjectivity is truly abject in character.
Returning briefly to Thielicke’s theological anthropology is illuminative on this point. If
homosexuality is born out of human sinfulness and defines the homosexual subject, then
the homosexual subject is so defined by sin that the abundant life to which Christ calls us
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seems like a tantalizing fantasy to the homosexual. Scott D. Anderson, another
Presbyterian who scrupled G-6.0106b while the that policy was active, noted in his
statement of departure from G-6.0106b that the categorical prohibition of homosexual
practice has such an effect.
…the message it sends to gay and lesbian believers everywhere is that no matter
how hard we might work and strive to conform our lives to the shape of the
Gospel, we are disqualified on the basis of unchosen aspects of who we are from
ever being able to respond to the call of God. This comes dangerously close, I
believe, to telling gay and lesbian believers that Jesus Christ has nothing to offer
people like me.88
The prohibition of homosexual practice, to Anderson, gives the Gospel a distinctly
heterosexual form. The reflections of one minister who was ousted from the UMC, Rose
Mary Denman, expresses something similar. She writes that she assumed she was
heterosexual for so long “because to stand in relationship to God and the Church was
seen as synonymous with being heterosexual.”89
The comments of these individuals who have felt the weight of sexual prohibition
concur with the basic assumption of body theology that we experience the divine through
our bodies. That being the case, the conflation of homosexual identity and conduct and
the prohibition of homosexual practice alienate gays and lesbians from the life of the
church. The prohibition sends a clear message that the church is a space for
heterosexuals, whether real or pseudonymous, and the reality of being gay or lesbian is
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denied any validity. Consider some of Lisa Larges’ comments in her statement of
departure from G-6.0106b. She writes:
[G-6.0106b] denies the dignity and lived experience of same-gender loving
people….It removes sex from the context of intimacy and covenantal relationship
and denies the fullness and richness of committed loving relationships between
persons of the same gender….It denies the full humanity of lesbian, gay, bisexual,
and transgender persons by focusing solely and exclusively on one part of their
lives.90
Larges distills into a few short sentences what is truly at stake—the full humanity of gays
and lesbians. If church policy lifts up the sexuality of homosexuals as the defining trait
of their personhood only to deny them the lived experience of that sexuality, are
homosexuals fully human in the eyes of those who espouse these policies?91
And so we are confronted with the falsehood of the claim that homosexual
practice can be categorically condemned without condemning homosexuals as persons.
The rhetoric of homosexual practice defines the homosexual in terms of prohibited sexual
expression, and the language of avowal demands that gays and lesbians define
themselves this way as well. It is to that language that we now turn.

90
91

Larges, “Statement of Departure.”

If this question sounds hyperbolic, note that it is a question that has been asked before by others writing
from marginalized positions. Catharine A. MacKinnon, for example, has asked this question from a
feminist perspective. See MacKinnon, Are Women Human? And Other International Dialogues
(Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2007).

CHAPTER FIVE
COMING OUT UNDER THE PROHIBITION OF HOMOSEXUAL PRACTICE
In 1996, when the PC (USA) introduced the amendment that would become G6.0106b, prohibiting self-acknowledged practicing homosexuals from ordination, there
was much speculation about what “self-acknowledgment” might mean. One
commentator declared that the phrase opened a “titanic-sized loophole” because it
seemed to apply “only to those who admit their ‘guilt.’ ”1 Though “titanic” is somewhat
of an overstatement, this individual is partially correct. If a gay or lesbian minister or
ordinand remains in the closet, it is possible, maybe likely, that she or he will avoid
disciplinary hearings.
One might wonder why a denomination that wanted to prevent practicing gays
and lesbians from being ordained would include language that allowed for such a
loophole. The answer to this question is relatively (perhaps deceptively) straightforward.
The denominations that adopted such language have done so to ensure that they will
neither initiate nor tolerate a gay witch hunt, for lack of a better phrase. They want to
avoid a situation where people feel empowered to speculate about the sexual orientation
of ministers, ordinands, and church officers. Court hearings, in other words, are not
meant to determine whether the accused is homosexual. On the surface, then, the
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language of avowal is meant to protect gays and lesbians from being outed. This is not
always the case. There are examples of bishops asking clergypersons about their sexual
orientation and relationship status when that clergyperson had not volunteered the
information.2 In examples such as this, if the minister answers that she is indeed a
practicing homosexual, charges are likely filed as a result. In a technical sense, it is still
the avowal and not the bishop’s suspicion that initiates disciplinary hearings. But even
when the language of avowal appears to have the intended effect of preventing people
from speculating about the sexuality of clergy and ordinands, it contributes to the
oppression of gays and lesbians in deeper ways.
This chapter explores the consequences of the language of avowal. As discussed
in chapter two, Foucault’s discussion of the Christian practice of confession is
particularly illuminating for understanding these consequences. In a heteronormative
culture, coming out as gay or lesbian always, perhaps, feels like a confession, but within
the Protestant denominations studied here, avowing that one is a homosexual is framed
by the very concrete prohibition of homosexual practice. Thus, for all the positive
implications of coming out of the closet, to call coming out in these churches a form of
confession is not a stretch.3 Confession plays a constitutive role in shaping how we
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understand ourselves with regard to sex. In particular, confession links the power of
prohibition with an obligation to speak the truth concerning oneself. Foucault’s thesis in
The History of Sexuality is that disciplinary power functions not by repressing or
silencing discourses on sex but, rather, by multiplying them. Sex, once turned into
discourse, is observable and, thus, able to be regulated. With this relationship in mind, I
argue that the language of avowal oppresses by structuring the coming out experience of
gays and lesbians in these churches. Ideally, coming out is a moment when gays and
lesbians are able to put forth an authentic and healthy sexual identity. But because
coming out under the prohibition of homosexual practice opens the possibility of
ecclesial discipline, coming out is contextualized by homophobia and heterosexism. In
short, avowal stipulates that gays and lesbians ask themselves, “What is the ‘truth’ of my
sexuality?” and that they answer this question within the context of the prohibition of
homosexual practice.
Of course, if I treat the act of avowal as a confession, that begs the question: what
exactly is being confessed? The phrase “self-avowed practicing homosexual” suggests
that the confessant is admitting to being not just a homosexual, but a practicing
homosexual. This line of thinking connects to the argument critiqued in the previous
chapter—that the ordination policies in question are not discriminatory because they
pertain to the avowal of a certain practice and not a type of person—and so we see the
importance of understanding the effects of the rhetoric of practice before addressing those
of avowal. In light of chapter four’s analysis, it is clear that what is being avowed is
murky at best, for the rhetoric of homosexual practice does not provide the clear
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distinction between being and acting that its proponents claim. In fact, Björn Krondorfer
notes in his study of male confessional writings that coming out implies sexual activity in
the minds of many.
Even if a gay man never talks about his private life in public, the heterosexual
mentality will associate his ‘coming out’ declaration with performing particular
sexual activities. Such short-circuiting effect of the ‘gay’ label—which reduces
the range of human possibilities to a particular sexual practice—functions quite
independently of individual life choices…4
Avowing one’s sexual orientation is tantamount to a confession of sexual practice. The
language of avowal, then, has repercussions even for gay and lesbian clergy and
ordinands who remain celibate, or non-practicing (or whatever one wants to call it),
because under the logic of the rhetoric of homosexual practice, if you are a homosexual,
you always have something to confess.
To connect this chapter further with the previous one, if the rhetoric of
homosexual practice places gays and lesbians in a double-bind, whereby their sexuality is
used to define their personhood and yet they are denied any legitimate expression of that
sexuality, then the language of self-avowal places them in yet another: the double-bind of
authenticity. Authenticity is a cherished goal for everyone, but most especially for gays
and lesbians who are sometimes treated as or assumed to be heterosexuals until coming
out. But under the prohibition of self-avowed practicing homosexuals from ordination,
authenticity is also a ploy, for the thing one must do in order to live authentically makes
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one immoral in the eyes of one’s church. Negotiating this catch-22 is the predicament
that gays and lesbians are forced into by the language of avowal.
We must also note before proceeding that confessional discourse is at once
personal and institutional in nature. The language of avowal institutionalizes the coming
out experience; it puts that experience firmly under the institution’s gaze. To say this
another way, if chapter four was about the language that the denominations use to define
gay and lesbian subjects, then chapter five is about these institutions’ attempts to shape
the speech that gays and lesbians use to define themselves, and how gays and lesbians
respond to those attempts. In most instances in these denominations where a minister has
been subjected to a disciplinary trial, the trials were initiated by the minister’s act of
coming out to someone in the church, usually a bishop. So the trial begins with what is
interpreted by the church as an admission of guilt by the accused. Coming out, then, is a
confession that makes the homosexual the one who puts the enforcement of the
prohibition of homosexual practice into motion. Yet, coming out is deeply personal too.
It is ultimately the individual who speaks, and so institutional discourse alone does not
capture how the language of avowal operates. We must foreground the voices of gay and
lesbian clergy to hear the impact that the language of avowal has on gay and lesbian
subjectivity. Their voices reveal that the language of avowal operates less as a protection
of gays and lesbians and more as a subtle exercise of power, one that, at the very least,
produces a public display of anti-homosexual church discipline, thereby buttressing a
particular conception of the homosexual subject. More than that, though, it encourages
the internalization of a homophobic definition of homosexuality, coercing many gays and
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lesbians in church and society to hate themselves and remain closeted.
This chapter is divided into five sections. The first section reflects on the
religious significance of coming out for gays and lesbians in the church. That coming out
is a significant spiritual moment hardly needs to be argued. The proliferation of spiritual
and liturgical resources for gay and lesbian Christians—almost all of which entail
meditations on and sacred rituals for coming out—are evidence enough.5 But to gloss
over this fact is to risk underestimating or not fully understanding what is at stake. For
this, we turn to queer theologians who have written about coming out from a theological
and spiritual point of view. Coming out is an effort to craft one’s identity in an
intentional way and, in a religious context, this includes claiming who one is as a creature
made in the image of God. Since the language of self-avowal structures part of the
coming out experience for gays and lesbians, evaluating the full impact of this language
requires an understanding of the role that coming out plays in one’s experience of faith.
The second section explores how the language of self-avowal is used in
denominational documents. We must ask what kind of speech regarding homosexuality
do these denominations encourage and discourage? And whom do they authorize to do
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the talking? To be sure, these Protestant denominations do not have the power to regulate
all instances of speech that occur within their churches. Their democratic forms of
governance ensure that many different voices are heard at all levels of church leadership.
But, to the extent that they can, what forms of speech about homosexuality are
encouraged and discouraged? What is consistent in all three denominations during the
periods when the gay and lesbian ordination prohibitions are/were in place is that each
tries to force speech about homosexuality within the context of the prohibition of
homosexual practice. Furthermore, the only form of speech about homosexuality that is
required by these denominations is that which comes from gay and lesbian clergy and
ordinands in the guise of a confession.
This analysis, however, cannot simply examine coming out from the perspective
of institutional language. Coming out is, after all, a deeply personal thing, and examining
avowal as confession makes it crucial to take into account just how the avowing subject
avows. In a confession, after all, the subject is both the speaker and the subject of the
speech; that is what makes it a unique form of speech. To this end, section three explores
how gays and lesbians have depicted the coming out process in a religious context by
examining the coming out sermons of two mainline Protestant clergy. The first coming
out sermon analyzed is by Daniel Geslin, a minister in the United Church of Christ
(UCC). The UCC was the first American church to ordain an openly gay man—William
R. Johnson in 1972—and has since passed numerous progressive policies regarding the
church and homosexuality, most recently its adoption of a same-sex marriage resolution
in 2005. Thus, Geslin’s coming out sermon is preached from a place of relative security;
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he is not threatened by reprisal from his denomination. This sermon provides a
counterpoint to the second: Beth Stroud’s coming out sermon, preached to her UMC
congregation shortly after she disclosed her sexual orientation and relationship status to
her bishop. The congregation itself was and had been supportive of her as an ordained,
practicing lesbian, but her denomination was not. At the time the sermon was delivered,
charges had not yet been filed, but Stroud and her church had every reason to believe
they would be. How does the prohibition against homosexual practice shape the way
Stroud presents herself at this pivotal moment in her life?
This question probes the oppressive aspect of coming out in a heterosexist church:
sexuality, sexual identity, and sexual history are all powerful and deeply personal things.
The demand to confess these things, to make them public when one’s denomination will
interpret such an act as an admission of guilt, can have a profound impact on the
confessing subject. Of course, those who preach a coming out sermon do so because they
have decided that it is worth jeopardizing their ordination credentials; it also means they
do not accept their denomination’s definition of homosexuality. The deepest impact of
avowal, then, is unseen. It is in the many who remain closeted, who remain
pseudonymous heterosexuals in the eyes of their denominations, colleagues, and
parishioners. But, as we shall see, even in a coming out sermon, the effect of avowal is
present in the constant dissonance between the public self and private self—the struggle
for authenticity.
Section four examines what has remained in the background for much of this
dissertation. Coming out is a form of resistance. As Björn Krondorfer notes, the nature
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of any confession is multifarious. Speaking specifically of male confessions, he notes
that making a confession is a submission to certain norms yet, at the same time, it opens
up “the possibility of questioning what is perceived as normative masculinity, creating
alternative spaces for men to reveal something about the variety of their intimate
lives….Dominant ideals of manliness and masculinity can be undone by critical and selfreflective investigations.”6 Similarly, despite the ways denominations try to frame the
coming out experience for gays and lesbians, many gays and lesbians have the courage
and the support (support from their congregations, family, friends, etc.) not only to come
out as gay or lesbian but also to publicly defy their denominations’ policies. Just as the
denominations’ policies put forth a definition of the homosexual over and against how
gays and lesbians define themselves, gays and lesbians resist this by asserting an identity
of their own and, in the process, make themselves vulnerable to church discipline.7 An
exploration of coming out sermons illustrates part of this resistance.
Finally, section five offers a conclusion to the dissertation, bringing together the
analyses from this and the previous chapter and offering an answer to the question, “Who
is the self-avowed practicing homosexual in mainline Protestantism?” In light of my
analysis, I also offer thoughts on the power of language and the importance of
understanding its theological foundations and implications. In short, words matter. They
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often carry more meaning than we realize and have consequences beyond our intentions.
In the case of the rhetoric of the self-avowed practicing homosexual, this has certainly
proven true to the detriment and harm of gays and lesbians and to the church.
The Spiritual and Theological Significance of Coming Out
It is a truism to say that coming out is a significant moment in the life of a gay
man or lesbian. Nevertheless, the dynamics of this experience need to be elaborated
because they illustrate the difficulties and dangers that gays and lesbians face as they
navigate their way through a homophobic and heterosexist society and church.
Coming out is necessary for an authentic life. However, we would be wrong to
think that authenticity is something easily achieved once and for all, because coming out
is not a single event, but something that occurs many times in the lives of gays and
lesbians. Patricia Jung and Ralph Smith, for example, describe various stages of coming
out—coming out to oneself, one’s parents and friends, one’s employer and colleagues,
etc—and others have made similar observations about the plurality of the coming out
experience.8 Coming out, though, is not only a process; it is one that is always
incomplete. Foucault scholar Didier Eribon describes the situation that gays and lesbians
find themselves in by virtue of being queer.
Doubtless there is no gay person so “open” that he or she has not, at one moment
or another, made compromises with the closet. This is why coming out is never
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done only once and for all. Rather it is a point of departure, a kind of “ruling
ideal” that shapes one’s conduct but can never be fully attained. The closet is
structured in such a way that you are never simply either in or out, but always
both in and out, more or less in or more or less out depending on the particular
instance and your own evolution. You can never be fully in the closet to the
extent that, as we have seen, the closet can always become a sort of “open secret.”
There is always at least one person who seems to know, whom you know knows,
or whom you suspect must know. And you can never be fully out of the closet,
for at any moment you can once again find yourself in the situation of having to
disguise what you are or of simply not feeling like making things perfectly clear.
Thus the decision no longer to pretend, to be open about what you are, can only
be the beginning of a necessarily interminable process…”9
Eribon refers to this unease of perpetually straddling the closet’s threshold as “the
definition of the very structure of gay identity.”10 If the closet plays such a strong role in
shaping gay and lesbian identity, the ways that the institutional church shapes the
religious space in which gays and lesbians come out cannot be overlooked.
Despite the interminableness of coming out, the high point(s) of the process is
when one’s personal and public identities are in harmony. It is of great importance, then,
to note that the anti-gay policies studied here impact the coming out process most visibly
at precisely this moment. It is when a gay or lesbian clergyperson or ordinand comes out
publicly that the church intervenes.
In a religious context, queer theologians have described coming out as intentional
acts of identity formation and intensely spiritual. Ronald Long, for example, writing
specifically from a gay male perspective, describes the coming out experience as an act
of tremendous courage “to begin to dare to live a life that makes one so obviously
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It is also an intentional way of shaping one’s identity. Long is critical of

gay theology’s heavy reliance on Foucault—he claims that Foucault overestimates the
“determinateness and determination of language”12 and leaves too little room for
individual agency, an interpretation of Foucault that I critique in chapter two—and argues
that identities are “strategic acts of self-interpretation by which a self brings itself into
determinate focus.”13 To come out, then, is to begin to interpret oneself in a nonhomophobic, non-heterosexist way, and to present that self-interpretation in public. For
Long, accepting his identity as a gay man—and he feels this is true for many if not most
gay men, constituting the shared core of gay male identity—entails accepting a
susceptibility to masculine beauty. Indeed, he calls masculine beauty sacred in that to
neglect this aspect of reality would result in a diminishment of life. Consequently, he
defines a gay man’s coming out as his “refusal to live a life that belies the sacrality of
what he holds sacred.”14 Therefore, coming out is a positive and crucial spiritual act for
Long because remaining in the closet is tantamount to a rejection of something sacred.
Or, to put it another way, coming out fundamentally alters how one relates to the
sacred. Carter Heyward, working from her framework of justice as right relation,
describes coming out in this fashion. It is a relational process: the closet is a place where
one’s relational life is kept hidden, and so coming out means coming into one’s relational
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power. This power occurs on the level of the individual—to name oneself is to take
control of one’s self-understanding—but it also reverberates in one’s community. As
Heyward writes, “For you to come out will contribute to the well-being of us all insofar
as you are participating in shaping the Sacred among us.”15
These acts of self-interpretation require language. Eugene Rodgers, Jr., argues
this point through a reflection on Thomas Aquinas’ discussion of the vices of lying and
homosexuality. Rodgers considers these two subjects alongside one another because,
first, they are two places in Aquinas’ corpus where he seems to favor an appeal to natural
law over an appeal to the virtues16 and, second, when considered together they make an
interesting case for gays and lesbians to come out of the closet, at least from Rodgers’
modern interpretation of them. Aquinas classifies lying and homosexuality in a
somewhat similar fashion. Lying, as a vice against truth, counters the nature of the mind
(since lying is enunciating something contrary to what the mind adheres to as true) and
same-sex sex acts, as a vice against nature, counters the truth of the body. Aquinas’
reasons for this similarity in classification are complex, as Rodgers describes in more
detail in his essay, but the basis may ultimately rest on Aquinas’ understanding of Paul.
Paul associates same-sex sex with lying in Romans 1:24 and, based on Aquinas’ Romans
Commentary, Rodgers surmises that “for Aquinas the ‘natural virtue’ of truth telling
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seems to have applied to bodies as well as speech, and told against homosexuality.”

Thus, Rodgers extrapolates from Aquinas the principle that our bodies, as well as our
words, must adhere to truth.
If one applies that principle to a positive conception of homosexuality, Rodgers
believes we find an imperative for gays and lesbians to come out.
Homosexuality, one infers, is for Thomas in some respects a lie of the body. We
might today adopt the similar reasoning to an opposite conclusion: heterosexual
activity by gay and lesbian people is exposed when their bodies give them the lie,
and coming out is the bringing into community, the semiotic offering, of the
body’s truth telling….The communicative acts of coming out certainly entail selfdefinition, but these acts of signification come through surrender to an interpretive
community. Coming out is opening one’s life to be told by others….Coming out
articulates the sign-giving character of human, bodily life.18
Bodies demand language, but not just any language. Bodies demand truthful language
and, for Rodgers, gay and lesbian Christians meet that demand when they come out to the
community of the church and affirm their sexualities as good.
Rodgers does not use the word “sacrament” to describe the religious significance
of coming out, but others have. Benjamin Perkins, for example, claims coming out is a
sacramental journey, and believes framing coming out in this manner can bring attention
to the plight of closeted gays and lesbians in powerful ways.19 Chris Glaser offers a more
sustained discussion of coming out as sacrament. He argues that in a Christian context
coming out can and should be thought of as the unique sacrament that gays and lesbians
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offer the church. He is not suggesting that coming out should be made an official
sacrament of the church—as a Presbyterian, he affirms the Reformed tradition’s
recognition of two sacraments, baptism and communion—but is speaking more generally.
He defines a sacrament as “a means of grace…an objective expression of God’s
unconditional love, as well as a subjective experience of that love to those who believe
and participate in those rituals,”20 but just as frequently he speaks broadly of sacrament
as the sacredness of life—that God is revealed in all living things. Coming out is
sacramental, for Glaser, because it reveals the presence of God in the lives of gays and
lesbians and invites others to experience God in a new way. Glaser sums up the
comparison this way: “At their best and deepest level, sacraments renew life,
relationships, community, and communion with God. At its best and deepest level,
coming out means a new life, fresh and refreshed relationships, access to a new
community, and increased intimacy with God.”21
Glaser makes numerous, more specific comparisons between coming out and
sacrament. A sense of community is essential to both. Any sacrament presupposes a
community that values and participates in the ritual. To be sure, not all members of the
community participate with the same level of belief; but the key point is that a sacrament
communicates the sacred, and communication requires giving and receiving. So too,
coming out implies a community that hears and responds to the one coming out. It is “a
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sacrament that may be shared with one other person, a community, a congregation, a
denomination, or the world.”22
Glaser also dwells on the relationship between sacraments and time. Sacraments
bear elements of the past, present and future. There are sacraments that occur at particular
times in one’s life (e.g. baptism) and others that are repeated through out one’s life (e.g.
communion). Coming out mirrors this as well. As already stated, coming out is not a
one-time act, but a process that unfolds over one’s life. Glaser notes that that is so “not
only because there are always new people to whom the sacred in our lives may be
revealed, but also because overcoming all impediments to ‘celebrating’ our holiness
requires a lifetime.”23 For this reason, Glaser sees an analogy between coming out and
the Christian notion of sanctification. Overcoming one’s own and others’ homophobia
and heterosexism is a form of freeing oneself from sin and maturing in faith.
We notice at least two things from these reflections from queer theologians on
coming out that bear on the analysis of avowal. First, coming out emerges from these
reflections as a moment in the life of a gay or lesbian Christian that holds great spiritual
significance. Coming out in general is obviously important, but these scholars show how
interconnected coming out is with one’s spiritual and religious life. In a way, this comes
as no surprise when one considers the implications of body theology. Coming out has
fundamental social consequences. As Heyward notes, the closet hides one’s relational
life, and so coming out brings that life into one’s communities. Body theology reveals
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the falseness of dividing the social from the spiritual, and so coming out necessarily has
theological and spiritual consequences. Again, Heyward: “Locked within ourselves,
holding secrets and denial, we embody not merely the fear of our relational possibilities;
we also embody the rejection of the sacred ground of our being, which is none other than
our power to connect.”24
Second, these scholars also show the degree to which coming out is an intentional
crafting of one’s personal and public identity. One theoretical assumption of this
dissertation is that identity is a socially constructed and fluid thing, shaped at first by
factors beyond one’s control but also eventually by one’s intentional choices and actions.
Coming out is a way for an individual to take control of one’s identity, to assert over and
against people’s assumptions and expectations, “This is who I am!” It is a naming of
oneself. Considered this way, we have to conclude that to out someone else, regardless
of the intentions behind the act, robs the person outed of the opportunity to take control
of his or her identity.25 Furthermore, to insert oneself uninvited into another’s coming
out process, to try to influence that sacred process in ways that the person coming out
might oppose, has a similar effect.
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To put it another way, “This is who you are” or “This is who s/he is” are very
different statements with different consequences from “This is who I am.” In a religious
context, the differences in these statements can carry profound theological implications.
When the institutional church imposes an identity on gays and lesbians grounded on a
heteronormative theological anthropology, it relegates them to an inferior position within
God’s created order, as though heterosexuals were created more in the image of God than
homosexuals. Similarly, to come out in church is to say not only that you are proud to be
gay or lesbian, but that you believe God loves you as a gay or lesbian person. The slogan
“Gay is good,” in this context, becomes a theological anthropology (one, perhaps, that
has not yet been articulated in theological scholarship). In short, coming out is a
theological assertion, and the church and the individual who comes out too often struggle
against one another for ownership of that assertion.
Self-Avowal in Denominational Policies and Court Proceedings
While the effects of the language of self-avowal are best illuminated by the gay
and lesbian clergy and ordinands whom it impacts, we must also ask how the language of
avowal is discussed in institutional discourses. It is there that we catch a glimpse of the
different ways that these institutions have sought to control discourse about
homosexuality and shape the act of coming out. It is perhaps important to note at the
outset that the language of self-avowal has not occupied the center of the homosexuality
debates in the denominations studied here the way the rhetoric of homosexual practice
has. The key issue has always been the moral status of homosexual practice. But an
examination of avowal in institutional discourse highlights the fact that the language

197
brings focus to bear on the role of the gay or lesbian individual in the ordination and
disciplinary processes. Such attention places a burdensome onus of authenticity on gays
and lesbians. This onus is burdensome because it forces clergy, ordinands, and church
officers to choose between living an authentic, public life and following their calls to
ministry—and this choice is one that heterosexuals do not face. We find this to be the
case when we examine the documents with the following questions in mind: What sorts
of speech about homosexuality are encouraged and discouraged, and who does the
speaking?
The UMC, more than the PC (USA) and ELCA, has sought to regulate what is
and is not said about homosexuality. The references to homosexuality found in the Book
of Discipline tell the story. These passages function, first of all, to label homosexual
practice incompatible with Christian teaching and then to prohibit such practice (see ¶
161F, ¶ 304.3, and ¶ 2702.1). Taken together, these passages also explain who is
permitted to speak with validity about homosexual practice in the UMC and under what
circumstances. For example, sections ¶ 613.20 and ¶ 806.9 of the Discipline list the
responsibilities of committees that oversee the financial matters of the denomination.
Among these responsibilities, it is stipulated that church funds may not be apportioned
“to any gay caucus or group, or otherwise use such funds to promote the acceptance of
homosexuality or violate the expressed commitment of The United Methodist Church
‘not to reject or condemn lesbian and gay members and friends.’” This passage was
originally passed in 1976 without the final clause that denies funds for anti-gay groups
within the church. The final clause, however, does little to blunt the intention of the
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statute. Funds can, of course, be used to promote positive discussions of human
(hetero)sexuality, but not homosexuality. The imbalance speaks volumes. It essentially
denies LGBT organizations any legitimate status within the church, and treats the voices
of gays and lesbians with suspicion. The overall effect of this financial regulation is to
ensure that the UMC does not fund discussions of homosexuality for which it does not
also establish the terms.
The boundaries of ¶ 613.20 and ¶ 806.9 were tested when the Minnesota Annual
Conference passed legislation permitting domestic partner benefits for lay employees
(obviously, such benefits could not be offered to ordained employees, who are not
supposed to have domestic partners) provided that the lay employees pay for those
benefits. Members of the annual conference challenged the benefits plan, claiming that
permitting them “promoted the acceptance of homosexuality.” In a 2007 Judicial
Council decision, the domestic partner benefits plan was upheld, but only because no
church funds were used to pay for the benefits. Since the decision isolates the use of
church funds as central to the case, it suggests that, were the domestic partner benefits
plan paid for with church funds, the plan would indeed “promote the acceptance of
homosexuality” and, therefore, constitute a violation of the Discipline.26 This decision
demonstrates one way that affirming “speech” about homosexuality is discouraged within
the various bodies of the UMC.27
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It should be pointed out that there are examples of ministers, congregations, and Annual Conferences
speaking out in support of LGBT persons without being censored. In the cases that have reached the
Judicial Council, two Annual Conferences--the Desert Southwest Annual Conference and the CaliforniaNevada Annual Conference--adopted resolutions titled “We will not be Silent” that protested the stance of
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If ¶ 613.20 and ¶ 806.9 attempt, to the extent that they can, to ban gay and lesbian
speech in the denomination, then it is interesting to note the one passage in the Discipline
that encourages gays and lesbians to speak for themselves. It is in the language of selfavowal. The phrase “self-avowed practicing homosexual” emphasizes the role of the
individual homosexual in the enforcement of the ordination prohibition. The practicing
homosexual is admonished to confess, to turn her sexual experience into discourse and
subject herself to ecclesial discipline. Taken as a whole, the passages in the Discipline
that refer to homosexuality deny gays and lesbians the ability to speak positively on their
own behalf. Gay and lesbian speech is confined to confession. They may speak if by
doing so they admit their guilt. To say this another way, the Discipline restricts
homosexual speech so that it always occurs within the context of the prohibition of
homosexual practice.
The discussion of “self-avowal” in UMC Judicial Council decisions reinforces the
way the Discipline highlights the obligation of gays and lesbians to come out. In the first
case to come before the Judicial Council regarding the prohibition of “self-avowed
practicing homosexuals” from ordained ministry, Decision 544 (1984), the Council
expressed concern that there was not a clear definition of “self-avowal” (and “practice,”
discussed in the previous chapter) and charged the General Conference to provide a

the denomination regarding LGBT persons in the church and encouraged congregations to welcome LGBT
persons in leadership roles in the church. In both cases, the Judicial Council stated that the resolutions did
not violate the Discipline and were allowed to stand. Presumably, the Judicial Council could not nullify
these decisions because 1) they did not involve the appropriation of conference funds and 2) they avoided
using the specific language of the Discipline's ordination prohibition. These cases reveal the limits of the
UMC's ability to regulate speech about homosexuality. See UMC Judicial Council Decisions 913 (2001)
and 1028 (2005).
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definition. This concern was echoed in Decision 702 (1993), citing the denomination’s
regard for due process. If ministers are to be afforded due process in any complaint
proceedings, the Judicial Council argued, the term self-avowal must have a clear
meaning.
In several decisions, the Judicial Council provides guidance to the General
Conference regarding what a definition of “self-avowal” would minimally include. In
Decision 722 (1994), it stipulated that “an adequate definition of ‘self-avowal’ must
address the question of to whom the avowal shall be made so that identification is not
dependent on the testimony of others.” We see here a concern to exclude hearsay or
outside testimony from the prosecution of gay and lesbian clergy, affirming the
observation made earlier that the intention of the language of “self-avowal” is to ensure
that church courts do not become a place to speculate about an individual’s sexual
orientation. Furthermore, the most important element of the phrase “self-avowal” is the
person to whom the avowal is made, something that is reinforced in Decision 764 (1995)
and Decision 837 (1998). To whom must the practicing homosexual confess for the
confession to be legitimate? The UMC General Conference answered this question by
adding a footnote to the ordination prohibition at ¶ 304.3 of the Discipline, defining “selfavowed practicing homosexual” as a person who “openly acknowledges to a bishop,
district superintendent, district committee of ordained ministry, Board of Ordained
Ministry, or clergy session that the person is a practicing homosexual.” The confession
must be made to an individual or group that has authority over the clergyperson or
ordinand.
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Beyond the language of the Discipline and the Judicial Council decisions
adjudicating that language, the UMC has discouraged affirming speech about
homosexuality in another, more obvious way. In 1988, the UMC called for a four-year
study of human sexuality in an attempt to move past the controversy created by the ban
on gay and lesbian clergy. The commission presented its report to the 1992 General
Conference, which stated that there was not sufficient evidence to come to a clear
conclusion about the biological, psychological, and theological grounds of homosexuality
as a sexual orientation and recommended that the denomination remove the language
from the Discipline that condemned homosexual practice. It also recommended in light
of the persecution that gays and lesbians face in society that the UMC add language to the
Discipline strongly supporting gay and lesbian civil rights. The report was incredibly
contentious. The General Conference normally votes to accept reports such as this—an
action that merely enters the report into the official minutes of the conference—and then
takes up the recommendations in separate resolutions. Delegates, however, were afraid
that the word “accept” might suggest approval, and so they voted to “receive” but not
“accept” the report. The condemnation of homosexual practice was left intact, but the
General Conference did pass a resolution supporting gay and lesbian civil rights. The
rejection of that report sent a clear message that the policy could not be challenged easily,
and no new study has been initiated since that time.
Two things stand out from the discussion of self-avowal that has taken place
within the UMC. First, the denomination has made it clear that, for a practicing
homosexual to be charged with an offense, she or he must come out as a practicing
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homosexual to a person or group in a position of official authority over her or him.
Second, the attention paid to clarifying “self-avowal” stands in contrast to the lack of
attention paid to clarifying what does and does not constitute homosexual practice, as
noted in my discussion in chapter four of Judicial Council Decision 764. In short,
establishing the exact nature of the “offense” seems less important than establishing
protocol to facilitate gay and lesbian confessions of guilt.
Before the PC (USA) overturned its ban on gay and lesbian clergy with the
passage of Amendment 10-A in May 2011, the PC (USA) had several things in common
with the UMC in terms of how speech about homosexuality had been discouraged at
times and permitted at others. Like the UMC, and around the same time, the PC (USA)
called for a task force to study human sexuality—though the controversy surrounding
homosexuality precipitated it—only to reject the work of the task force in no uncertain
terms. As the task force began to find consensus on a justice-seeking framework for the
report, its chairs began to receive pressure from denominational leaders to tone down its
work because rumors of the task force’s progress proved to be unsettling.28 The task
force issued its report in 1991, titled Keeping Body and Soul Together: Sexuality,
Spirituality, and Social Justice. Among other things, the report linked sexuality and
justice in a way that affirmed homosexuality the same as heterosexuality. Tensions
erupted following the report’s publication and it quickly became the most widely read
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In

his “Beliefs” column for the New York Times, Peter Steinfels called the report “radical”
and “dead on arrival” within the denomination.30 He was right. At the 1991 General
Assembly, delegates voted overwhelmingly not to adopt the report and none of its
specific recommendations were considered.31
The Book of Order, unlike the UMC’s Discipline, does not mention
homosexuality at all. There are references to sexual orientation, but the constitution does
not get more specific than that. Even G-6.0106b, the now-overturned prohibition of selfacknowledged practicing homosexuals from ordained ministry, simply prohibited by
implication. It declared that marriage is an institution between “a man and a woman” and
that clergy must remain chaste in singleness. For a clergyperson to be charged, the
person must self-acknowledge a sinful practice. It is, perhaps, odd that the 1996 General
Assembly that approved this policy did not see fit to name what they were prohibiting.
According to William J. Weston, this oddity was the result of the loyalist faction in the
denomination (his term for the centrist middle committed to maintaining unity in the
church while respecting, though not affirming, its gay and lesbian members) wanting to
avoid “the divisive spectacle of prosecutors from one end of the church pursuing
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It should be noted that, unlike in the UMC, the rejection of the 1991 report is not the end of the story.
The PC (USA) initiated another study process in 2001, which led to the acceptance of the document,
“Peace, Unity, Purity: The Theological Task Force for Peace, Unity, and Purity of the Church,” in 2006.
The acceptance of this document was a crucial step in the denomination's journey toward a more just
ordination policy.

defendants from the other.”
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Thus, by broadening the new policy so as to raise the

standard for heterosexual behavior as well, the hope was to avoid isolating the gay and
lesbian minority.
Of course, the impetus for the new policy was the homosexual ordination
“problem,” and the enforcement of the policy, as documented in the previous chapter,
only reinforces its true intentions. For an evaluation of how the phrase “selfacknowledged” functions in G-6.0106b, we must juxtapose the demurral of the ordination
policy to name homosexuality as its true focus with the fixation of the church courts on
how and when to investigate gay and lesbian candidates for ordination and installation
about their sexuality. The history of these cases was reviewed in the previous chapter,
but it is worth repeating that, during the life of G-6.0106b, the GAPJC ruled in numerous
cases that ordaining bodies have a positive obligation to investigate a candidate’s
sexuality if they have reason to suspect the candidate of homosexual practice.33 The
candidate must self-acknowledge such practice for the ordaining body to take the action
of removing the individual from the candidacy process, but, unlike in the UMC, it is not
always the self-acknowledgement that initiates such action. Many of the cases in the PC
(USA) were initiated by complaints from one church session that another church had
installed a homosexual as deacon, elder, etc. The resulting GAPJC decisions delineated
the conditions under which an ordaining body should question a candidate, and the goal,
32
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it seems, was to get the candidate to make explicit what G-6.0106b only implied:
homosexual practice is a sin.
During the period in the ELCA when the denomination prohibited practicing gays
and lesbians from ordained ministry, it too sought to regulate speech relating to
homosexuality. The ELCA, like the UMC and PC (USA), also began a study process in
the late 1980s, almost immediately after the denomination formed. The study process
resulted in numerous drafts of social statements throughout the early 1990s, none of
which were ever presented for a vote at Churchwide Assemblies. Thus, instead of
adopting a comprehensive social statement, the 1995 Churchwide Assembly called for a
message from the Church Council on human sexuality that focused on issues where there
seemed to be consensus. The result was the 1996 statement, “Sexuality: Some Common
Convictions.” Since this document simply dealt with areas of agreement, homosexuality
was only mentioned once to point out that it was an issue on which there was little
agreement.34 Like the UMC and PC (USA), then, the initial attempt to produce some
form of statement on homosexuality was derailed because the church could not accept the
progressive stances of the proposed statements.35
The ELCA also restricted pro-homosexual speech by suspending and/or expelling
congregations that violated church policy by calling openly gay and lesbians persons to
ordained ministry. The most famous example occurred in the early 1990s when two
34

ELCA Church Council, “Sexuality: Some Common Convictions” (1996), available at
http://www.elca.org/What-We-Believe/Social-Issues/Messages/Sexuality.aspx.

35

Like the PC (USA), the ELCA initiated another period of intentional study and discernment, resulting in
the Journey Together Faithfully study series and then the social statement that created space for practicing
gays and lesbians to be ordained, Human Sexuality: Gift and Trust.

206
congregations in the San Francisco bay area, St Francis Lutheran Church and First United
Lutheran Church, ordained three openly gay and lesbian persons—Jeff Johnson, Ruth
Frost, and Phyllis Zillhart—to the ministry of Word and Sacrament. Each of them had
refused to submit to the ELCA’s policy that sought to impose celibacy on gays and
lesbians and so was not going through the candidacy process. Their ordinations,
therefore, were considered irregular by the denomination because they were not on the
roster of ordination candidates, and the Sierra Pacific Synod immediately filed charges
against the congregations for violating the ELCA’s policies. The result was that both
congregations were suspended from the denomination. Their suspension meant that St.
Francis and First United were “deprived of certain rights and privileges such as sending
voting lay delegates to synod assemblies and petitioning the church.”36 The term of
suspension was five years, after which, because neither congregation was willing to abide
by the ELCA’s heterosexist policies, both were removed from the roll of ELCA
congregations.37 The suspension silenced the congregations in that they were not able to
participate in the ELCA’s legislative process. The calling of Johnson, Frost and Zillhart
was a form of speech that affirmed gays and lesbians as fit for ordination, and the ELCA
could not allow such speech to go unpunished. Thus, the suspension and expulsion of St.
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Francis and First United was an attempt to restrict speech about homosexuality that did
not advance the ELCA’s stance (at that time) on the ordination of homosexuals.
Within the ELCA’s disciplinary system, we also see that some of the church’s
official documents place constraints on how disciplinary bodies were able to speak about
gay and lesbian clergy in their decisions. In fact, this issue was Brad Schmeling’s
primary argument in his case before the Committee on Appeals in 2007. Schmeling’s
counsel argued to the Committee on Appeals that, while the documents Definitions and
Guidelines and Visions and Expectations both contained proscriptions against practicing
homosexuals from serving as clergy, the ELCA’s constitution, the supreme governing
document of the denomination, contained no such language. Furthermore, the
constitution grants discipline hearing committees (DHC) a degree of discretion in
hearings, such that the DHC could have chosen to find Schmeling not guilty of “conduct
incompatible with the character of the ministerial office.”38
The DHC, however, felt constrained by the language of section b.4 of the
Definitions and Guidelines and, as a result, ruled that Schmeling was guilty of the
charges. The DHC’s decision is intriguing because the committee members referred to
the prohibition of homosexual practice as bad policy and even suggested it might be
unconstitutional. Furthermore, they stated that they felt forced to rule against their better
judgments.
In the event that the Committee on Appeals determines that paragraph b.4) of
Definitions and Guidelines is unconstitutional, so that this case should be decided
under the standards for ministers established by chapter seven of the constitution
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and the procedures for discipline established by chapter twenty of the constitution,
then this committee would find, with near unanimity, that there is nothing about
Pastor Schmeling’s acknowledged and stipulated homosexual relationship that
would impede the proclamation of the gospel or the right administration of the
sacraments. If relieved of the specific requirements of Definitions and Guidelines
and permitted to decide this case under the standards of constitution chapters
seven and twenty, this committee would find almost unanimously that Pastor
Schmeling is not engaged in conduct that is incompatible with the ministerial
office, and would find with near unanimity that no discipline of any sort should be
imposed against him.39
When the case was sent up to the Committee on Appeals, it weighed in on the DHC’s
comments, admonishing the committee for overstepping its bounds by doing more than
its charge. By suggesting the policies regarding the ordination of gays and lesbians are
bad policy and using Schmeling’s case to reveal what is bad about it, the DHC was out of
order.40 As an official body of the ELCA, it attempted to speak in a way that was
contrary to the denomination’s prohibition of homosexual practice, and that form of
speech was deemed unacceptable.
Lastly, as discussed in the previous chapter, Chris Scharen notes how the
candidacy process is based on a series of examinations intended to produce suitable
ordinands.41 Prior to the 2009 Churchwide Assembly, this process demanded that
candidates review the heterosexist policies of the church banning homosexual practice
and acquiesce to them. This process by its very nature encourages heteronormative
speech from ordination candidates and discourages speech that affirms gays and lesbians.
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A gay or lesbian clergyperson who has gone through this process, then, has conceded (if
only for the purposes of being ordained) to a conception of the homosexual person based
on the negation of that person’s sexuality. And if and when that clergyperson violates her
church’s policies concerning homosexual practice, the burden is on her to speak again,
identifying herself as incompatible with the ministry to which she is called.
While the language of self-avowal has never been at the heart of denominational
debates about the ordination of gays and lesbians, church actions have highlighted the
role that it plays in oppressing gays and lesbians in the church. In various ways and to
the extent that they are able, these churches have discouraged speech about
homosexuality that takes place outside of the terms of the prohibition of homosexual
practice. The language of self-avowal must be understood within this situation, for it
represents the type of speech about homosexuality that is actually encouraged. If gays
and lesbians are to speak about themselves in the church they must do so first by
describing themselves in relation to the prohibition of homosexual practice. How gays
and lesbians attempt to assert an authentic sexual identity in the face of such language
reveals some of its harmful consequences, and it is to this that we now turn.
Coming Out under Prohibition
To analyze avowal as a form of confession places the role of confession in the
spotlight. This differs from the analysis of homosexual practice, which showed that the
institutional discussion and evaluation of homosexual practice occurs without much, if
any, consideration of the experience of homosexuals. In that discourse, scripture and the
Christian theological tradition—interpreted through a heteronormative lens—often take
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precedent over experience, and so denominations define homosexual practice for
homosexuals. With the language of self-avowal, however, the homosexual subject is
asked to speak. The institution provides the context of that speech, to be sure, but what
gays and lesbians say—how they decide to avow their sexual selves to their churches—is
the primary source to analyze in order to see the effects of this language.
Coming out sermons provide one way to see the complex nature of the coming
out process and how the prohibition of homosexual practice impacts it. In what follows, I
compare two coming out sermons from ministers in somewhat different situations
professionally. The first is by Daniel Geslin, a minister at an Open and Affirming church
in the United Church of Christ (UCC)—a relatively safe place to share one’s coming out
story.42 The second is by Beth Stroud, who was stripped of her ordination credentials in
the UMC in 2005. Stroud’s sermon was preached in 2003 soon after she came out to her
bishop, the action that initiated the trial process that led to her defrocking. Thus, the
prohibition of “self-avowed practicing homosexuals” in the UMC is the context for the
sermon. To be sure, the coming out stories in these two sermons bear many similarities
and illustrate the spiritual and theological significance of coming out as described by the
queer theologians discussed earlier. Despite these similarities, the differences found in
these two sermons highlight the impact that the prohibition of homosexual practice has
on those asked to avow it.
42
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As any coming out sermon is sure to be, Dan Geslin’s sermon, “A Coming Out
Story,”43 is autobiographical. His story begins in Minneapolis. It was there that he felt
God’s call not only to enter the ministry but also to come out of the closet. Following
these calls, which Geslin sees as two parts of a whole, meant balancing his fear of people
knowing that he was gay with his faith in God. Feeling as though he could not fully
answer this call in Minneapolis, he moved to San Francisco. “If I could just get to San
Francisco,” he writes, “I would be born again into a New Life.”44 Once there, he enrolled
at a Lutheran Seminary in Berkeley.
At seminary, Geslin embraced the dual call of ministry and authenticity. Indeed,
he found the language to express why he feels these two things are inseparable:
Going to seminary was as much about being gay as it was about being “spiritual.”
What I would learn in seminary is that, for me, being gay and being spiritual are
the same thing, because that is…who I am. God was calling me by name. In
seminary I learned God’s name: YWHW—“I AM WHO I AM”—and learning
that I am created in I AM’s image. God was calling me to become…who I am!45
Ministry and sexual orientation are not compartmentalized for Geslin. Both are integral
aspects of his identity, and so denying one would mean denying the other. It is not
surprising, then, when he describes his love for his partner Raf as sacramental (echoing
Chris Glaser).46 Indeed, he writes that the first time he and Raf made love was for him a
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conversion experience. He relates this to the story from one of the lectionary texts for
that Sunday, John 3:1-6, where Jesus tells Nicodemus that one must receive a new birth, a
birth of the Spirit, to enter the Kingdom of God. Making love to Raf for the first time
was a “new birth” for Geslin, a turning point in his life: “That was the moment when I
finally trusted that God has goodness in store for me, even when I cannot see it ahead of
time, if only I could come out as a person of faith. That revelation was my ‘born again’
experience.”47 If that moment was pivotal in Geslin’s life, it is also the climax of his
sermon. It is here that the call that he heard from God—to live openly as a gay man and
enter the ministry—is integrated into a whole. It took going to seminary for him to
become comfortable with himself as gay, and it took loving another man for him to
become comfortable with himself as a person of faith.
When Geslin came into his identity as a gay man called to ministry, he was able
to come out to his bishop back in Minnesota confidently, despite knowing that this act
would prevent him from being ordained in the Lutheran Church. For our purposes, it is
striking to note the relative ease with which he tells this part of his story. There is no
build up to this moment. It is not approached with any sense of dread or somberness. As
it happens, other than the fact that Geslin tells us he enrolled in a Lutheran seminary, we
have no way of knowing that he was Lutheran at the time. Did he grow up Lutheran?
Was the church a major part of his upbringing or was its presence in his life more
peripheral? We are not given any answers to these questions. The institutional church
has remained invisible or deep in the background of his coming out story up to this point.

47

Ibid., 37.

213
And now Geslin does not dwell on it. We do not hear what it was like to have this
conversation with his bishop. The event is recounted very matter-of-factly, as though it
were one item among many on a to-do list. It had to happen, it’s in the past, and now he
can say “I am who I am” with confidence and celebration.
Geslin walks us through the events of his life leading up to his coming out, and
the fact that he does so from a place of security and affirmation from both his
congregation and his denomination colors the way he remembers the first time he came
out to himself in the 1980s and to the Lutheran church where he was an ordination
candidate. To be sure, there is tension in his coming out story, but it is not between him
and the institutional church. It is within himself, or perhaps between him and God. Only
as this tension finds some resolution does the church become a character in the story. We
hear an unreserved naming of who Dan Geslin is, and an announcement that God, I AM
WHO I AM, created him this way and called him good. Relating his coming out story
from a safe place allows him, it seems, to focus not on the role of the church he was a
part of at the time, but rather on putting forth his own, authentic identity, which he
describes as part of his call from God. In short, free from the threat of ecclesial discipline
by both time and institutional affiliation, Geslin is in control of how he speaks of his own
sexuality and how it relates to his Christian faith.
Stroud’s sermon is delivered under very different circumstances. In March of
2003 she disclosed to her bishop that she was a lesbian in a committed relationship with
another woman. Many of her parishioners were no doubt already aware of her sexual
orientation and relationship, but she formally disclosed this information to her
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congregation in a letter dated April 19. She delivered her coming out sermon, “Walking
in the Light,” on April 27. Stroud stood at the beginning of a very tumultuous time in her
life. She knew that coming out to her bishop would almost certainly lead to charges filed
against her. She had officially avowed her homosexual practice and, in the eyes of the
UMC, was leading a life incompatible with her faith. And so, as Stroud took her place in
the pulpit that Sunday, she no doubt felt the full weight of her actions.
She preached from John 20, and began her sermon with the simple message that
Jesus offers to the disciples in the upper room: “Peace be with you.” “Isn’t that just like
Jesus,” Stroud writes, “to appear not when we’re out in public putting our best face
forward, not when we’re wearing the masks of confidence…but rather to sneak into the
private spaces where those masks are down?”48 At the outset, then, she indicates to her
parishioners that this sermon will delve into the deeply personal. She also introduces
Jesus not as an iconic or institutional figure, but as a friend. In fact, she then contrasts
her relationship with Jesus with her relationship—if that is the right word—with her
denomination.
I have not met Jesus walking through Annual Conference with hundreds of other
pastors all wearing a public mask of competence and piety. But I do know Jesus
in my inmost self. Jesus comes to me in the relationships where I experience my
human brokenness most intimately, and in the personal times of prayer where I
am simply myself before God.
The places where the church as an institution looks most like an institution seem to be the
places where Stroud feels the most closeted.
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The distinction between public space and private space is, of course, not
surprising. Without using the word, Stroud is describing the closet that she has been
coerced to stay in until now by, not her parishioners, but the institutional church. It is
also not surprising, then, that she describes public space as a façade, a place where people
present themselves falsely. Stroud believes that there was always her true identity
waiting to be made public, but she also demonstrates that identity is not singular. We
have different identities that we display, different masks that we wear, and the struggle
for Stroud is to allow her “inmost self” also to become her public self.
Much of what follows these first paragraphs is the narrative of her life in the
closet, her life-long struggle to reconcile who she knows herself to be with who her
church assumed and instructed her to be. The UMC has been a constant presence in her
life. “The church,” she writes, “is my first memory, my family, my home.” From
baptism, to singing “Jesus loves me” in Sunday school, to understanding and accepting
herself as a lesbian while in college—all of these events are a part of her story, her
struggle to be a United Methodist Christian and a lesbian. Indeed, it was when she came
out to herself in college that the she confronted the idea that she might have to choose
“between being true to myself and being a Christian.”
She wrestled with this choice for some years—attending seminary, leaving, and
then attending again. Yet through all of these struggles, the thing that seems to bring her
back to the church and accept her call to ministry is her relationship with Jesus. As she
stated at the start of her sermon, Jesus is the one who knows her true self and offers her
peace. It is that knowledge of Christ and the knowledge that Christ knows her that leads
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her to come out to her denomination, despite the possible consequences. As she tells of
the moment in her life when she came to this realization, she reads a portion of another
lectionary text for that Sunday:
God is light and in God there is no darkness at all. If we say that we have
fellowship with God while we are walking in darkness, we lie and do not do what
is true; but if we walk in the light as God is in the light, we have fellowship with
one another, and the blood of Jesus God’s Son cleanses us from all sin.49
Stroud uses this scripture to powerful effect, associating the closet with a place of
darkness, a place where one is forced to “lie and do not do what is true,” a place absent of
true fellowship. (The metaphor recalls Eugene Rodgers’ description of the closet as a
“lie of the body.”) For Stroud to be who she is, for her to experience God and fellowship
with others fully, she must come out and walk in the light. For her to minister and to live
with authenticity, she must bring the public facet of her life, the side of her that her
denomination is acquainted with, and the private part of her life into harmony.
And here the sermon crescendos with Stroud expressing her longing: “I want to
take that experience of the risen Christ out of the locked room, out of the closet, and into
the world where everyone can see it. I want to walk in the light so that Christ might be
revealed in my life.” Stroud’s narration of the past events in her life has now arrived at
her present desire to live a life completely out of the closet. In a perfect world, this
moment in her sermon would be one of rejoicing. It would be followed by the call heard
in Geslin’s sermon—and punctuated with exclamation points, as Geslin was fond of
doing—for all to be who they are.
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But she does not move into a celebratory or triumphant tone. Instead, as she
expresses this profound desire to be known by others as Christ knows her, she is
confronted by the prohibition of homosexual practice. In this moment where Stroud
asserts for the first time—at least from the pulpit—her self-defined identity, she is
compelled to acknowledge the way in which her denomination seeks to define her. Her
next words: “I know that by telling the truth about myself, I risk losing my credentials as
an ordained United Methodist minister. And that would be a huge loss for me.” The
UMC’s ordination prohibition sets the mood for the occasion. It is why she has not come
out sooner and it is why coming out now carries such anxiety. Rather than staying in the
moment, the moment when she begins to walk in the light for all to see, she is forced to
anticipate how her denomination will interpret her life—that is, how it will interpret
her—and what consequences this holds for her and her congregation.
As Stroud’s coming out has compelled her to look ahead to the impending
conflict with the UMC, most of the rest of her sermon deals with details about what they
might experience in the coming days. She introduces her partner and then thanks the
church staff that supported her in her decision to come out to the bishop. She reminds the
congregation not to treat the UMC or her bishop as enemies. And, knowing that she and
her partner will be going through a difficult time, she offers the congregation guidance on
how best to minister to her and one another throughout the discipline process. She tells
them, “Please remember to slow down. You’re a great church for protest marches.
You’re not always so great at casseroles. But this situation may call for casseroles.” It is
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as though her coming out is all the protest she can handle right now. What she needs is a
quieter form of support.
While Stroud’s sermon is not cheerful in tone, it should be noted that it is not
sorrowful, either. She concludes by reminding the congregation—and perhaps herself—
that while it is important to plan for what was ahead for her and her church, they were
sharing a joyful moment that day. What makes the joy in Stroud’s sermon different from
the joy in Geslin’s is the way the institutional church mitigates that joy by compelling
Stroud to add a “but…” to every joyful expression. Hear, for example, two of the last
sentences that Stroud preached to her parishioners that Sunday: “After all, here I am, for
this Sunday at least, and perhaps for many months to come, your openly lesbian, fully
credentialed, United Methodist pastor. I am excited to be able to give you the gift of my
whole self in the fullest expression of my ministry, for however much time we have”
(emphasis added). Stroud has difficulty celebrating this moment without also conjuring
the UMC policies that threaten her ministry.
Foucault’s discussion of confession and the process he refers to as pyschagogy,
provides an interesting lens through which to read these sermons. The pyschagogic
relationship involves the confessor (the bishop or, more generally, the institutional
church) and the confessant (the one coming out). In comparing these two coming out
sermons, we have seen how much more present the institutional church is in Stroud’s
sermon than Geslin’s. Yet, we should also note that the main character in Stroud’s
sermon is without a doubt herself. The church is present as she narrates her struggle to
reconcile her sexuality and faith, but its presence is often subtle. If we were to personify
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the church as a character in a play, it would be a character who is almost always on
stage—sometimes prominently, sometimes not—but speaks seldom. However, it is
worth remembering that the institutional church operates in this relationship as the
“spiritual guide.” Foucault notes that in the Christian formulation of pyschagogy, the
spiritual guide does not have to have an overbearing presence in the discourse of truth. It
is the guided soul that is ever-present in its own discourse.50 In Stroud’s sermon, then, it
is understandable if not predictable that she dwells on the details of her life. And, as the
UMC’s characterization of the homosexual subject looms silently on the stage of her life,
the moment when it moves to center stage becomes all the more illuminating. Stroud
confesses her desire for her church to know her as Jesus knows her—the deepest truth of
who she is—and then is compelled to note that that same church has imposed a penance
on this moment of truth-telling. “The most fundamental and essential cost of truth and of
‘truth-telling’ will be borne by the person whose soul has to be guided,”51 Foucault
writes. The sentence is translated from the French in passive voice, and with good
reason. The passive voice denies the “soul that has to be guided” the full empowerment
that should accompany coming out to one’s faith community.
The prohibition of “self-avowed practicing homosexuals” impacts Stroud’s ability
to control her own coming out sermon, but this point should not be overstated. The fact
that she decided to come out to her bishop and to her congregation via a sermon tells us
that she has accepted her sexual identity and overcome to a large degree the
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internalization of homophobia. Indeed, her personal narrative attests to this fact. It also
tells us that Stroud has dwelled on the heterosexist and homophobic policies of her
church and decided that authenticity—being able to give the gift of her whole self, as she
put it—is worth subjecting herself to church discipline and putting her ordination
credentials in jeopardy.
The point is that Stroud’s coming out sermon helps to illustrate the larger, often
unseen impact that these policies have: if the policy could impact someone who was so
comfortable with her lesbian identity and had support from her congregation, imagine,
then, the impact on gay and lesbian ministers and ordinands who do not enjoy that kind
of support and have not yet reached Stroud’s level of self-acceptance. Their voices
cannot testify to the harm the prohibition of homosexual practice has on them because
they feel forced to remain silent. This fact reveals the insidious character of the phrase
“self-avowed”: by framing coming out as an act of confession, it coerces gays and
lesbians to stay closeted while imposing the label incompatible on those who make their
sexual orientation public. Authenticity becomes something to be feared because of the
consequences associated with it. Rose Mary Denman, who was defrocked for being a
“self-avowed practicing homosexual” in the UMC in 1987, discussed in her memoir how,
after she came out to her denomination, a group of closeted lesbian clergy expressed
frustration with her. They feared her act of coming out would threaten their own secrecy
within the church, an idea that was unacceptable to them.52
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Leanne McCall Tigert, who has conducted a great deal of qualitative research
with LGBT Christians, describes this effect as a form of shame. Tigert defines shame as
a form of control—and sexual shame a form of sexual control—that operates through the
constant threat of exposure, “of being seen by others or ourselves in some diminished
way.”53 When shame is pervasive enough, it becomes, in Tigert’s words, toxic. Toxic
shame is when one experiences oneself as fundamentally flawed, a feeling that shapes
one’s core identity. Furthermore—and echoing the claims of body theology—she states,
“Toxic shame is not only a rupture of self with self; perhaps even more significant, it is a
rupture of the self with God.”54 Those gays and lesbians who have courageously come
out in the face of denominational persecution and prosecution have demonstrated the pain
that these policies inflict, but it is not an exaggeration to say that we can only guess at the
true extent of the harm done.
Coming Out as Protest and Resistance
One facet of the coming out experience that has been in the background for much
of this chapter must now be brought to the fore: despite the negative impact that the
language of avowal has on gays and lesbians in the church, those who come out to their
denominations most often do so in defiance of the ordination policies. Coming out is a
form of resistance. Take for example, a salient comment made by Ruth Frost after her
ordination and the ordinations of Jeff Johnson and Phyllis Zillhart. In an interview about
the ordinations and the trial that ended in the suspension of their congregations, Frost
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remarked: “After the ordination and the publicity that surrounded the ordination and the
ecclesial trial, the church no longer controlled who could speak and who would be
heard.”55 Defying these policies makes one subject to church discipline, but it also forces
the church to confront voices of dissent in a very public way. Many members of these
denominations most likely do not track all the events that occur at regional and national
gatherings, but when a clergyperson is tried in a church court, it makes news. And
despite the fact that news today too often consists of sound bytes incapable of
communicating the full force of the clergyperson’s resistance, seeing someone actually
impacted by the policy humanizes the issue even as the legalese of a trial seems to
dehumanize it. As more and more ordinands and clergy come out to their denominations,
it becomes more and more difficult for churches to maintain control over its own rhetoric.
Here, we must recall Foucault’s discussion of power in The History of Sexuality,
for conventional thinking would argue that an act of resistance could not also be a source
of oppression. It must be an either/or, many would say. But Foucault denies the idea that
power is a monolithic thing. Power is everywhere and takes many forms. Oppression
and resistance are not clearly distinguished, diametrically opposed forces, as Hollywood
epics would have us believe. Judith Butler also makes this point, and the way she
approaches the issue is perhaps more helpful. She argues that the resources for resisting
an oppressive power are always impure. You are always working from a
heteronormative way of knowing, and so you are always implicated to some degree in the
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The word “queer” is a germane example of this (my example,

not Butler's). While the word has been reappropriated by the LGBT community as a
positive identity marker, it is still used pejoratively and can stigmatize as well as liberate.
The primary meaning and consequence of the word is determined not only by the person
using it, but also the people who hear it and the community and culture in which it is
spoken. In other words, “queer” signifies both gay pride and gay shame simultaneously.
Similarly, coming out is both a liberating moment for a gay man or lesbian, but
the language of self-avowal carries an intentional effort to strip that experience of some
of its liberating power. In the case of Beth Stroud, for example, her journey of coming
out to her church is known as much for its end result, i.e. being convicted and defrocked,
as it is for representing gay and lesbian resistance. This dissertation, in an effort to
deconstruct the oppressive nature of the language in question, has focused more on how
the phrase “self-avowed practicing homosexual” harms gays and lesbians, but this
oppression is far from the whole of the story. Indeed, the reason the anti-gay ordination
policies of the ELCA and PC (USA) have been revoked is largely due to the courage of
the gays and lesbians in those churches that have come out and spoken against them.
Conclusion: Language, Theological Ethics, and Sexual Subjectivity
The self-avowed practicing homosexual is a construction of the homosexual
subject only possible in modern times, though we have seen many of its characteristics
before. There are striking similarities, for example, between the homosexual that
emerges from mainline Protestant documents and the sodomite, as Mark Jordan
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Jordan also notes that the shift in

Christian speech from the Sodomite to the homosexual demonstrates how churches have
sought to continue to speak about sexed bodies as the state began to take an increasingly
active role in regulating sexuality.58 He is alluding to the invention of the word
“homosexual” and to the relationship between sexual knowledge (leading to sexual
taxonomies) and state regulation that Foucault referred to as biopower. While here is not
the place to develop Jordan’s suggestion in the language of Foucault’s theories of
sexuality as an apparatus of state control, I should point out the simple fact that the term
“homosexual” was not invented by any Christian church. It emerged in the medical and
psychiatric communities and came to classify a form of sexual inversion—whereby the
homosexual is a person with an underlying disorder driving him to desire and have sex
with persons of the same sex. The homosexual arrived in the English vernacular with a
severely compromised sexual agency and, thus, in need of regulation. Churches
appropriated this word, a process that occurred rather seamlessly because the intent of the
churches, like that of the medical community in the early- and mid-twentieth century,
was to regulate persons who exhibit sexual attraction to others of the same sex or gender.
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Of course, the gay rights movement and its predecessor homophile movement
offered a competing narrative of the homosexual, and it is in this tumultuous environment
that American mainline Protestant denominations began crafting their initial responses to
the “problem” of homosexuality. The denominations studied here and their predecessors
sought a fuller understanding of homosexuality, but their overarching goal was clearly
the regulation of homosexuality within their churches. Adding the qualifier “practicing”
to the homosexual was a defensive maneuver. Its purpose was to hold the new political
potency of “homosexual” as an identity marker at arms’ length. The argument goes: The
church accepts (i.e. tolerates) gays and lesbians but must “listen” to the authority of
Scripture, which condemns homosexual acts. But what becomes clear after examining
how the policies that codified this argument have been enforced is that we are still
dealing with the homosexual who suffers from a weakened sexual agency. Thus,
homosexual practice is more than a nebulous constellation of sexual expressions; it is the
superficial marker of a corrupted soul.
And the practicing homosexual is distinctly modern because the qualifier is
deemed necessary. If the denominations studied here had written policies concerning
homosexuality only decades earlier, they might not have found it necessary to distinguish
the practicing homosexual from the non-practicing homosexual. By placing the emphasis
on homosexual practice, these denominations confused the already confusing relationship
between acts and identities. With most sinful longings—say, the longing to hurt someone
physically—the moral agent is taught to reject such a longing because to fulfill it is a sin,
but is not asked to understand oneself as inherently violent. Here, then, there is a clear
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distinction between an action and one’s identity. Because churches label homosexual
practice sinful yet seek to protect the status of being a homosexual, gays and lesbians are
placed in a double-bind. They are not asked to reject their sexual orientation, but are
asked to reject the natural expression of that sexual orientation. Of course, the distinction
between identity and act collapses in upon itself when churches attempt to enforce their
policies, so those gay and lesbian clergy who are technically “non-practicing” are
nevertheless viewed with suspicion in the eyes of the church. It is a theological and
political convolution that mires gays and lesbians in a lose-lose situation. Any gay or
lesbian who tries to reconcile these two things—the interpretation of a homosexual
orientation as morally neutral and the condemnation of homosexual practice as
immoral—is doomed to failure, and this failure is interpreted by the denomination as an
inevitable shortcoming.
The language of avowal demands that gays and lesbians enter this double-bind by
describing themselves in relationship to it. As I’ve argued, self-avowal is a form of
confession. But it is a distinctly modern form of confession given what is being
confessed and the posture of those confessing it. Those clergypersons and ordinands who
avow that they are practicing homosexuals do so with the conviction that they are living a
life compatible with God’s will, and if their denominations label such a life incompatible
with the Christian tradition, then the problem lies with the tradition and/or the
denomination’s interpretation of it. At the same time, the avowal is received by the
denominations as an admission of guilt—and the offense is not a particular act or set of
acts, but being the type of person who might commit such acts. So, while the self-
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avowed practicing homosexual has achieved a high level of personal authenticity, that
feeling of authenticity is mitigated by the fact that the act of coming out has made her a
sex offender in the eyes of church authorities. To complicate this terrain even further, we
find another double-bind related to the language of avowal: the self-avowed practicing
homosexual is a sex offender, and the practicing homosexual who refuses to avow is a
liar.59 Gays and lesbians must choose between the two, and those who come out in the
face of their churches’ stigmatizing label do so because they have the strength and
support to assert their self-understanding over and against how they are understood by
their denominations.
In other words, avowal is a confession predicated on two very different
conceptions of the homosexual subject: the one imposed by the institution and the one
announced by the person coming out. In the context of American mainline Protestantism,
then, gay and lesbian sexual subjectivity consists of negotiating the space that these two
homosexual subjects occupy. To be sure, sexual subjectivity is messy, and negotiating
this space is not an either/or that simply requires a choice of which subject to accept and
which to reject, because these two competing conceptions of the homosexual subject
probably overlap more often than not. Even when one has the strength and support to
assert one’s own positive self-understanding over and against the understanding of
homosexuality imposed by one’s denomination, the latter is still present in many ways.
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And so, the self-avowed practicing homosexual is a morally bankrupt conception
of the homosexual subject produced by the mainline Protestant churches that have
adopted and enforced it. Since the language itself creates an environment where gays and
lesbians cannot live morally exemplary lives in the eyes of their churches, the selfavowed practicing homosexual is a self-fulfilling prophecy: it establishes the very terms
by which gays and lesbians are found culpable and declared to be incompatible with
ordained ministry and the Christian tradition.
By drawing attention to the ways in which this rhetoric operates, I have shown
that the heterosexist policies are themselves incompatible with the understanding of
human sexuality as a good gift from God, and the fact that the PC (USA) and the ELCA
have overturned their policies is a sign that many within these churches are becoming
aware of this contradiction. Even in the UMC, there are signs that people within the
denomination are less supportive of the UMC’s policies and disciplinary bodies are less
willing to enforce them. In June 2011, Amy DeLong, an openly lesbian UMC minister in
Wisconsin, was tried on charges of being a self-avowed practicing homosexual and
performing a same-sex marriage. She was found guilty of the latter and suspended for
twenty days, but was found not guilty of being a self-avowed practicing homosexual by a
vote of 12-1. Many were shocked by the not guilty verdict—there were audible gasps in
the courtroom as the verdict was announced60—because DeLong initiated her disclosure
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of her status as a lesbian in a relationship with another woman and has even registered
her domestic partnership with the state of Wisconsin.61
Of course, we must ask which is truer. Is the rhetoric waning in influence? Or are
the changes more indicative of a shift in the opinion of clergy, who often have a larger
role in shaping and/or voting on changes in policy? Does the rhetoric still hold sway over
the many members of these denominations who are not active in the legislative
processes? Time will tell, but there are some within these churches who would rather
practice the time-honored Protestant tradition of splitting from a church than remain
within a church that welcomes openly gay and lesbian clergy. But even if the rhetoric is
in fact on the decline, it is imperative that institutional acceptance is accompanied by
theological acceptance. Scharen draws attention to this distinction in his study of ELCA
ordination and marriage policies. He applauds the work of groups like Extraordinary
Luther Ministries that have worked to overturn institutional discrimination, but these
efforts are limited in scope without an equally rigorous call for overturning the
heterosexist and homophobic aspects of the theologies that buttress the policies.62
I agree with Scharen, and while space has been made for LGBT ordination and
the blessing of same-sex unions in the ELCA and PC (USA), there also needs to be a
sexual theology that places gays and lesbians on equal footing, anthropologically
speaking, as heterosexuals. In the ELCA’s Human Sexuality: Gift and Trust, for
example, none of the four acceptable positions that the document outlines actually
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expresses full equality for gays and lesbians. Marriage is described as a relationship
between a man and a woman, and the most progressive of the four acceptable positions
on homosexuality does not offer support for same-gender marriage. It states that some
members of the ELCA, on the basis of conscience-bound belief, “believe that the
neighbor and community are best served when same-gender relationships are lived out
with lifelong and monogamous commitments that are held to the same rigorous
standards, sexual ethics, and status as heterosexual marriage.”63 Clearly, the intention is
to describe same-sex unions in similar language as heterosexual marriage, but the title of
marriage is withheld.
Human Sexuality: Gift and Trust does recognize that some within the church
conclude that marriage is the appropriate term to use in describing lifelong monogamous
same-gender relationships, but it does not say that it will include such a view within the
life of the church. Furthermore, it states that such a conclusion “differs from the historic
Christian tradition and the Lutheran Confessions.”64 The significance of this nuance is
that, while homosexual relationships are no longer defined as inherently sinful, they do
not receive the theological standing that heterosexual relationships do. Human Sexuality:
Gift and Trust does not refer to marriage as an order of creation—as we observed in
Helmut Thielicke’s theology, discussed in chapter four—but it does highlight Mark 10:69, which describes marriage as a divinely-ordained institution between a man and a
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woman. And, in any event, the concept of marriage as an order of creation has deep roots
in American Lutheranism.65
The double standard is palpable. While homosexual practice is no longer
prohibited in the ELCA, it still occupies an inferior position within the denomination’s
statement on human sexuality. To be sure, Human Sexuality: Gift and Trust marks an
important step forward for the ELCA and came about through a long process that aimed
to create a more just church for gays and lesbians while at the same time keeping the
denomination from fracturing. But same-gender relationships are still second-class
relationships. They are permitted, and they can even be celebrated in worship. But the
us-them mentality perpetuated by the refusal to grant the term marriage to same-gender
couples testifies to the hold that heterosexism still has on the church.
If gays and lesbians are still seen as existing outside of God’s intentions for
creation, then institutional acceptance is, in reality, institutional tolerance. The difference
between acceptance and tolerance is embodied by the list of qualifiers—lifelong,
monogamous, publicly-accountable—needed in order to make a same-gender relationship
credible. The list is meant to mirror the commitment of marriage, but it also places gays
and lesbians in the position of always having to prove themselves. If a candidate who is
heterosexual states that she or he is married, well, that’s that. No more questions asked.
But because the title “married” is withheld from gays and lesbians, identifying oneself as
having a partner is not sufficient. The ordaining body needs more information. It needs
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some proof that the relationship is worthy. In short, queer relationships are not given the
benefit of the doubt, while heterosexual relationships are.
In the PC (USA), same-sex marriage is also not permitted at present. Gays and
lesbians in partnered relationships are allowed to be ordained, but it is illegal for a
clergyperson to preside over a marriage ceremony for two persons of the same gender. In
2008, a GAPJC decision reveals the importance of challenging the theology of marriage
that defines marriage as a heterosexual institution. The case involved Jane Adams Spahr,
who presided over several wedding ceremonies of same-gender couples in 2004 and
2005. Spahr had been found guilty by a Synod PJC (SPJC) of violating the PC (USA)’s
Constitution and was officially rebuked. The GAPJC overturned the decision of the
SPJC, removing her censure. While the outcome of the case seems positive, the legal
reasoning of the court was deeply offensive. It argued that since the denomination
defines marriages as between a man and a woman, it is not possible that Spahr presided
over a same-gender marriage. The court writes: “By the definition in W-4.9001, a samesex ceremony can never be a marriage. The SPJC found Spahr guilty of doing that which
by definition cannot be done.”66 The GAPJC completely denied the reality of what took
place and asserted, to put it bluntly, that God cannot give a same-sex couple the blessing
of marriage.
Institutional acceptance must be paired with theological acceptance. This analysis
of the self-avowed practicing homosexual has shown how the rhetoric puts forth an
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oppressive conception of the homosexual subject, one that has theological grounding in
addition to (or in collusion with) its grounding in social and cultural prejudices. If we
purge church constitutions, social statements, etc. of references to the self-avowed
practicing homosexual but do not challenge the theological tradition of its deep-seated
homophobia and heterosexism, then these forms of oppression will only manifest
themselves in different ways, couched in different language. Such is the nature of
language. It is manipulable and we must choose our words carefully and in a way that
promotes the abundant life to which Jesus calls us. All of us.
I suspect that we do not yet have the language to describe human sexuality in such
a way. Our vocabulary is so structured by our obsession over the gender of the objects of
our desire that it may be some time before we have the right language. If that is the case,
I suspect it will be queer theologians and ethicists creating the lexicon. As a
heterosexual, I frequently find that it is the arguments and testimonies of LGBT persons
that shock me out of my heteronormative way of thinking, and they may well provide the
theological and ethical ideas that shape how we as Christians think about and value the
sexual diversity found among all of God’s children.
For now, though, there is plenty of work to be done deconstructing the many
manifestations of homophobia and heterosexism within the Christian tradition that harm
how gays and lesbians are viewed by the church, wider society, and, most tragically, by
themselves. This is the necessary first step. As Didier Eribon writes, “It is only in
becoming conscious of the determinisms that shape conscious and unconscious minds
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that individuals can come to constitute themselves as ‘subjects,’ as their own subjects.”67
May we one day have the theological and moral language—and a church willing to speak
it and live by it—that allows everyone to discover their own subjectivity as persons made
in the image of God.
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